WHAT\u27S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC ENHANCEMENT: A SECOND LOOK AT OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE by TOBEY, DANIEL L
Yale Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 6
Issue 1 Yale Journal of Law and Technology Article 2
2004
WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC
ENHANCEMENT: A SECOND LOOK AT
OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE
DANIEL L. TOBEY
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
DANIEL L. TOBEY, WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC ENHANCEMENT: A SECOND LOOK AT OUR
POSTHUMAN FUTURE, 6 Yale J.L. & Tech (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol6/iss1/2
ARTICLE
WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC
ENHANCEMENT: A SECOND LOOK AT OUR
POSTHUMAN FUTURE
DANIEL L. TOBEY*
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 56
II. THE POSSIBILITIES OF GENETIC ENHANCEMENT .................... 57
III. How TO EVALUATE NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORIES ............. 60
IV. THE HUMAN BOUNDARY: A CLOSER LOOK AT FUKUYAMA .... 68
A . N ATURAL RIGHTS ........................................................... 69
B . FA CTOR X ....................................................................... 72
1. CIRCULARITY AND INCOMPLETENESS ......................... 73
2. CONTINUUMS VERSUS GROUPS .................................. 75
3. CAPACITY FOR W HAT ............................................... 78
C. GENETICS AND FACTOR X ............................................... 81
D. FINAL THOUGHTS ON OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE .............. 87
V. GENETICS, LAW, AND ECONOMICS ....................................... 90
A. COSTS W E W ON'T CONSIDER .......................................... 94
B. COSTS WE ARE NOT ALLOWED TO CONSIDER .................. 95
C. COSTS OF THE MARKET MECHANISM .............................. 97
VI. NOT HUMAN BOUNDARIES, BUT HUMAN ESSENCE ................. 103
A. Two VIEWS OF HUMAN LIFE ............................................ 106
B. THE PERFECTIONIST VIEW ................................................ 110
1. THE ARISTOTELIAN VIEW OF
ACCOMPLISHMENT AND VIRTUE ................................. 113
2. AN ALTERNATE VIEW OF
ACCOMPLISHMENT AND VIRTUE ................................. 116
3. GENETICS AND THE ARISTOTELIAN VIEW .................... 120
4. GENETICS AND THE DYNAMIC TENSION VIEW ............. 123
5. OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT AND RESPONSES ........ 126
6. SUMMARY OF THE PERFECTIONIST ACCOUNT .............. 128
* AB Harvard College; JD Yale Law School. An earlier version of
this article received the 2003 Benjamin Scharps Prize and the 2003 Margaret Gruter
Prize from the Yale Law School. The author studies medicine at the University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center. He would like to thank his family and Robert
Burt.
1
TOBEY: WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
WHAT'S REALLY WRONG
C . THE LIBERAL VIEW .......................................................... 128
1. Two VIEWS OF LIBERALISM ........................................ 129
2. DIGNITARY LIBERALISM ............................................. 130
(a) D IGNITY D EFINED ................................................ 131
(b) WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO PROTECT? ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3. DIGNITARY LIBERALISM AND
GENETIC ENHANCEMENT ........................................... 135
4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHIFT
TO THE PREFERENCE-BASED VIEW .............................. 136
5. CONTRACTUAL LIBERALISM
AND GENETIC ENHANCEMENT .................................... 141
D. SUMMARY OF THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE ............................. 143
E. THE POSTMODERN RESPONSE ........................................... 144
F. SUMMARY: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
TAKES US FROM THICK TO THIN HUMANITY .................... 147
G. LAW AND ECONOMICS REVISITED ..................................... 148
H . FUKUYAMA REVISITED ..................................................... 149
VII. POLICY: ENHANCEMENT VERSUS HEALING ............................ 150
A. FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE BASIS FOR REGULATING
ENHANCEM ENT ............................................................... 150
B. NEED FOR A PRACTICAL STANDARD ................................. 152
C. ENHANCEMENT VERSUS THERAPY .................................... 153
1. NORMAL VERSUS ABNORMAL ...................................... 154
2. DISEASE VERSUS NON-DISEASE .................................... 156
D. FUNCTIONALIZING ENHANCEMENT VERSUS THERAPY ....... 157
E. THE CATEGORIES SHAPE THE PERCEPTIONS ...................... 158
V III. C ON CLU SION ......................................................................... 159
D. TOBEY
2
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol6/iss1/2
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC
ENHANCEMENT: A SECOND LOOK AT OUR
POSTHUMAN FUTURE
DANIEL L. TOBEY
This Article presents the case against genetic enhancement. It begins
with a critique of Fukuyama's highly publicized work on enhancement. It then
reconstructs the case for regulation, arguing that enhancement will undermine
the most basic and universal sources of meaning and well-being in human life.
The Article pays special attention to the law and economics scholarship,
holding that the economic method will not detect certain types of harm to the
human genome. The essay concludes with a policy solution that will preserve
the benefits of genetic therapy while avoiding the harms of genetic
enhancement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Should we allow ourselves to enhance the human species
genetically? Answering no is surprisingly difficult. Many of us who
oppose enhancement, often passionately, cannot express a secular
theory of what exactly is at stake. Lauren Slater tells the story of a
roomful of doctors at a bioethics convention who were paralyzed by
one speaker, a physician who wanted to offer his patients wings.
Everyone felt that something was deeply wrong, yet no one could give
a satisfying account of what it was.1
Francis Fukuyama offers one explanation in his recent work,
Our Posthuman Future. Fukuyama argues that genetic enhancement will
undermine our system of human rights by disrupting the boundary that
encloses all humans in a single group. Fukuyama concludes that we
should limit genetic science to allow therapy but prohibit
"enhancement" or non-therapeutic procedures.2
1 Lauren Slater, Dr. Daedalus, HARPERS, July 2001, at 57. I use this
story for its metaphorical value. The physician in question is a plastic surgeon who
imagined a mechanical, not genetic, intervention. Genetic enhancement will, in the
short run, be more concerned with improving present traits such as intelligence,
personality, and strength, as I describe below. However, this anecdote captures quite
lyrically the ambivalence towards biomedical enhancement and our difficulty
articulating it.
2 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE (2003).
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While Fukuyama should be applauded for bringing attention to
the issue, I will argue that he has reached the right conclusion for the
wrong reasons - and that a stronger foundation for these principles
must be built. I will argue that Fukuyama's emphasis on the human
boundary is problematic, and that his theory, even if true, still would
not capture the full range of harms of genetic enhancement. The real
issue, I will argue, is not a challenge to human boundaries and human
rights, but rather to the most basic sources of meaning and well-being
in human life, what I will later refer to and defend as the human
essence. I will distinguish this perspective from Fukuyama's and show
how it provides a stronger basis for legislating against genetic
enhancement while allowing genetic therapy. I will also suggest a
solution to the puzzle described above: genetic enhancement is
difficult to indict, because it appears to advance the precise human
values it ultimately erodes.
This essay pays special critical attention to the law and
economics scholarship. Genetics has generated irrational fear in the
law as well as public opinion, and the law and economics scholars
have been vital in deflating much of the genetic hyperbole. Yet the
goal of this essay is to give voice to a rational fear that is difficult to
articulate, one that I believe will be underestimated by the influential
law and economics school. The human essence is not easily quantified,
and I will attempt to show that the economic methodology, in both its
descriptive and normative form, will be incapable of describing the full
harms of genetic enhancement.3 Yet it is precisely the existential
nature of the claim that makes it both elusive and worth the effort.
II. THE POSSIBILITIES OF GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
Genetic modification is a shorthand way of saying that science
may allow us to control and select certain (1) physical attributes and
(2) internal qualities of mind and character. Genetic enhancement
involves modifications for "non-therapeutic" or "non-medical"
reasons. The distinction between therapy and enhancement is complex
and a source of considerable debate. We will take up this issue at the
end of the essay.
3 The terms descriptive and normative will appear frequently in this
essay. As much will turn on them, I will define them here. Descriptive (also, positive)
analysis seeks to build "a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is."
Normative analysis, by contrast, seeks to build "a body of systematized knowledge
discussing criteria of what ought to be." JOHN NEVILLE KEYNES, THE SCOPE AND
METHOD OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 34-35, 46 (Macmillan and Co. 1891). This
distinction, common in economics and philosophy, is often referred to as the
difference between the is and the ought.
D. TOBEY
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Genetic enhancement can potentially affect a broad range of
features: everything from physical qualities such as height, weight,
appearance, strength, and agility to behavioral qualities including
intelligence, creativity, mood, personality, and passion. Currently,
genetic screening is possible; physicians using in vitro fertilization can
select for the presence or absence of known genetic traits prior to
implantation, a process now used to prevent inheritance of genetic
disease. What lies on the horizon is the question of genetic
modification rather than simple screening: actually setting the palette
of qualities one's child or even, potentially, one's self will possess (the
former and the latter pose different ethical considerations, which we
will consider later).
There is much debate over what will be possible and when.
This essay will not address questions of technical possibility. Rather, I
will present the idea of enhancement and consider its consequences.
Ethical considerations are often postponed because technical
accomplishment appears distant. As such, science proceeds
incrementally, and small but cumulative changes may be accepted
without a realization of the larger trends. At the same time,
unexpected advances can place abilities ahead of ethical preparation.
The result of both trends is to end up in a place we might not like,
without a clear sense of how we let ourselves get there. This essay
offers a prospective framework to guide the development of genetic
science.
The benefits of enhancement are potentially vast. I will describe
the most optimistic scenario, in order to grant enhancement its
strongest case. In addition to new treatments for disease, genetic
modification may allow us to decrease suffering in other ways. For
example, to the extent that success and material well-being are due to
talents and abilities, genetic enhancement may allow us to reduce the
4 For example, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) is used
today for parents at high risk of passing on genetic disease. PGD involves in vitro
fertilization, followed by the implantation of only those embryos that lack the
disease-causing genotype. Physicians have applied PGD to prevent inheritance of at
least 50 genetic conditions, including early-onset Alzheimer's and some familial
cancers. See Yury Verlinsky et al., Preimplantation Diagnosis for Early-Onset Alzheimer
Disease Caused by V717L Mutation, 287 JAMA 1018 (2002). In theory, PGD could be
used to screen for any trait, disease or otherwise, and debates are already forming at
the margins. There are parents desiring sex selection for nonmedical reasons and, in
anticipation of future research, debates over sexual orientation selection. As more
and more non-disease traits, such as intelligence and athleticism, are understood
genetically, the demand for enhancement is likely to increase. See e.g., The Ethics
Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Sex Selection and
Preimplantation Diagnosis, 72 FERTIL STERIL 595-98 (1999); Udo Schuklenk et al., The
Ethics of Genetic Research on Sexual Orientation, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN
MEDICINE 522 (John D. Arras and Bonnie Steinbock eds., 5th ed. 1999).
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"different and unequal faculties of acquiring property" that give rise to
vast inequality.5 The gifts of athletic, intellectual, and creative ability,
currently available only to the genetically lucky, may one day be more
egalitarian in their distribution. On the societal level, efficiency and
productivity would be increased as a function of enhanced human
capital. And on the personal level, sources of confidence and
happiness, such as height, weight, eye color, personality, and more
may be within one's control. We might even imagine an earth where
Einsteins, Shakespeares, and Mozarts come around more often than
once in several lifetimes. A number of scientists have already
considered ways to imbue humans with abilities that are currently
reserved to other species or even to the imagination, an act that would
increase the possibilities of human life and the freedoms we have for
self-expression and determination.6
Yet enhancement raises questions, too. Enhancement is in part
a question of identity. What does it mean, for example, to have the
ability to select qualities that are not currently a matter of choice? At
the extremes, enhancement is also a question of boundaries. It
implicates the mental and physical properties that separate humans
from non-humans.
Finally, I should note that many of these issues are not
confined to genetics. The frontiers of plastic surgery, pharmacology,
neuroscience, and biotechnology raise many of the same questions. In
fact, some forms of enhancement will be more easily achieved through
these alternate routes. Thus, such methods are equally critical, and my
analysis applies to them as well. However, genetics is the issue of the
day, in its salience and familiarity; it provides a scaffold for the
analysis of enhancement, and we will use it here as a starting point for
discussion.
5 James Madison quoted in FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 149. Of
course, plenty of theorists have also noted that genetic enhancement will be
expensive, and if it is accessible only to the rich, genetic enhancement could lead to
vastly increased inequality. Yet this is a question of the application of the technology
and how we regulate it not an inherent consequence of the technology itself.
Therefore, if at the end of this essay the only harm of genetic enhancement in the
reader's mind is increased inequality, then one could argue that we should allow it
but insure its accessibility across income groups. Since I will be arguing that there are
intrinsic harms of genetic enhancement, however, I will argue instead for prohibition,
not fair distribution.
6 See Slater, supra note 1, at 57.
D. TOBEY
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Ill. HOW TO EVALUATE NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORIES
Before we consider the moral theory set forward by Fukuyama,
it is necessary to ask, how does one evaluate a moral theory?
Immanuel Kant argued that morality would be self-executing; that is,
any rational being who deliberated on moral questions would
ultimately come to the same result (namely, his). Therefore, all
rational beings should find themselves bound to that theory by mutual
acceptance.' Two hundred years and several thousand dissertations
later, Kant's prediction on consensus has not played out exactly as
hoped. Nevertheless, many recent philosophers have shared this view
that consensus can provide a positive test for ethical theories: in some
way, by the faculties of intuition or reasonableness, we will know the
correct moral philosophy when we see it.
And yet consensus remains elusive. Habermas, who is often
credited with rescuing the enlightenment notion of objective moral
theory from its postmodern critics, has argued that the best we can
hope for is consensus among small communities bound by shared
social lives - little islands of enlightenment objectivity floating in a sea
of relativism.' However, to many minds, this is a bit like gaining
consensus by counting only those votes that agree with you.
Richard Posner offers an alternative method for evaluating
moral theories. Posner argues that we cannot devise a positive test to
prove moral theories, because moral theories, unlike scientific ideas,
cannot be tested empirically. Therefore, Posner concludes that a
negative test is the best we can hope for. While we cannot positively
determine a "best" moral theory, we can screen out unacceptable ones.
Posner writes: "an ethical theory cannot really be validated
but.. .it can be rejected on one of three grounds."9 These grounds are
(1) that the theory fails to satisfy basic logical requirements of
consistency, completeness, and the like, (2) that it produces moral
answers contrary to "widely shared ethical intuitions," or (3) that any
7 Kant wrote that a rational being will follow the moral imperatives
only if they are generated via the individual's reason: "It must regard itself as the
author of its principles independently of alien influences." IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 65 (Yale University Press 2002)
(1785).
8 See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION VOLUME 2 126 (Thomas McCarthy trans. 1987).
9 Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 111.
2003-2004
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society following the theory would fail in competition with societies
following other theories. 10
What do we think of these criteria? Posner notes that factor (3)
is "very controversial," though in the present article he does not
elaborate. No doubt, the controversy is partly because this factor
equates the value of a moral theory with its Darwinian fitness: how
would a society following such a theory do in competition with other
societies? I do not wish to argue that Darwinian fitness is not a morally
relevant value. I will remain agnostic on that point for now. What I
will argue, however, is that by imposing this idea as an exogenous
condition by which we accept or reject a moral theory, Posner has
effectively removed the condition itself from moral evaluation. It
becomes a rule of the game rather than one of the pieces in play. How
can we evaluate the morality of Darwinian fitness as compared to
other values if we are told that Darwinian fitness is a threshold
condition by which we can reject a moral theory all together?
Of course, the same can be said of any threshold condition.
However, what makes this particular threshold condition suspect is
that many values are in direct conflict with competitive advantage, and
yet many individuals would, using their "widely shared ethical
intuition," argue that the anti-competitive values are ethically superior.
The liar may excel in business and drive others out of work. The
ruthless law firm may succeed over the timid or pro bono oriented. The
doctor who treats only rich patients and rejects the poor will earn more
money and run a more competitive practice. The nation which is
internally stable yet externally bellicose may appropriate the most
geopolitical power. In all of these instances, many people would wish
to consider these competitive advantages against other values. The
doctor who treats only the rich may soon gain the competitive
advantage, but we may not wish to dub him ethically superior. As I
said, the point is not to argue that these competitive individuals are
morally wrong or even to assess the moral worth of competitive
advantage. The point is to argue that the controversy alone is enough
to disqualify competitive advantage as a threshold condition and
10 In his own words, the three criteria upon which a theory may be
rejected are "first, that the theory fails to meet certain basic formal requirements of
adequacy, such as logical consistency, completeness, definiteness, and the like;
second, that the theory yields precepts sharply contrary to widely shared ethical
intuitions precepts such as that murder is in general a good thing or that a sheep is
normally entitled to as much consideration as a man; or third, that a society which
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relegate it to its proper place, as one value among many to be judged
and balanced by the ethical theory.11
Posner would probably respond that I am making too much out
of competitive advantage. The theory need not be the most
competitive; it need only be able to meet the threshold condition of not
going out of business. In other words, it must be able to exist
indefinitely in equilibrium with other theories. If someone following a
theory cannot survive, then it is not a valid theory, and perhaps that is
all that Posner means by this factor. I have two responses. The first is
that, if this is all that is meant by Factor (3), then we have reduced
Factor (3) to a very thin version: a theory is invalid if following it
means suicide. Note that even when I phrase it that way, in its thinnest
form, it is not uncontestable. We could imagine situations in which
moral action would require competitively suicidal action. 
12
The second response is that Factor (3), even in this thin form,
contains an asymmetry. It is asymmetric to assume that if the theory
fails, then it is the theory that was deficient. The other logical
possibility is that the theory was indeed ethically superior, and it is the
other, dominant theories that are to blame for out-competing the
ethically superior theory (rather than adopting the ethically superior
theory themselves). Recognizing this asymmetry requires uncoupling
the ethical value and competitive value of the theory, which is, after
all, the point of the argument. In other words, it is not hard to imagine
that the ethically superior theory may die off in competition with
unethical actors. That is the bind of morality: it does not always "pay
off." If it did, there would be nothing hard about being moral. Rather
than rejecting the theory, however (which is the side of the asymmetry
adopted by Posner), we might instead see an obligation to enforce
conditions which allow that ethically superior theory to survive.
11 One may construct examples which say that "the liar always gets
caught in the end," so honest behavior is actually competitively superior. However,
these can be answered with examples in which the savvy liar is not caught and the
nice guy does indeed finish last. This becomes a battle of the anecdotes, and we are
left with an empirical debate. Nevertheless, the mere fact that reasonable scenarios
exist in which ethically superior behavior is anti-competitive is enough to disqualify
competitiveness as a threshold condition.
12 The most extreme example is self-sacrifice. Some would argue that
the sacrificing of one's own life for another is a moral act, and yet its value, in terms
of survival fitness, is zero. I would imagine that Posner's response might be that
moral theories should be evaluated not on the level of the individual, but on the
societal level. As such, an act of self-sacrifice may have a fitness value of zero for the
individual, but it may mean a great deal of fitness value for the society. Such a theory
may be found in E.O. Wilson's work on kin selection. The question of scale is a good
one: on what level do you evaluate whether a theory passes factor (3)?
2003-2004
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To demonstrate this point, let us apply an "ethical" analysis to
the familiar Prisoner's Dilemma scenario.13 Let us assume for this
example that our widely shared ethical intuition is that Cooperation is
the ethically superior strategy in the single-game Prisoner's Dilemma.
However, the familiar moral of the Prisoner's Dilemma story is that in
a single-game scenario, Cooperation is a dominated strategy and will
not win in a competitive environment - unless there is an external
enforcement mechanism which can coordinate the two players and
ensure that they both cooperate when they say they will. By analogy to
our discussion of Factor (3), the third party coordinator is the other
side of the asymmetry that Posner's factor does not explore. If a theory
is ethically superior but dominated in a competitive environment, then
perhaps the solution is for society to adopt mechanisms (criminal law,
contracts, police) which coordinate ethical behavior and allow the
ethically superior strategy to survive.
To take the analogy one step further, the Prisoner's Dilemma
has also been subjected to multiple-game interactions using a so-called
genetic algorithm. A genetic algorithm (GA) is a computer program
which simulates the conditions of evolution. To design a GA, you
encode the rules of the game, and then you allow a number of different
strategies to compete over several rounds. Strategies appear in the next
round ("reproduce") with a frequency proportionate to their "fitness,"
which is a measure of how well the strategy performed in the previous
round. In addition, these strategies will cross-breed and mutate, giving
rise to spontaneous, new strategies. Under the Prisoner's Dilemma
conditions, it has been shown that one strategy will evolve over time as
the superior strategy, and given enough iterations, it will out-perform
all other strategies until it is the only one left. This strategy is known as
Tit-for-Tat. In it, the first move is Cooperate (C), and from that point
forward, it does whatever its opponent did in the previous round. The
success of this strategy has been attributed to its punishment of bad
13 For those not familiar, the Prisoner's Dilemma is a game theory
scenario that has become widely popular due to the number of diverse, real-world
scenarios for which it provides insight. In the game, we imagine two prisoners in
different rooms. Each has a choice: he may cooperate with the other prisoner (C) by
not talking, or he may defect (D) and rat out his fellow prisoner. If both players
cooperate (C,C), they each get 3 points. If both defect, they each get 1. But if one
cooperates while the other defects, the defector gets a good deal (say, 5 points), while
the cooperator gets the boot (say, 0 points). The point which is commonly drawn
from this scenario is that while everyone would have been better off had they
cooperated, the rational strategy in a single-game scenario is to defect, because the
costs of getting ratted out are too high. Therefore, no cooperation will occur in a
single-game scenario unless there is an outside controller who can coordinate the two
prisoner's decisions and enforce their mutual cooperation. This model has proved
useful in analyzing situations ranging from nuclear arms races to wearing protective
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behavior (an opponent's Defection (D) in round n yields a D from Tit-
for-Tat in round n+1), combined with its forgiving character (once the
opponent switches back to C, Tit-for-Tat will follow suit in the next
round).
From an ethical perspective, we might compare Tit-for-Tat to
Hammurabi's Code: both encompass the idea of "an eye for an eye."
We might imagine other strategies, like All-C (cooperate no matter
what the opponent does), which relate more to the ethic of "turn the
other cheek."
The point is not to argue which of these theories is ethically
superior. The point is that, under Posner's Factor (3), all ethical theories
but one would be rejected out of hand at the threshold. This is because, in the
GA scenario (which simulates competitive equilibrium) only Tit-for-
Tat survives in the absence of external, third-party coordination of
players. By Posner's Factor (3), this apparently "solves" the question
of morality for this scenario, though many individuals would object to
both the inability to compare Tit-for-Tat to other ethical theories on
their substantive merits and to the decision not to employ third-party
external controls to allow other, perhaps ethically superior theories to
survive.
Why spend so much time on such a technical issue? The
answer is that Factor (3) has a great deal to say about genetic
engineering, and in particular about genetic enhancement of the
human species. Assume that in the next two centuries, genetic
engineering will allow us to increase human intelligence, strength, and
other competitive qualities. A society which disallows genetic
enhancement will almost certainly fail over time in competition with
societies that do allow enhancement.
Thus, if we accept Posner's Factor (3), it would likely be the
case that an ethical theory that bans genetic enhancement is
automatically rejectable. This is a vibrant example of the point I
introduced at the beginning of this discussion: by making competitive
value a threshold condition, we improperly remove from moral
inspection actions like genetic enhancement, which may hold both
tremendous competitive value and tremendous ethical implications.
Accordingly, this is an issue I will return to later in the essay.
So what do we think of Factor (2)? Here, Posner says that we
should reject a moral theory if "the theory yields precepts sharply
contrary to widely shared ethical intuitions - precepts such as that
murder is in general a good thing or that a sheep is normally entitled to
as much consideration as a man."
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Posner does not identify this criterion as controversial, as he did
with Factor (3), but I believe it would have been appropriate to do so.
Humans have been formulating theological moral theories for over
four thousand years and secular ones for two thousand. And yet the
majority of humans have only rejected slavery as a moral harm in the
past one hundred or so years. In colonial America, a majority of
citizens felt that slaves were subhuman and were undeserving of equal
moral consideration. Only a small, enlightened minority felt otherwise.
Therefore, according to Factor (2), if I proposed a moral theory in
1776 which rejected slavery, we would have to reject the theory,
because it produced results "sharply contrary to widely shared ethical
intuitions." If I proposed the same theory today, it would pass Factor
(2).
Was that anti-slavery ethical theory wrong then but right today?
If we reject this result, then Factor (2) fails as a test, and we must
discard it. However, suppose we accept this result, and say "yes, the
anti-slavery ethical theory was wrong in 1776 but correct now because
widely shared beliefs have changed." Then we are left with a severely
crippled notion of what a moral theory is. In this case, the cart would
be leading the horse, and Factor (2) has reduced acceptable ethical
theories to those which tell us only what we have already accepted and
absorbed into intuition.14 Such a moral theory is of little use. It can, at
best, help us reason by analogy to similar moral dilemmas: if we know
A is morally wrong, and B is a matter of new inspection for which we
have no intuition, then if we can say that B is the same as A, we can
say that B is also wrong. Yet we did not need a theory to tell us this.
And further, such a theory has two fundamental deficiencies. First, it
lacks the a priori, intransigent nature which gives the traditional
understanding of morality force. Second, it cannot lead us on moral
issues, using the power of reason and logic to force society into
uncomfortable moral advances that go against settled intuition (as
most moral advances have traditionally done, from slavery to the de-
subordination of women). Thus, a theory which states A can guide us
on B, but it does not help at all for issue C, an issue where morality
and the intuition of the moment conflict.
Similarly, there is also the question of scale in confronting
Factor (2). How wide is "widely shared"? Do we mean widely shared
among a family, a town, a state, a nation, or among all humans?
Suppose the world is composed of two nations of equal size that differ
on the moral question of X. One nation's widely shared ethical
intuition favors X, while the other nation's intuition favors Not X.
14 This is the case with the examples Posner cites, such as 'murder is
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Factor (2) does not allow us to adopt a theory that arbitrates between
these two positions. Any theory that satisfies Factor (2) for one nation
must fail it for the other. Whose widely shared ethical intuition do we
favor? Or must we allow the two nations to hold inconsistent moral
theories, thus opening the door to cultural relativism: child sacrifice is
allowed in one nation and reviled in the other. This is the trap of
intuitionism: intuition is contingent, relative, and culturally and
historically determined. Now, of course the examples Posner gives us,
(a) murder is good and (b) sheep should have equal rights to persons,
might seem absurd in any era. But that is precisely the problem: a
moral theory wins no points for telling us only what we already know.
As Owen Fiss has written: "It is not the job of the oracle to tell people
- whether it be persons on the street or critical moralists - what they
already believe."15
Once again, while the discussion of Factor (2) may seem
technical, it is critically relevant to genetic engineering. Returning to
the paradox laid out at the beginning of the essay, intuition is the main
popular method of rejecting genetic enhancement. We seem to have a
sneaking suspicion that something is wrong with controlling many of
our own features or those of our offspring. The question remains: is
this visceral opinion on genetic engineering more like our centuries-
long rejection of murder or our centuries-long acceptance of slavery?
When intuition is sometimes very wrong, one wonders how Posner
can use it as a threshold disqualifier of moral theories.
This is a particularly relevant question in bioethics, where
intuitions change frequently and rapidly with new technologies. Some
technologies that our intuitions initially reject (violently) can quickly
become an accepted part of our moral intuition. For example, Leon
Kass, who serves as chair of President Bush's bioethics committee, has
said of in vitro fertilization: "Today, one must even apologize for
voicing opinions that twenty-five years ago were nearly universally
regarded as the core of our culture's wisdom on these matters."16
Often, our bioethical intuitions slide in the other direction, when a
medical action is initially perceived as harmless but later garners moral
repulsion. A famous example is the destigmatization of mental illness,
which has led our intuitions to reject practices towards the mentally ill
once considered perfectly permissible. Ironically, in an article on
cloning, even Posner notes the slipperiness of intuition in bioethics -
its lack of helpfulness as a guide:
15 Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. READER 107, 150 (1976).
16 Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
June 2, 1997, at 17.
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Nor do we attempt to factor into our analysis the sheer
'weirdness' of human cloning, a consideration that
might be thought to depress the demand. Not only is this
consideration analytically intractable, but it is probably
only transitional. A product or service that is new and
rare tends to be thought weird, and its diffusion is
resisted. But if it is a source of potentially substantial net
benefits, its use will spread, and when some critical mass
is reached the aversion will drop away and a more rapid
diffusion begin.17
Given that our initial intuitions often betray us relative to our later
moral opinions (in both directions) - and that this is particularly the
case in bioethics, where intuitions swing widely over short time
periods - it seems that Posner's criteria of rejecting theories that
conflict with our immediate intuitions may be unhelpful.
As I have said, I believe that our initial intuition on genetic
enhancement is correct, and that genetic enhancement is something we
will want to limit over the long run. However, I need something more
than intuition to demonstrate this.
Where are we, then? If we reject Factors (2) and (3), or at least
raise enough doubt to temporarily disable them as threshold bars, then
we are left with Factor (1). But this is a low bar indeed. A theory need
only meet basic formal logical criteria of completeness, definiteness,
etc., and if it does so, we can say no more about it. In other words, all
we can do is reject moral theories that do not make sense.
It is much easier to attack theories than to build new ones, and
I do not have a solution to the ancient problem of evaluating
normative theories. However, two important points come out of the
discussion in this section. First, if I am to reject Fukuyama's theory,
then it must be on the difficult bar set by Factor (1): i.e., demonstrating
that the theory fails analytic soundness. Second, if I have succeeded in
disabling Posner's other two factors, then I have gone a long way in
preventing Posner and the law and economics school from prejudging
the moral debate on genetic enhancement by packing their normative
assumptions into the threshold criteria for theory-disqualification.
17 Eric A. Posner & Richard A. Posner, The Demand for Human
Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 579, 580 (1999).
D. TOBEY
14
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol6/iss1/2
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
IV. THE HUMAN BOUNDARY: A CLOSER LOOK AT FUKUYAMA
In Our Posthuman Future, Fukuyama sets out to identify the
dangers of genetic engineering. This is a difficult task for two reasons.
First, the worst case scenarios of genetic engineering often
resemble science fiction visions of the future. As such, these
consequences seem distant enough that people delay serious attention.
In the interim, progress continues incrementally, which may reduce
our ability to draw lines later. Second, the potential harms of genetic
engineering are not of the kind that can be easily quantified and
weighed against benefits. As such, they tend to be dismissed,
reflexively, by law and economics theorists: i.e., how does one
measure "loss of moral structure" or "diminution of meaning" in a
cost-benefit analysis? The implicit assumption is that, if a factor does
not fit into a wealth maximization calculus, then it is somehow not a
serious factor. The irony of this position is that it is often the most
important values that are least quantifiable.18
Therefore, Fukuyama should be applauded for taking on this
important and difficult task. Nevertheless, I believe a stronger
foundation can be laid for his conclusions, and we must consider the
shortcomings of Fukuyama's thesis in order to build this stronger case.
To understand Fukuyama's position, I will divide his argument
into five parts. First, Fukuyama defends a particular view of morality
that suggests humans possess natural rights. Second, Fukuyama argues
that these rights derive from something unique to humans, which he
calls Factor X. As the basis of natural human rights, Factor X is
something shared by all humans and lacked by all non-humans. Third,
Fukuyama argues that genetic engineering threatens to undermine
Factor X, which will in turn undermine our moral system of natural
rights. Fourth, Fukuyama concludes that as a bioethical and legal
principle, we must limit biotechnology when it threatens to undermine
Factor X. Fifth, Fukuyama presents a number of bioethical
proscriptions based on the above principle of safeguarding Factor X.
Foremost among these, Fukuyama argues that we must codify the
distinction between therapy and enhancement, allowing the former but
not the latter.
18 The Law and Economics response to this statement is that all
values, no matter how intangible, can be valued in the economic utility function.
Gary Becker has built models quantifying, among other things, love and marriage.
Later in this paper, I will return to this issue and take up the question of whether all
values can be placed into a utility maximization calculation. See, e.g., GARY BECKER,
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
2003-2004
15
TOBEY: WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
WHAT'S REALLY WRONG
These analytic steps provide the basis for Fukuyama's
conclusion: "What is it that we want to protect from any future
advances in biotechnology? The answer is, we want to protect the full
range of our complex, evolved natures against attempts at self-
modification. We do not want to disrupt either the unity or the
continuity of human nature, and thereby the human rights that are
based on it."19 In simpler terms, Fukuyama is concerned with
preserving the boundary that circumscribes all humans into a single
category, which he describes as the "unity" and "continuity" of human
nature. Importantly, this boundary is not valuable per se to Fukuyama,
at least not in his stated argument. Rather, the human boundary has
instrumental value as the basis for human rights.
From the outset, this framework raises a number of questions.
What is Factor X, and can Fukuyama provide us with a compelling
account of it? Is the human boundary truly necessary for moral rights,
as Fukuyama asserts? Does a ban on actions threatening the human
boundary necessarily lead us to a ban on enhancement?
To address these questions, we will now consider the argument
in a little more detail.
A. NATURAL RIGHTS
Fukuyama defends one particular conception of morality over
other theories. Fukuyama begins by noting the major split in moral
philosophy between utilitarian theories, where all values are weighed
on a scale against other values, and rights-based theories, where
certain values trump others no matter the consequences. Fukuyama
then defends a particular conception of rights-based morality (natural
rights) over two other rights-based theories (divine rights and positive
rights).2" The principal question dividing these theories is, what is the
source of rights? Divine rights would come from God, natural rights
would come from human nature, and positive rights are created
through democratic, constitutional decision-making. As Fukuyama
describes it, natural rights theory holds that we can identify the moral
rights that humans deserve by looking at human nature. Fukuyama
admits that natural rights theory has largely fallen out of favor,
replaced by positive rights theory. Nevertheless, Fukuyama wishes to
resurrect this philosophy.
19 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 172.
20 See id. at Ch.7.
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Fukuyama's account of natural rights is problematic. He moves
fluidly and interchangeably between two very different assertions: first,
that humans deserve natural rights because of something special about
humans, and second, that we can tell what morality is by looking at
human nature. The first assertion is problematic because Fukuyama
bases his entire bioethical argument concerning genetics on the human
boundary - a boundary that philosophers and ethicists have found
infuriatingly troublesome. This reliance on the human boundary gives
his larger genetics thesis a shaky foundation, which is a point we will
consider in some detail later. The second assertion, that we can tell
something about morality by looking at human nature, is similarly
problematic. In the first place, looking to human nature undermines
Fukuyama's very first contention that we should discard utilitarianism
in favor of deontological, rights-based morality. Casual observation, as
well as the best current neurological research, tells us that humans tend
to make moral decisions by a combination of utilitarian and rights-
based thinking. 21 Furthermore, much of human nature is not very nice.
If natural rights theory tells us that we should take our moral cues from
what humans tend to do, we are given no methodology to distinguish
between the good things they do and the bad. If humans tend to have
wars, does this mean that the natural rights theory tells us war is
moral?
Fukuyama acknowledges this problem, but his answer does not
satisfy.22 He gives us something akin to Posner's third factor when he
writes: "Violence, in other words, may be natural to human beings, but
so is the propensity to control and channel violence. These conflicting
natural tendencies do not have equal status or priority. Human beings
reasoning about their situation can come to understand the need to
create rules and institutions that constrain violence in favor of other
natural ends, such as the desire for property and gain, that are more
fundamental., 23 In other words, if human beings enter into
competitive equilibriums that balance their drives for combat and
wealth accumulation, then Fukuyama says we have thus identified
morality. This view, like Posner's, draws heavily on sociobiology and
game theory. The irony here is that, while Posner is direct and tells us
there is no ought (so we should concentrate on the is), Fukuyama wants
to use sociobiology to show us that ought can be found in the nasty,
21 See e.g., Joshua D. Greene et al., An JMRJ Investigation of Emotional
Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001). The authors argue that the
use of Kantian versus utilitarian reasoning varies by situation, affected by the degree
to which a particular scenario engages emotional processing in the brain.
22 Fukuyama labels this critique of natural rights theory the
naturalistic fallacy. He describes the position as the idea that you cannot look to the
is (e.g., the empirical world) to discover the ought (e.g., the normative ideal to which
humans should aspire). See FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 114.
23 See id. at 127.
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brutish is. However, the only guidance Fukuyama offers is that nature
can set limits for our view of ought by pointing to failed experiments
(e.g., communism failed, so its principles cannot represent a normative
ideal for humans). Yet such a theory is unable to tell us if human
nature is traveling in the wrong direction, so long as we do not reach
communist-level meltdown: in other words, Fukuyama wants nature
to show us the ought, but all he has proven is that nature can show us
the isn't.
In any event, whether or not Fukuyama is successful in
building a case for natural rights is largely irrelevant. The thrust of
Fukuyama's argument is that genetics can "disrupt" the human
boundary, which will then undermine our system of moral rights.
However, the human boundary is implicit in nearly all strains of moral
philosophy. In the case of utilitarianism, there is the question of whose
utility counts and for how much. As Posner notes, a utilitarianism that
did not observe the human boundary would produce radical
pronouncements, such as limiting the number of humans to maximize
the happiness of sheep.24 In the case of divine rights, there is a stark
distinction drawn between humans and the other animals of the earth,
based on the Western Genesis view of creation. In the case of positive
rights, the system of moral rights is whatever the voting majority (or
supermajority) says it is, and the boundary of the voting class has been
pushed outward over time to match up with the human boundary
(there are, of course, questions of citizenship, but the human boundary
serves as the functional limit for who gets to vote on rights).
Therefore, Fukuyama has done more than is necessary for his
argument when he selects and defends a particular moral theory. If the
problem with genetics is that it may disrupt the human boundary, this
poses problems for all of the above theories. Fukuyama needed only to
note that in all mainstream strains of moral theory, the human
boundary defines the scope of who receives heightened moral
consideration (or in the case of positive rights, who gets to determine
what morality is). In fact, in defending a highly controversial natural
rights theory (a theory that is, as he notes, largely considered
"debunked"), Fukuyama makes a weaker case than he otherwise could
for the preservation of the human boundary.25
24 See Posner, supra note 9, at 103.
25 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 112.
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B. FACTOR X
The natural rights argument requires Fukuyama to show that
moral rights derive from some special aspect of human nature. Since
this quality is hard to define on first blush, Fukuyama begins by
positing its existence and naming it Factor X. He promises to flesh out
the content of Factor X over the course of his argument.
Factor X is the basis for the moral rights promised to all
persons. "What the demand for equality of recognition implies is that
when we strip all of a person's contingent and accidental
characteristics away, there remains some essential human quality
underneath that is worthy of a certain minimal level of respect - call it
Factor X.",26 If all humans deserve equal rights, then they must all
possess Factor X equally: "Factor X is the human essence, the most
basic meaning of what it is to be human. If all human beings are in fact
equal in dignity, then X must be some characteristic universally
possessed by them., 27 Accordingly, if non-humans are not entitled to
human rights, they must not posses Factor X. The essence of the
human boundary is that if you have Factor X, you are on the inside; if
you don't, you are out with the cows.
As Fukuyama notes, quite a lot turns on whether you are
entitled to such rights: "You can cook, eat, torture, enslave, or render
the carcass of any creature lacking Factor X, but if you do the same
thing to a human being, you are guilty of a 'crime against
humanity.",
21
Now that we know what's at stake, can Fukuyama give us a
compelling account of what Factor X is? After much analysis, his
conclusion is that several features of human beings, including their
subjective consciousness, emotional range, rationality, moral choice,
language, and culture combine into a whole that is more than the sum
of its parts. He writes: "It is not sufficient to argue that other animals
are conscious, or have culture, or have language, for their
consciousness does not combine human reason, human language,
human moral choice, and human emotions in ways that are capable of
producing human politics, human art, or human religion.,
29
Fukuyama accepts evolution, but then suggests that along the
continuous chain of evolution, there has been a discontinuous leap
that distinguishes the human species in kind from its predecessors (he
notes that the Pope has called this an "ontological leap" on the
26 Id. at 149.
27 Id. at 150.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 161.
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evolutionary chain, wherein a soul was inserted into humans alone).3"
Thus, Fukuyama concludes, in a section titled "What to Fight For":
If what gives us dignity and a moral status higher than
that of other living creatures is related to the fact that we
are complex wholes rather than the sum of simple parts,
then it is clear that there is no simple answer to the
question, What is Factor X? That is, Factor X cannot be
reduced to the possession of moral choice, or reason, or
language, or sociability, or sentience, or emotions, or
consciousness, or any other quality that has been put
forth as a ground for human dignity. It is all of these
factors coming together in a human whole that make up
Factor X. Every member of the human species possesses
a genetic endowment that allows him or her to become a
whole human being, an endowment that distinguishes a
human in essence from other types of creatures.31
These features combine to create the human whole, which gives rise to
our special moral status - which is what Fukuyama wants us to protect
from the possibilities of genetic engineering.
Let us now consider a few problems with this conception of
Factor X.
1. CIRCULARITY AND INCOMPLETENESS
There is a circularity in Fukuyama's reasoning that should raise
our first doubts about Factor X. In the above conclusion, Fukuyama
enumerates no complete, definite list of features that constitute Factor
X. Instead, Fukuyama argues that it is the human whole, which
includes the features he listed plus others, that creates Factor X.
Notice the circularity. Fukuyama began the chapter by stating
that there is something special about human beings, which he
temporarily named Factor X. He concluded his investigation of this
quality by stating that, in the end, Factor X is what is special about
human beings. In other words, his argument is simply a restatement of
his conclusion.
However, there is an admission at the end of the chapter that
suggests an even more troubling circularity. In a final aside, Fukuyama
30 Id.
31 Id. at 171.
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notes that "There is a strong prudential reason for not being too
hierarchical in the assignment of political rights, however. There is, in
the first place, no consensus on a precise definition of that list of
essential human characteristics that qualify an individual for rights.,
3 2
This is a staggering admission. As we have seen, Fukuyama
began the Factor X investigation by telling us that humans, and only
humans, deserve human rights because we all have Factor X. But here,
at the end of the chapter, he tells us we do not agree on what Factor X
is, so we should act as if the net is just wide enough to include all
humans (but no non-humans).33
Which is it? Do humans get rights because they all have Factor
X (the stated point of the chapter), or do humans get rights simply
because they are human, and we will just define Factor X to equal
being human?
If Fukuyama had wanted to take the easy way out, all he
needed to do was follow Posner's solution to the boundary problem.
Posner writes, "A better answer, I believe, is simply to say that we
don't care about animal utilities save as they enter into human utility
functions, and leave it at that.,3 4 Posner is to the point, if not
satisfying. He solves a difficult question by saying he doesn't care and
simply asserting special moral status for humans. Fukuyama, at least
in his stated goals, did not want to take this route. He wanted to argue
that yes, in fact, there is a principled distinction between humans and
non-humans that justifies a moral difference. Yet in the end, his
conclusion amounts to Posner's assertion that humans get special
rights because they are humans.
Thus, Fukuyama cannot escape the criticisms of philosophers
like Singer, who argue that species-based morality simply asserts
human superiority by fiat, not by principle.35
32 Id. at 175.
33 One who has not read Fukuyama's book may think that I did not
notice his use of the modifier "political" before the word "rights" in the above
quotation. They might wonder whether Fukuyama is suggesting a different standard
for political and moral rights, and whether my argument here is ignoring that
distinction. However, an inspection of Fukuyama's discussion on pages 174-75
reveals that he is using moral and political rights interchangeably on these pages, and
therefore his prudential argument is indeed in conflict with his otherwise a priori
moral argument. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 174-75.
34 See Posner, supra note 9, at 113.
35 See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION Ch. 1 (1990).
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2. CONTINUUMS VERSUS GROUPS
In Fukuyama's account of Factor X, there is also a tension
between continuums and groups that further undermines the theory.
As stated earlier, Factor X must apply to all humans and no
non-humans to support Fukuyama's argument. That is why we can
"cook, eat, torture, enslave, or render the carcass of any creature
lacking Factor X, but if you do the same thing to a human being, you
are guilty of a 'crime against humanity.' 36
However, the case begins to show its fault lines when
Fukuyama explores animal rights. He notes: "if animals have a 'right'
not to suffer unduly, the nature and limits of that right depend entirely
on empirical observation of what is typical for their species - that is,
on a substantive judgment about their natures.. .We tend to accord
conscious creatures greater rights in this regard because, like humans,
they can anticipate suffering and have fears and hopes."37 So far, so
good: an animal deserves rights commensurate with its natural
abilities; this is consistent with his view of natural rights. As such, a
dog would have more rights than a salamander, because the dog has
higher cognition and a greater capacity to experience pain and
emotions. Of course, no dog has the human right to vote, because it
lacks the capacities which make a right to vote sensible in the dog's
case.
38
Fukuyama notes a similar continuum of rights among humans,
based on their natural abilities. He observes that "An elderly person
with Alzheimer's, for example, has lost the normal adult ability to
reason, and therefore that part of his dignity that would permit him to
participate in politics by voting or running for office., 39 Again, this is
consistent with his view of natural rights.
This is where Fukuyama gets into trouble. In other passages,
Fukuyama explicitly rejects the continuum-based view of morality.40
"Reason, moral choice, and possession of the species-typical
emotional gamut are things that are shared by virtually all human
beings and therefore serve as a basis for universal equality" (emphasis
added).41 Suddenly, Fukuyama is using words like "species-typical"
and asserting that traits shared by "virtually all" humans provide a
36 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 150.
37 Id. at 146.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 174.
40 Id. at 154-55.
41 Id. at 174-75.
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basis for "universal" rights. He has thus shifted from a continuum of
rights, specific to each individual being's nature, to a set of rights given
to a defined group based on their average group characteristics. The
reason for this shift is clear: Fukuyama is troubled by the potential
consequences of a philosophy that allows us to say that humans should
get different rights based on their different qualities. And as soon as his
natural rights theory pushes him to acknowledge a continuum of ights
commensurate with each being's specific nature, he retreats,
performing intellectual somersaults to make his theory reach a
different conclusion.
The problem is that the two approaches, continuum and group,
are mutually exclusive, but Fukuyama straddles the two. The whole
point of Factor X was that every human, and only humans, possess it.
That was Fukuyama's sole justification for providing superior rights to
all humans and no non-humans. In Fukuyama's own words: "Factor
X is the human essence, the most basic meaning of what it is to be
human. If all human beings are in fact equal in dignity, then X must be
some characteristic universally possessed by them" (emphasis added).42
This is a continuum view, because it holds that in order to merit a
particular right, you must possess the feature (in this case, Factor X)
that is commensurate with the right.
The group-based view is highly distinct. It holds that an
individual gets rights not based on her own characteristics, but based
on the average characteristics of her group. In this vein, Fukuyama
writes: "Membership in one of these groups does not guarantee that
one's individual characteristics will be close to the median for that
group (I know a lot of individual children who would vote more wisely
than their parents), but it is a good enough indicator of ability for
practical purposes.,41
This group-based view raises a number of troubling questions
for Fukuyama. First of all, what does he mean that group averages are
"a good enough indicator of ability for practical purposes?" Given the
analytic framework of Fukuyama's book, we are not interested in good
indicators, rules of thumb, or helpful guidelines. Instead, Fukuyama
has proposed a work of moral philosophy, in which he argues that
genetic engineering must be limited because it threatens our a priori
source of human rights. It would be very different if Fukuyama were
arguing that, as a practical matter, for reasons of say, efficient
governance or public welfare, we ought to treat all humans equally and
ignore the "rights" of non-humans (this is Posner-land). But
Fukuyama has embarked on a different task and has written a different
42 Id. at 150.
43 Id. at 146-47.
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book, one which wants us to take seriously the claim that there is a
principled, moral superiority of all humans to all other creatures.
Therefore, it is a damaging slip to propose a continuum-based view of
human rights, but then - when confronted with the unfortunate
consequences of such a theory - tacitly shift to language about
individual rights based on group-average characteristics. If Fukuyama
had wanted to pursue the Posnerian route of pragmatism, it would
have called for a different investigation (empirical, sociological and
anthropological, with a very different set of arguments required).
The second troubling question of the group-based model is:
what defines the group we care about? The implication of Fukuyama's
shift to groups is that all humans get certain superior rights based on
their group-average characteristics. But why have we selected out and
privileged the "human" class? Why not make it wider, and say that all
mammals should get equal rights based on their group-specific traits?
This would, of course, drag the protection afforded to humans way
down, because they are currently high above average in this particular
grouping. Or what would stop someone from drawing the class
narrowly, saying that a particular race, ethnicity, or religion should get
rights based on their group-average traits, rather than equal human
rights? The problem Fukuyama faces is that his assertion of the human
group is arbitrary, once again akin to the Posnerian idea that we care
about humans because we do. When Fukuyama embraced a
continuum view based on Factor X, he had an answer to these
unfortunate questions. But when Factor X proved elusive, and he
shifted tacitly to a group-based view, he ran into a difficult mess.
If Fukuyama had followed the logic of his original, continuum-
based theory, he would have reached many of the same conclusions as
the animal rights bioethicist Peter Singer. Though Singer is a utilitarian
and Fukuyama is a rights theorist, their theories would arrive at much
the same place. Singer writes, "The evil of pain is, in itself, unaffected
by the other characteristics of the being who feels the pain.
44
Therefore, if animals have the capacity to feel physical pain much as
humans do, then it is as wrong, morally, to torture animals as it is to
torture humans. Note the consistency with Fukuyama's natural rights
principles: if the nature of a being is to abhor pain, then they have a
moral claim against the arbitrary infliction of pain by others. Yet, as
we know, this is not the conclusion Fukuyama reaches, because he is
torn between the continuum view and the group view. As such, he
presents a binary conclusion to a graduated theory, telling us that
animals can be tortured, hunted, and eaten, while humans cannot.
44 See SINGER, supra note 35, at 20-21.
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Singer is more consistent. His theory allows that we should
choose to save the average human life over the average animal life,
when that choice is forced. However, he does not reach this conclusion
because human lives are on average more valuable than animal lives.
Rather, he would use a continuum-based method; i.e., actually
comparing the two lives in question and then making the moral choice
based on the particular beings. Therefore, if the choice came down to a
terminally ill, brain-dead human and a healthy dog, Singer's theory
would choose to save the dog, all other things equal. No doubt, this
outcome may cause outrage to many people (Fukuyama rejects it
specifically).45 Singer's response is that "Most human beings are
speciesists ... ordinary human beings - not a few exceptionally cruel or
heartless humans, but the overwhelming majority of humans - take an
active part in, acquiesce in, and allow their taxes to pay for practices
that require the sacrifice of the most important interests of members of
other species in order to promote the most trivial interests of our own
species., 46 In other words, our current intuition is set to disregard
animal suffering. Singer hopes the logic of his theory will convince
open-minded readers that this present intuition is wrong.
However, the validity of Singer's conclusions is not at issue
here. The point is that there is a deep confusion at the heart of
Fukuyama's moral theory. This confusion is the direct result of the
difficulty of the boundary problem. Notice the Catch-22 Fukuyama is
in. If he had a compelling definition of the human boundary (Factor
X), then a continuum view would protect human rights while looking
at individuals. However, in the absence of this compelling account -
and even Fukuyama finally admits it doesn't currently exist47 - the
continuum view leads to aristocracy, while the group-based view leads
to either racism or absurdity. Once again, the tenuousness of basing
the case against genetic engineering on the human boundary is
revealed.
3. CAPACITY FOR WHAT
We have already seen that at the end of the day, Fukuyama
does not have a complete account of Factor X, and he therefore resorts
to a circular argument. However, throughout the text there are
45 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 154.
46 See SINGER, supra note 35, at 9.
47 Fukuyama writes, "There is, in the first place, no consensus on a
precise definition of that list of essential human characteristics that qualify an
individual for rights." FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 175.
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references to human features that give some substance to his account
of Factor X, and so we evaluate these factors now.
If rights derive from human nature, do they arise from (1) what
we are, (2) what we do, or (3) what we are able to do? Fukuyama
appears to support the third option: Factor X is based on our human
capacity to do certain things.4" In his definition of Factor X, he writes:
"Every member of the human species possesses a genetic endowment
that allows him or her to become a whole human being, an
endowment that distinguishes a human in essence from other types of
creatures."49 In this formulation, it is not that we are "whole human
beings" that gives us rights, nor is it that we do whatever it is whole
human beings do; it is that we have an "endowment" that "allows" us
to become a whole human being. This is a capacity or potential
argument; it is not an argument that hinges rights on how we actually
act as individuals.
If capacity is the issue, then we must ask, capacity to do what?
A few answers are spread throughout the text. In one section,
Fukuyama writes: "Only human beings can formulate, debate, and
modify abstract rules of justice."5 In another passage, he states: "It is
not sufficient to argue that other animals are conscious, or have
culture, or have language, for their consciousness does not combine
human reason, human language, human moral choice, and human
emotions in ways that are capable of producing human politics,
human art, or human religion."51 Notice that this final passage
eliminates options (1) and (2) (who we are and what we do, respectively)
and defines a particular goal for option (3). It is not enough, if we take
this sentence seriously, to possess human reason, language, moral
choice, and emotions. To have Factor X, we must "combine" these
qualities "in ways that are capable of producing human politics,
human art, or human religion." 52
This capacity-based view raises three major questions. First,
there is an issue of under-inclusiveness. Why is capacity to produce
politics, art, and religion a valid criterion for Factor X? Recall that
Factor X decides who gets to be cooked, eaten, tortured, and enslaved.
48 I do believe, on the whole, that Fukuyama wishes to support option
(3). However, there are particular arguments in Fukuyama's book that seem to point
towards option (1) as a secondary, but necessary element for moral consideration.
See particularly his discussion of Artificial Intelligence. There, he argues that no
matter how sophisticated a computer's output is, it cannot be worthy of moral
consideration as long as it lacks subjective experience.
49 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 171.
50 Id. at 165.
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As such, the ability to produce art or politics seems a little too high a
bar. There are many beings, including those with severe cognitive
disabilities, who lack the higher level capacities Fukuyama is
describing, and yet I would not want them to be cooked and eaten as
Fukuyama allows for those who lack Factor X.
In fact, the problem of under-inclusiveness here is immense and
extends well beyond those with mental disabilities. Factor X is
supposed to be the universal human quality. However, it is not self-
evident that all, or even most, humans have a capacity to produce art,
politics, or religion. Many of us have a capacity to observe art, politics,
and religion, but that is not what Fukuyama said. Production of these
goods was his distinguishing feature. Therefore, if we take these
passages seriously as an account of Factor X, then Fukuyama has
devised a definition of Factor X that fails to capture a huge number of
(if not most) humans.53
Second, Fukuyama never gives an account of why these
particular goods matter. I personally enjoy art and religion, but I am
not sure, from reading Fukuyama's account, why the capacity to
produce these things should be the basis for moral rights. The closest
Fukuyama comes to making an affirmative case for the moral
relevance of art or politics is their complexity,54 but Fukuyama knows
better than to premise moral rights on complexity alone. Complexity
and morality have no necessary relationship. A pattern of viral
mutation is complex, yet it does not merit moral consideration. So
why politics, art, and religion?
Third, why does capacity matter morally? What about the
person who could produce these things but does not and will not?
53 It is possible that Fukuyama stepped into under-inclusiveness while
conscientiously avoiding the inherent risk of over-inclusiveness (which is a common
pitfall for boundary theories). As Singer has pointed out, most philosophical
accounts of what matters for moral inspection (e.g., intelligence, capacity to feel
pain) apply to many non-human animals, and sometimes in greater quantity than
some humans. For example, Singer writes that non-human animals, infants, and the
severely mentally retarded can be in the same category in terms of intelligence and
awareness, and so morally, what we can do to one, we must say we can do to all:
if we use this argument to justify experiments on nonhuman
animals we have to ask ourselves whether we are also prepared to
allow experiments on human infants and retarded adults; and if we
make a distinction between animals and these humans, on what
basis can we do it, other than a bare-faced and morally
indefensible preference for members of our own species?
Singer, supra note 35, at 16. Fukuyama obviously wishes to avoid such disturbing
questions by drawing a boundary that captures all humans and only humans. But in
dodging over-inclusiveness, he travels deep into under-inclusiveness.
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What if everyone in human society ceased to produce art, religion, and
politics - would this disable Fukuyama's system of moral rights, or is it
enough that we retain the capacity to produce these things?
I will not belabor these points, because they are simply alternate
ways of reaching the same core instability that is detailed elsewhere in
this section: the human boundary is a problematic concept on which to
base an important ethical position.
In sum, the human boundary is a focal point of controversy and
confusion in moral philosophy. We feel it intuitively, and it is a
powerful force for peace and justice in the human community. Yet
describing it analytically has proved slippery and problematic; almost
any route you take can lead to unpleasant outcomes - what Posner
calls moral monstrousness. From here you can go the direction of
many scholars, including Ackerman, Singer, and Kant, who explicitly
base their moral theories on qualities that are not linked, by definition,
to being a human per se.55 Or, you can go the route of Posner and
simply defend the human boundary by fiat or by reference to intuition.
Yet Fukuyama has built a crucial bioethical case on a philosophical
house of cards, and that is why this essay takes on the task of
refoundation.
C. GENETICS AND FACTOR X
Finally, what about Fukuyama's conclusion: that we ought to
limit genetic science to protect Factor X, and that this principle leads
us to prohibit genetic enhancement?
Let us assume for this section that Fukuyama has given us a
complete and satisfactory account of the human boundary. What then
is the mechanism by which genetic engineering would disturb our
shared humanity and thus our human rights?
55 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 71-
74 (1980). Ackerman premises liberal citizenship (and thus the protections the liberal
citizen receives from abusive power) on the ability to engage in a communication
about power relations. Ackerman writes: "A liberal state is nothing more than a
collection of individuals who can participate in a dialogue in which all aspects of
their power position may be justified in a certain way." This requires that actors be
able to understand one another ("it is this simple chain that links the theory of
citizenship to the theory of translation"), but so long as they can communicate
sufficiently, they need not be human. Thus, Ackerman notes that a roaring lion
cannot sufficiently ask and answer the legitimacy questions required for citizenship,
but a talking ape could and could therefore be a citizen. See id. at 71-74. See also
SINGER, supra note 35, at 19 ("Whatever criteria we choose, however, we will have
to admit that they do not follow precisely the boundary of our own species.").
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Recall Fukuyama's main principle:
What is it that we want to protect from any future
advances in biotechnology? The answer is, we want to
protect the full range of our complex, evolved natures
against attempts at self-modification. We do not want to
disrupt either the unity or the continuity of human
nature, and thereby the human rights that are based on
it.
56
Later, Fukuyama works to give substance to this principle by
suggesting ways to begin regulating technology in accordance with his
theory. He suggests that "One obvious way to draw red lines is to
distinguish between therapy and enhancement, directing research
toward the former while putting restrictions on the latter. The original
purpose of medicine is, after all, to heal the sick, not to turn healthy
people into gods.
57
The critical link in his main statement is that disrupting the
unity of human nature will thereby disrupt human rights. Why?
Fukuyama does not provide an explicit list of mechanisms, but
we can tease out a few from various parts of the text: principally, he is
concerned about (what I will call) stratification and reductionism.
1. STRATIFICATION
Stratification suggests that enhancement will allow us to
increase genotypic and phenotypic diversity. Eventually, such diversity
will press us to the point of losing our shared humanity. Fukuyama
fears that this could lead to increased social stratification and even
oppression:
the posthuman world could be one that is far more
hierarchical and competitive than the one that currently
exists, and full of social conflict as a result. It could be
one in which any notion of 'shared humanity' is lost,
because we have mixed human genes with those of so
many other species that we no longer have a clear idea
of what a human being is.
58
56 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 172.
57 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 208.
58 Id. at 218.
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There are really two levels of concern here. The first is that
genetic enhancement may stratify the distribution of genetic talents
and advantages more widely than the current natural lottery does. This
type of stratification could increase inequality and hierarchy in society,
but it does not seem to pose obvious problems for the human
boundary. The second more fanciful concern is that creating mixed-
species beings, also known as chimeras or transgenic animals, would
truly obliterate the species boundary.59
Let us consider these two fears separately. The fear of widening
the talent distribution is legitimate and practical. Genetic
enhancements, like elective cosmetic surgery today, could be
expensive and not covered by health insurance. As a result,
enhancement may only be accessible to the rich, who could use their
artificially increased skills to widen their preexisting advantages. Some
might argue that this is only different in scale from the current state of
affairs, where rich parents provide their children with the best schools
and exam preparation money can buy, in turn calcifying social
hierarchies. This may certainly be an area for social concern and
egalitarian regulation.6"
However, even if we give Fukuyama's theory the benefit of the
doubt, it cannot explain what is wrong with this enhancement inequality.
Assume there is a coherent Factor X that imbues rights to all humans.
If some humans receive increased intelligence or athletic ability
through enhancement, while others do not, both classes of people will
still possess Factor X. This is true because Factor X, we are told, is the
minimum core of what it means to be human, and this will still be
possessed by all humans, as Fukuyama states "when we strip all of a
person's contingent and accidental characteristics away, there remains
some essential human quality underneath that is worthy of a certain
minimal level of respect - call it Factor X."'61 There are currently wide
distributions of talents among humans, and yet Fukuyama tells us all
humans possess Factor X. If these distributions are widened, why
would this affect the minimum, shared quality that protects us all? This
59 "Fanciful" may be too dismissive, given that patents currently exist
on transgenic species, and some scientists have expressed interest in creating
human/non-human hybrid species. See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 206-07;
Slater, supra note 1.
60 One could imagine two approaches: enhancement for none or
enhancement for all. This is a question of distributive justice and well beyond the
scope of this essay. However, it is worth pointing out that to date, major theories of
distributive justice take the natural talent lottery as given, and then they seek to
wrestle with issues of fairness given this inequality of ability. If genetic talents
become pieces in play, rather than starting rules of the game, moral philosophies
would have a lot to talk about.
61 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 149.
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does not mean we shouldn't worry about inequality - it simply means
that Fukuyama's theory does not give us the tools to analyze the harm
he is positing.
Now consider Fukuyama's second concern, transgenic species.
Once again, there are a vast number of potential, pragmatic harms in
creating new species. However, there is also a similar inability to
explain Fukuyama's concern via his moral theory. Let us assume that
other creatures gain human level quantities of Factor X (for example,
the capacity to combine emotions, language, reason, and other higher
level traits into art, politics, and religion). In this case, why wouldn't
these creatures also qualify for "human" rights? And if these beings
refuse to abide by the rules of shared Factor X morality, how is this
problem any different than that we face today when plenty of humans
refuse to abide by these moral rules? In other words, Fukuyama is
assuming that once non-human creatures gain Factor X, then Factor X
will cease to act as a source of rights. However, this is not a necessary
outcome of his theory. Quite the opposite, it could simply be the case
that more creatures will receive Factor X protection.
Surprisingly, in a different section of the book, Fukuyama
reveals that he shares this intuition. He quotes a hypothetical posed by
McShea: are you more likely to enter into a moral relationship with a
lion with human speech and emotions or a human with a lion's speech
and emotions? Fukuyama's response: "The answer, as countless
children's books with sympathetic talking lions suggest, is the lion,
because species-typical human emotions are more critical to our sense
of our own humanness than either our reason or our physical
appearance.' 6 2 Here, Fukuyama is focusing on one element of Factor
X, emotions. Yet the point remains, a lion possessing all of Factor X
would be a fine candidate for a moral relationship with humans. While
Fukuyama admits as much, he does not accept the obvious
conclusion: if more creatures gain Factor X, this would simply expand
our conception of who gets Factor X. It suggests nothing about the
tarnishment or diminution of Factor X's value. As long as you don't
write "human" into the definition of Factor X (as Fukuyama does),
then his theory of moral rights is actually quite flexible for new
situations.
I do not wish to diminish the potential problems of both
enhancement inequality and transgenic creation. There are many
practical and moral concerns, and Fukuyama should be applauded for
calling attention to them. The point here is that Fukuyama must go
outside of his theory to describe these potential harms. However, this
essay is concerned with evaluating the central argument of
62 Id. at 169.
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Fukuyama's theory: that genetic engineering may disrupt the human
boundary and thus natural human rights. You cannot reach
Fukuyama's conclusions here by applying this moral theory.
Therefore, Fukuyama has not shown that an increase in
diversity will necessarily harm Factor X or moral rights.
In addition, we must also consider the possibility that genetic
enhancement can decrease diversity, not just increase it. If we assume
that society holds certain ideals for appearance, intelligence, success,
etc., then it is at least reasonable to assume that we might see a
convergence, rather than a divergence, of traits if enhancement were
allowed. This is certainly the case in current elective cosmetic surgery,
where we see regression towards a physical ideal: the sizes and shapes
of manufactured bodies tend to cluster, not diverge. Of course, this is
not necessarily a good thing: using enhancement to decrease diversity
is loaded with the air of eugenics. The point here, though, has nothing
to do with whether elective convergence is good or bad. The point is
that Fukuyama cannot address this concern with his theory alone,
because in terms of preserving the human boundary, genetic
convergence would be useful.63
Therefore, it is not at all clear that Fukuyama's stratification
theory supports his ban on enhancement. If enhancement leads to
divergence, there is no necessary reason that this would harm human
rights or Factor X. And if enhancement leads to convergence, then the
stratification argument does not apply. We may think convergence is
very bad for a number of reasons, but Fukuyama's theory does not say
much about it, because in boundary-preservation terms, convergence is
helpful, not harmful.
2. REDUCTIONISM
Fukuyama points out a second way in which genetic science
could undermine Factor X and human rights, the reduction of our
human essence. He writes, "If Factor X is related to our very
complexity and the complex interactions of uniquely human
characteristics like moral choice, reason, and a broad emotional
63 The counterargument is that if 90% of the population converges
around certain idealized traits, then this makes the remaining 10% more vulnerable
to persecution. This may be true, but it is not a boundary issue, because the
convergence occurs within the already defined boundary. So it is again outside the
domain of Fukuyama's theory, since he posits that Factor X is wide enough to cover
all individuals within the current diversity of human life.
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gamut, it is reasonable to ask how and why biotechnology would seek
to make us less complex. )
64
Fukuyama's answer is that our broad emotional gamut is at
stake. "We will be constantly tempted to think that we understand
what 'good' and 'bad' emotions are, and that we can do nature one
better by suppressing the latter, by trying to make people less
aggressive, more sociable, more compliant, less depressed., 65 This
leads to two harms. First, he argues that all of our virtues are defined
in opposition to suffering and death: "In the absence of these human
evils there would be no sympathy, compassion, courage, heroism,
solidarity, or strength of character. '66 Second, Fukuyama argues that
without travails, humans would become hollow, and human life
would become shallow: "A person who has not confronted suffering or
death has no depth.,
67
These are challenging points, and though some may be inclined
to reject them reflexively ('Suffering is good? You can have it!'), I
believe they merit deeper consideration.
However, once again there is a disconnect between
Fukuyama's theory and the issues he wishes to regulate. He asserts the
relationship between suffering and depth. But what does this tell us
about the relationship between suffering and the human boundary or
human rights?
Fukuyama offers one answer: an important constituent of the
human boundary is sympathy, and sympathy requires the capacity to
suffer personally in order to feel the suffering of others. In Fukuyama's
view, this sympathy is a sort of social glue that ties together the human
community. 68 However, this explanation has two shortcomings. The
first is that even if we eliminated much human suffering through
genetic engineering, it is not clear what effect, if any, this would have
on the human boundary. Under Fukuyama's assumptions, if we are
genetically diminishing emotional pain and suffering, then we are
presumably also able to diminish aggression and anti-social behavior.
Therefore, there is no reason to assume that we ought to ban
emotional modification on boundary grounds, when it is possible that
such modifications may strengthen the boundary.
Second, and more importantly, the boundary issue fails to
capture a large element of what Fukuyama is really concerned about
64 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 172.
65 Id.
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here. Even if you accept his boundary-threat, this would only limit
biotechnology insofar as it threatened the human boundary. As such,
the theory cannot account for his intuition that what is really at stake is
not the human boundary, but the depth and shape of human life.
Again, I would assert that this is a question of meaning or essence in
human life, and this is the basis upon which I will ground my
reconstruction. It is worth noting here that Fukuyama shares this
concern - that genetics may somehow diminish the essence of human
life - but again, his theory does not provide us with a language to
address these concerns.
Thus, Fukuyama does not prove that genetic reductionism
threatens human rights. However, it is further possible to argue that
genetic enhancement has the ability to strengthen human rights as
Fukuyama defines them. If we were capable of producing good
politics, art, and science before, then with enhanced skills we might be
able to produce better politics, art, and science. And, following the
thread of Fukuyama's natural rights argument, these enhanced
capacities would entitle us to enhanced, not diminished, moral rights.
Furthermore, right now only some humans are capable of
producing the things that Fukuyama says lead to moral rights. With
enhancement, more humans would have the distribution of talents and
predispositions that Fukuyama says give rise to special moral rights.
Thus, genetic enhancement, applied properly, could better distribute
Factor X, or even kick us up, as a species, to Factor Y.
D. FINAL THOUGHTS ON OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE
In the preceding sections, I have attempted to show three
points: first, that Fukuyama does not provide a satisfactory account of
the human boundary and human rights; second, that even if he had
provided a satisfactory account of the human boundary, it still would
not explain the genetic harms he is concerned about; and third, even if
his account of the human boundary did explain those genetic harms,
he still has not shown how a distinction between therapy and
enhancement would prevent those harms. Therefore, Our Posthuman
Future does not answer the question that I began with: what exactly is
wrong with genetic enhancement?
As a postscript to this analysis of Fukuyama, I believe there is a
revealing tension at the end of Our Posthuman Future. After spending
the entirety of his book seeking to define and defend Factor X,
Fukuyama makes a startling off-hand comment on the penultimate
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page: "So, despite the poor repute in which concepts like natural rights
are held by academic philosophers, much of our political world rests
on the existence of a stable human 'essence' with which we are
endowed by nature, or rather, on the fact that we believe such an essence
exists" (emphasis added).69
This last clause should leap off the page. Fukuyama has
dedicated his text to arguing the first half of that sentence, that our
political world rests on the existence of a stable human essence
endowed by nature. Only in the final sentences of the book, without
fanfare and without further support, does Fukuyama let slip what
might truly be animating his argument. Fukuyama is not really be
worried about metaphysics, but practical social stability. In other
words, it does not matter if Factor X exists. What matters is that we
believe it exists.
If this is the case, then no part of Fukuyama's conclusion that
bioethics should protect the human boundary depends upon his
philosophical case. There is a disconnect, because the thrust of the
book argues a proposition that is neither necessary nor sufficient for its
final conclusion. Either Fukuyama wrote the wrong book, or he wrote
exactly what he meant, but then hedged his bets in the final pages. I
suspect it was the latter, but in any event, this disconnect leads to two
ironies.
The first irony is that if Fukuyama is really, at the end of the
day, concerned with social stability and political order, this would
have been a much easier case to attempt. Simply put, the argument
would go like this: we should not tamper with the popularly conceived
boundaries of humanity because we might splinter ourselves into more
and more distinct groups. Given our all-too-familiar tendency toward
conflict with the other, this radical diversity might lead to disastrous
consequences. Fukuyama worries that genetic enhancements could
upset our delicate belief in Factor X, undermining our system of
human rights, and in turn upsetting the social stability which flows
from having an accepted system of human rights. This is a reasonable
issue to raise, and it is certainly easier to bring this up than to conceive
and defend a new philosophical theory of bioethics. So Fukuyama has
taken the long road in an effort to get to a place where many people
are probably already settled.
The second irony is perhaps more damaging. One might be
tempted to argue: so what if Fukuyama went the long way around,
making a highly specific moral argument for a pragmatic position? The
whole includes the lesser, and so a successful defense of natural human
69 Id. at 217.
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rights will more soundly defend his position than asserting a mere need
to believe it is so. However, the case may be that Fukuyama's moral
philosophy undermines his practical point. By taking on the difficult
task of trying to defend the blunt human boundary, Fukuyama has
shone a spotlight on how slippery it really is. Factor X may be a bit
like faith; there are good reasons to have it, but inspecting it
analytically is the best way to harm it.
Does switching to a descriptive, rather than normative, view
save Fukuyama's thesis? I think the answer is that to some extent, it
helps. It is true that as an empirical matter, most of us believe in a
shared humanity, and this belief appears in much of our thinking on
positive legal rights. The human boundary is at work in the
International Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on
Human Rights and Dignity With Regard to Biomedicine (Council of
Europe), the Nuremberg Code barring experimentation on humans,
and many other documents on human rights. Even Posner, who is
famously skeptical of moral philosophy claims, describes a similar
practical concern in his essay on cloning and genetic engineering:
If genetic engineering is expensive, then one might
foresee that wealthy people will produce intelligent and
beautiful offspring, which over time will become steadily
genetically distinct from the offspring of poor people,
until there are two entirely different species that cannot
reproduce sexually. Thus, even if racial discrimination
ends, new forms of discrimination may rise in its place,
including discrimination that is a consequence of
choices people make about the genetic makeup of their
offspring.7"
However, on this point, Fukuyama's work gives us some cause
for hope as well as concern. He points out, as a historical matter, that
our sense of fellow-feeling is expandable, and that over time we have
tended to push the boundary for moral concern increasingly outward,
from the days of tribalism and then aristocracy to the current
humanistic view of liberalism.71 Furthermore, Fukuyama stands as an
example of someone who truly does believe in the human boundary
and its role in morality, and yet even he comes to the conclusion that a
new species with humanesque traits would be a good candidate for a
moral relationship, as we saw in the lion example.
This is, of course, now an empirical question: either genetically
modified humans will or won't treat each other well. So I would add
70 Posner & Posner, supra note 17, at 608.
71 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 150.
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this to the list of serious pragmatic concerns about genetics, including
its effect on equality and income distribution, and its potential
unintended consequences on genetic diversity and species fitness.
However, these concerns, while important, are only part of the
picture. I do not think they provide a complete explanation of the deep
unease surrounding genetic enhancement. The practical version of
Fukuyama's thesis still allows us to worry about genetic enhancement
only when it threatens our belief in the human boundary. In the pages
above, I eventually grant Fukuyama his strongest case and show how
his main concerns, stratification and reduction, do not necessarily
follow from a threat to the human boundary. If these arguments are
persuasive, then they also apply to the situation in which we only
believe in the human boundary. Thus, this descriptive form still fails to
capture much of what is bothering Fukuyama and others with genetic
engineering.
Even if enhancement left the human boundary intact or had no
effect on human rights, even if it reduced inequality, and even if there
were no harms to species fitness, I believe there would still be a deep
and lasting harm from genetic enhancement.
For that reason, I now turn to a different set of explanations -
the question of essence and meaning in human life - to analyze genetic
enhancement.
V. GENETICS, LAw, AND ECONOMICS
Before I turn to the affirmative argument, I wish to take a
moment to consider the law and economics school and its analysis of
genetics to date.
There are three reasons for paying specific attention to the law
and economics school in this essay. First, this school has emerged as
one of the dominant strains of contemporary legal theory. Second, the
law and economics school has been effective (as we shall see below) in
deflating much of the irrational hyperbole surrounding genetics in the
law. Third, and most importantly, there is something particular in the
school's defense of genetics that requires further analysis: it is precisely
the methodology of the law and economics school that will be least
able to recognize the types of harms I suggest for genetic enhancement.
It is too early to tell what the law and economics theorists will
say about genetic enhancement. However, a few prominent
economically-minded theorists have begun to write on other genetic
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topics, and their views have been consistent with the methodology of
the school as a whole.
In fact, it is the methodology, independent of particular subject
matter, that defines the economic approach. As Gary Becker has
written:
Let us turn away from definitions, therefore, because I
believe that what most distinguishes economics as a
discipline from other disciplines in the social sciences is
not its subject matter but its approach... The combined
assumptions of maximizing behavior, market
equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and
unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic
72
approach.
This approach extends beyond matters traditionally understood as
economic, and theorists apply this methodology in ethics and
jurisprudence as well; as Richard Posner has argued, the
incompleteness and indeterminacy of moral theory should compel us
to adopt a different, economic value as our normative guide to ethical
action: wealth maximization.73
So far, the law and economics school has used its powerful,
coherent analysis to dismiss concern over genetics. One example is
"genetic discrimination," or the use of genetic testing by employers,
insurance companies, and others to find new information about
applicants. In the literature, genetic discrimination is held up as one of
the most worrisome issues in genetics. Yet the economically-minded
theorist Richard Epstein has responded that genetic discrimination
poses no new problems and requires no new solutions. 74 Epstein writes
that "False statements about or deliberate concealment of genetic
information is as much a fraud as false statements about or
concealment of any other issue." 7 He argues that in any potential
contractual relationship, be it a job, insurance plan, or marriage
proposal, if the applicant does not wish to reveal genetic information,
he or she may simply apply elsewhere.
Epstein's guiding principle, left unstated, is efficiency, greater
efficiency in labor markets, insurance markets, the non-economic
marriage market, etc. As such, his concern is not that genetic testing
72 See BECKER, supra note 18, at 5.
73 See Posner, supra note 9, at 139.
74 Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination:
OldResponses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1994).
75 Id. at 13.
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will reveal too much about an individual, but that employers and
potential spouses will not have access to this information and will thus
make inefficient decisions: "The greater knowledge that comes from
testing increases the informational asymmetries that are always the
bane of insurance markets."76
If one does not share Epstein's concern for efficiency as the
primary value meriting protection, then different conclusions could be
reached. We might, for example, decide that a potential spouse has a
moral obligation to reveal a predisposition for early-onset Alzheimer's,
but that a potential employee has a socially conceived right to work
and therefore should not have to reveal that information (unless it is a
safety concern). The difference between such a position and Epstein's
is one of disagreement over who should bear the cost of accidents.
Epstein wants a purely efficient free market where all attainable
information is used. We might believe, alternatively, that efficiency
should be balanced against a community's sense of fairness, and
therefore someone with only a predisposition for a disease should be
protected in the labor market until that disease manifests and
comprises his ability to work. This issue need not be resolved here: I
am only highlighting the assumptions and methodology at work in law
and economics scholarship.
Eric and Richard Posner use a similarly economic approach in
their work on cloning. Many bioethicists find a host of spiritual,
ethical, and otherwise intangible critiques of cloning. Some have gone
so far as to say that clones are not human. However, the Posners are
interested in building a model of the market demand for cloning. They
write: "In economic terminology, we focus on the private benefits and
the social costs of human cloning.""
In sum, the law and economics theorists employ their
consistent methodology when discussing issues of genetics and
biotechnology. This methodology embraces (1) the cost-benefit
analysis for individual and social decision-making, and (2), the
normative ideals of efficiency, market distribution, and utility or
wealth maximization."S Even so-called descriptive forms of the
economic approach (those which do not explicitly rely on any
normative economic stance) embrace this normative basis by
privileging efficiency and the like over other social values.
76 Id.
77 Posner & Posner, supra note 17, at 580.
78 Most economists are interested in maximizing utility. However, see
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Let's state the issue this way: law and economics scholars are
applying their tools to bioethics and generating a predictable set of
answers to social problems. Their methodology is highly popular, and
thus influential, in law at present. The question then is, what do we
think of the normative basis that animates their methodology? Or shall
we just accept the conclusions of economics and apply them to law
without wondering what normative structure this advances?
Posner famously laid out the case for wealth maximization as a
normative principle. His general thesis was that the failure of moral
philosophy to produce satisfactory accounts leads us to discard those
theories all together. In their place, Posner suggests that wealth
maximization "provides a firmer basis for a normative theory of
law."79 The benefit of wealth maximization is that it "accommodates,
with elegant simplicity, the competing impulses of our moral nature.""
In other words, as a descriptive matter, the system of market
capitalism balances our natural desire for individual gain with our
social impulses towards empathy, altruism, and benevolence (which
Posner asserts are required for market success)."1 If one accepts these
propositions, then Posner further argues that the market provides
guidance on controversial moral issues, such as selling babies or
organs. Posner states:
There are those who believe that allowing baby sales
would have profoundly undesirable effects, would
encourage eugenic breeding that could transform the
character of the human race, and would increase racial
hostility (there is no shortage of black babies for
adoption as there is of white ones, so black babies would
command a lower price). These points have no weight to
one who embraces the wealth maximization principle.
He can find no immorality in the idea of a baby market,
when morality is derived from economic principle
itself.8 2
Under Posner's system, wealth maximization is the only criteria.
Therefore, if an efficient market can exist for a good, then such a
market is moral.
79 Id. at 103.
80 Id. at 136.
81 Posner writes: "Because the individual cannot prosper in the market
without understanding and appealing to the needs and wants of others, and because
the cultivation of altruism promotes the effective operation of markets, the market
economy regulated in accordance with the wealth maximization principle also
fosters empathy and benevolence, yet without destroying individuality." Id.
82 Id. at 139.
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A complete analysis of wealth maximization is beyond the
scope of this essay." Instead, I wish to focus on one particular issue
concerning Posner's theory - which costs we can or cannot value in his
system. There are two points here.
A. COSTS WE WON'T CONSIDER
First, as a practical point, the empirical bent of wealth
maximization means that costs that are harder to quantify (costs of a
more intangible, normative, or even numinous cast) may receive less
attention. To be fair, I will not go so far as to say that Posner's theory
cannot accommodate such factors. Posner notes that the "only kind of
preference that counts in a system of wealth maximization is thus one
that is backed up by money - in other words, that is registered in a
market.,1 4 However, Posner is quick to point out that these costs and
benefits need not have an explicit market value or tangible form.
Rather, they must "have value which could be monetized by reference
to substitute services sold in explicit markets or in other ways." 5 Most
economists use utility maximization rather than Posner's wealth
maximization, and they too suggest ways that intangible goods can be
accommodated in a cost-benefit analysis. Utility is essentially the
language of choice and trade-offs; thus, for example, when a person
chooses between extra income and more time with loved ones, they
are weighing monetary and intangible benefits in a single calculus. At
least in theory, one could always imagine a series of trade-offs in
implicit or shadow markets that could reveal the extent of our
valuation of such goods.
Yet even granting Posner the theoretical compatibility, as a
practical matter, such values may get pushed aside if we adopt the
cost-benefit analysis as our sole metric. This may be what Posner did
when he refused to include the "weirdness" of cloning in his model of
economic demand, because he considered it "analytically
intractable." 6 Indeed, Posner's use of the word "intractable" is telling;
the primary definition of intractable is "difficult to manage or
govern." 7 Some values are simply tough to cram into a cost-benefit
83 For fuller accounts, see Anthony Kronman, Wealth Maximization as
a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a
Value?, id. at 191.
84 Posner, supra note 9, at 119.
85 Id. at 120.
86 Posner & Posner, supra note 17, at 580.
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analysis and are thus economically frustrating in a public policy
model. Even if intangibles can be included, it is not likely that they will.
This can be seen in Posner's recent defense of a professional,
rather than conscripted, army."8 Using his economic mode of analysis,
Posner dispatches with the communitarian idea of mandatory service
by referencing pragmatic economic concerns - a professional army is
more effective because an efficient voluntary market is in place. Posner
may be right. But what is notable and relevant here is Posner's utter
inability to take seriously the communitarian's stated benefits of
mandatory service: duty, loyalty, civic virtue, shared effort,
commonality, equality. He asks, "How much military effectiveness
should we give up to promote the communitarian vision? The
communitarians have not told us." 9 The implication is that no cost-
benefit analysis was performed to determine the marginal utility of
community compared to other goods. And the communitarians must
play by Posner's rules; he will not wrestle with the question of how to
value intangible, non-moneterizable social goods. The intractability of
these values makes them easy to ridicule when an economic model is
implemented.
A critical point follows. The ease of measurement or the ease of
identification of a social cost tells us nothing about its importance. If
the cost-benefit analysis lends itself to neat economic models and
moneterized costs that can be traded quantitatively, then what might
be the most important costs in some situations may get left out
completely - simply because they do not fit neatly into the model.
B. COSTS WE ARE NOT ALLOWED TO CONSIDER
The second point concerns a set of costs that Posner tells us, in
his theory, that we cannot consider. In the baby example, he argues
that we should not care about certain potential "profoundly
undesirable effects," including racial hostility and eugenic alteration of
the human race. At first blush, one would ask why not. Aren't these
"costs," if not for the immediate parties involved in the transaction,
than for society as a whole? That alone should qualify them as
economic "externalities," which indicate market failure and the need
for regulation. Furthermore, despite their non-economic nature,
Posner has told us explicitly that wealth maximization must consider
and weigh non-monetarized costs and benefits in its calculus. Yet
88 Richard A. Posner, An Army of the Willing, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
May 19 2003, at 27-29 [hereinafter Posner, An Army ofthe Willing].
89 Id. at 29.
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Posner tells us that we can reject these possible harms out of hand, he
tells us they hold no weight. So why aren't these costs like any other?
I suspect what Posner is really trying to do is distinguish harms
that result from a good sold on the market from harms that result from
using the market mechanism to sell a good. This view makes sense
given his rationale in the baby selling passage; there is "no immorality
in the idea of a baby market, when morality is derived from the
economic principle itself."90 This explains why the racial hostility and
eugenic alterations discussed in the passage are dismissed, rather than
classified as costs or externalities. The racial hostility discussed is not
racial hostility generated from, for example, a racist book sold on the
market. Rather, it is the differential pricing of white babies and black
babies - an intrinsic feature of the market mechanism - that creates
this racial hostility. Similarly, the eugenic breeding discussed is not the
result of a technology sold on the market, but rather the operation of
consumer purchasing-choice itself. In other words, what distinguishes
these costs for Posner is that they are not incidental costs of market
goods - they are costs associated with using the market mechanism per
se.
If this is the distinction Posner cares about, then the crucial
question is what follows from it? Why can't we evaluate not only the
costs of goods, but the cost of using the market mechanism to sell
those goods or the cost of using the economic approach in evaluating
moral decisions? It seems that the principal irony of the economic view
is that the only thing on earth that we cannot value with a cost-benefit
analysis is the cost-benefit analysis.
Of course, this is the position Posner must assume because he
has defined the market as morality. It is a move similar to his use of
Factor 3 (described earlier); key normative positions are defined as
exogenous factors and, as a result, are removed from inspection. As
such, Posner has no tools with which to critique the market system
morally.91
But what about the rest of us, can we imagine a series of harms
associated with use of the market mechanism in certain areas?
90 Posner, supra note 9, at 139.
91 But why wouldn't he assess them economically? As a matter of
completeness, one might wonder why an economist dedicated to the economic
approach would not wish to include these costs, either as transaction costs or
externalities, in the analysis.
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C. COSTS OF THE MARKET MECHANISM
One such harm involves the comparison of incommensurable
goods, or what Calabresi and Bobbitt have called 'the costs of costing.'92
The theory of incommensurability holds that some goods cannot or
should not be measured on the same scale. There are two forms of this
claim. The strong form holds that certain types of goods cannot be
measured on the same scale. Benjamin Barber has argued the strong
form in characteristically theatrical language: "Can personal dignity be
measured by personal wealth? Is power commensurable with
happiness? What is the exchange rate between glory and property?"93
The weak form holds that some goods should not be measured on the
same scale. Cass Sunstein has argued that "Incommensurability occurs
when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric
without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these
goods are best characterized."94 The single metric usually at issue is
money, as Simmel explains, "Money, with all its colorlessness and
indifference, becomes the common denominator of all values;
irreparably it hollows out the core of things, their individuality, their
specific value, and their incomparability." 95 As Calabresi and Bobbitt
put it, "Another, more significant problem with market determinations
we shall call the costs of costing ... moralisms and the affront to values,
for example, of market determinations that say or imply that the value
of a life or of some precious activity integral to life is reducible to a
money figure." 96
I believe the strong form of incommensurability is indefensible.
We routinely place monetary values on lost life and limb in the tort
system, and the market is fully capable of pricing blood, organs, life,
babies, and whole humans; we have seen markets function for all of
the above.
However, the implications of the weak form are critical, and
they reveal a central flaw in the expansion of the economic approach.
There seem to be two harms expressed in the above accounts of
incommensurability. The first is a snap-shot approach; pricing
incommensurable goods causes immediate "violence to our considered
judgments" or "affront to values." The second is a longitudinal
92 GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES, 32 (1978).
93 BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 203 (1984).
94 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 80
(1997).
95 Georg Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life, in THE SOCIOLOGY
OF GEORG SIMMEL 414 (Kurt H. Wolff ed., 1950).
96 CALABRESI AND BOBBITT, supra note 92, at 32.
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approach. By pricing goods, we not only cause immediate discomfort,
but we irreparably hollow out their value. It is not that the market
cannot value certain goods; it is that when we use the market to price
and distribute certain things, we (1) reduce the value of those goods in
our estimation and (2) collapse the many ways we value things into a
single, impoverished understanding of value.
This critique applies not only to the market system, but to the
other hallmark of the economic approach: the use of the cost-benefit
analysis in individual and social decision-making. Michaelson points
out that the use of cost-benefit analyses by corporations in toxic
regulation represents a shift from an understanding of inviolable
principles to calculative behavior. "Cost-benefit risk determination,
consequently, shifts toxic regulation from a proxy liability rule to a
proxy property rule, and moves the entitlements from the owners of
bodies to the producers of toxins."97
Needless to say, the Posnerian approach does not allow us to
consider the incommensurability critique (in fact, in the paragraphs
cited above, he expressly forbids it), because these "costs" flow directly
from the proper functioning of the economic approach.
A second, similarly forbidden critique is that choices are not
always good; we might call this, after Calabresi and Bobbitt, the cost of
choosing. Traditional economic theory assumes that to a rational
person, more choice is always better than less, because at the very least
you can ignore the extra choices and be back where you started.
Psychologically-minded economists have begun to note the point
others have long recognized, that choices and options can themselves
have negative effects. Bertrand Russell writes:
To begin with, [work] fills a good many hours of the day
without the need of deciding what one shall do. Most
people, when they are left free to fill their own time
according to their own choice, are at a loss to think of
anything sufficiently pleasant to be worth doing. And
whatever they decide on, they are troubled by the feeling
that something else would have been pleasanter... the
exercise of choice is itself tiresome.98
Yet beyond the mental cost of choice, there is the ethical point:
that there are some consensual choices humans should not allow
themselves, either because we don't like the social consequences or we
97 Jay Michaelson, Note, Rethinking Regulatory Reform: Toxics, Politics,
and Ethics, 105 Yale L.J. 1919 (1996).
98 BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE CONQUEST OF HAPPINESS 162 (1996).
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don't like what the choice does to us. These might include some of
Calabresi and Bobbitt's tragic choices, where a fundamental value is at
stake whichever way the decision goes.99 Yet they need not be tragic.
There is also the folly of allowing trivial decisions that in summation
do harm to the chooser - an essential point in many elements of the
enhancement discussion we will discuss. This category of ethically-
problematic choices also includes individually costless choices that
sum to a social harm we dislike. See Posner's example of a baby
market leading to differentially priced white and black babies. Yet the
strict economic approach does not consider the philosophical
implications of these arguments, that the economic method itself may,
in some circumstances, not be worth its own price.
The point is this, the economic method, both in its practical
application and in its normative foundation, fails to consider an entire
set of critiques that implicate its methodology. It may be the case that
the economic approach cannot, by its construction, fully assess some
of the most important societal values.
Most of the time, Posner is consistent and unflinching in his use
of the market as a normative system. He defends a baby market on the
grounds that a consensual market transaction has occurred, and as
such, two parties are better off without making anyone worse off. He
notes, consistent with his principles, that we can reject the more
transcendental, immeasurable costs that are not captured in the market
transaction. Yet at other moments, Posner seems to slip; in one
passage, he notes (without further explanation), "wealth cannot be
equated to GNP or any other actual pecuniary measure of welfare. A
society is not wealthier because of a shift of women from household
production into prostitution" (original emphasis).1"' Well, why not? If
women shift into prostitution, then under Posner's system, prostitution
must be their revealed preference, and the transition is efficient. If we
take Posner seriously, we cannot look for immorality in baby sales
once the efficient baby market has been established. An efficient sex
market is certainly, in Posner's words, 'feasible.'1 1 If the immorality of
selling a baby or a kidney wasn't enough to register on Posner's chart,
why would the immorality of selling sex be different? Perhaps I am
making too much of this prostitution quote, and Posner was merely
trying to suggest that ceteris paribus, a money-making venture was not
different in kind than a non-monetary endeavor. Yet I cannot help but
note that to make his point, Posner needed only to compare a shift of
women from household production to the legitimate workforce. His
99 Although for Calabresi and Bobbitt, the emphasis is on choices a
society must make.
100 Id. at 120.
101 Id. at 139.
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choice of prostitution as an example suggests that he finds humor,
perhaps, in this suggestion. But why? From a purely wealth
maximizing approach, the sex trade is ethically indistinct from the
regular workplace, just as baby sales were ethically indistinct from car
sales. Yet one cannot miss in his tone a certain discounting of
prostitution as compared to household production. If this is true, it
suggests that perhaps, even in Posner's own intuition, something might
be missing from market-defined morality.
The economic approach is coherent and extremely useful. As a
descriptive model, it allows us to build predictions of rational behavior
that assist us in making law, policy, and business decisions about how
to structure society. Yet as a model it is least powerful (and most
costly) when dealing with the more intangible, unquantifiable elements
of human life, which, as a consequence of their often existential
nature, tend to be important, intractable, and (in a highly quantitative
methodology) likely to be dismissed. And as a normative system, the
poverty of the economic approach is that it is blinded by its own
usefulness as a descriptive tool, and as such it ignores its own costs as a
prescriptive guide. It transplants the virtues of a market system
(efficiency, for one) to nonmarket life, and it does so in a way that
writes these values into the definitions of moral action and thus
removes them permanently from inspection. 10 2 Economics may
describe, to some extent, how we make decisions, but it does not
follow that it should be used as a guide for how we think about our
decisions. Humans may act, to a reasonable approximation, as rational
utility maximizers, but we may lose something uniquely human when
we begin to think of ourselves as such.
There is one response that I must address here. I can imagine
Posner or Epstein asking: if the cost-benefit analysis has costs and
benefits in given situations, then what do you propose we use to assess
when it is appropriate? In other words, am I caught in an infinite
logical loop, asking us to question our use of the cost-benefit analysis
based on a cost-benefit analysis?
The first answer is that we make these decisions the way
humans have always made decisions, long before the economic,
calculative approach began invading all spheres of life. That is, by
drawing on our emotional range and store of experiences to produce
qualitative, emotionally validated "gut" assessments. It is of no
consequence that this process might be, at its core, a cost-benefit
analysis, nor that it could be modeled as a cost-benefit analysis. What
102 We saw this for example, in the case of Posner's threshold criteria
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matters is that to the decision maker, key values were not moneterized
or rationalized in ways that diminish their perceived values. It is not
difficult to argue that principled or emotionally-felt decision-making
can be described in calculative language, or for that matter that rights-
based moral philosophy can be described using a utilitarian
framework. 13 What matters here is what the chooserfeels she is doing,
103 This distinction could be described as that between implicit and
explicit costing. I argued that even if they are formally similar, to the decision-maker
the two vary dramatically in psychological or moral terms. This same point can be
made for another deep split that runs through democratic theory and moral
philosophy namely the distinction between principled and calculative behavior.
The two may be functionally similar or even identical, but in terms of moral or
psychological meaning to the actor, they are distinct.
Principled behavior is roughly analogous to what is called in moral
philosophy deontological behavior (deon signifying duty), wherein the moral agent
abides by categorical principles which remain constant independent of particular
circumstances. Kantian moral imperatives, in which rational beings have a duty to
universal, unwavering moral laws, exemplify this perspective. Whereas in moral
philosophy, deontological laws are often metaphysical in origin, in the principled
behavior of, for example, the ideal democratic citizen (who follows the law out of a
principled respect for it), the laws are created by individual democracies and make no
claims to metaphysical truth.
Calculative behavior is roughly analogous to teleological or consequential
moral reasoning in philosophy. The moral actor makes decisions in this mode in
light of a chosen end. Actions are judged in accordance with the end and not the
means. Benthamite utilitarianism is a form of this mode of moral reasoning.
Importantly, in this analogy the economic utilitarianism of calculative behavior is
distinct from the Benthemite utilitarianism of moral philosophy. In Benthemite
utilitarianism, the just end is social utility: securing the greatest good for the greatest
number. In the economic notion of utilitarianism, an individual rather than societal
view is taken, since in economic theory utility cannot be compared across
individuals. In economic utilitarianism, the chosen end is each individual
maximizing his personal utility.
One can argue that principled and calculative behavior are not necessarily
distinct in kind, so long as we limit our view to logical formalism and ignore the
effects of the two decision-making processes on the decision-maker. Economically-
minded theorists have argued that at heart, the two modes of decision-making are
indistinct. If a right (or principle) is something that can never be trumped in a
calculation, then a right can be modeled as a good with infinite value (or utility, in
the case of utility maximization models). These views focus on the formalistic idea
that principled decision-making can be modeled as a subset of calculative decision-
making. Thus, a right receives infinite value in a cost-benefit analysis and can never
be trumped by other, competing goods.
Long before law and economics, Mill offered a similar integration of
principle and calculation in moral philosophy. In Utilitarianism, Mill criticized both
sides of the divide between two strains of moral reasoning, deontological and
teleological. Mill criticized deontologists for casting the rules of justice, which are
analogous to our principled behavior, as absolute and inviolable, while he criticized
teleologists for failing to see the role of justice in utilitarian calculations (Mill refers
here to philosophical utilitarianism, not economic individual utility). Mill argues that
when one calculates social utility, certain principles are so essential to this social
utility that they arise as seemingly constant trump cards. These actions which in
nearly every circumstance win the calculation of social utility over other actions
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and what that choice of methodology means for our identities and self-
perception as persons.
This does not mean that we reject the economic approach all
together. Rather, as I have said, it is incredibly useful for certain types
of goods. However, it calls into question the march to spread the
descriptive economic approach into all areas of life, a march led by
Becker and others. And it certainly calls into question the Posnerian
normative economic approach and its application to matters of non-
economic values. Sunstein gives us a guide for this propriety, using our
begin to resemble inviolable principles of justice, but they remain open to those
extraordinary, rare circumstances when their transgression improves social utility.
"[J]ustice is a name for certain moral requirements which, regarded collectively,
stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefore of more paramount
obligations, than any others, though particular cases may occur in which some other
social duty is so important as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice."
See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 62 (George Sher ed., Hackett 1979)
(1861).
In the same Millean way, the principled approach of democracy could fit
within the calculative framework of economics, such that democratic principles are
never truly inviolable but rather approximate inviolable principles. Assume that the
telos of the democratic actor would not be social utility but living in accordance with
the democratic values of his society. Thus, an actor with an ideal valuation of
democracy will, in this formulation, respect democratic principles in nearly every
situation, but leave open the possibility of rare situations in which principled
democratic action conflicts with democratic values. (Some of Lincoln's actions
during the Civil War are cited in this respect).
These two formal resolutions are similar but distinct. The economic
resolution suggests that a model of individual calculation can accommodate truly
inviolable principles. The Millean resolution suggests that individual calculation can
lead to an approximation of inviolable principles. As a descriptive matter, Mill's
solution may be the best account to date of how humans actually make moral
decisions in the real world. Normatively, which of the two is more appropriate
depends on the conceptual question of whether, in certain instances, a particular
democratic ethos is best served by violating a set principle of that democracy. It is
beyond the scope of this essay to pursue the matter further here.
However, these resolutions do not capture an essential dimension of the
problem, because the analytical integrations of principled and calculative behavior
tell us nothing about how the two modes of decision-making affect the decision-
maker. What may be indistinct analytically could be wildly distinct in terms of the
social, moral, and psychological implications for the chooser. Robert Burt recognizes
this point in his work. ROBERT BURT, DEATH Is THAT MAN TAKING NAMES (2002).
There, he points out that two actions that will functionally achieve the same result,
such as terminal sedation and euthanasia, may have very different psychological
impacts on the actor. In fact, the idea that the two modes of behavior are
fundamentally distinct in moral flavor reaches far back. Tocqueville believed that in
his era, there was a "universal collapse" from principled to calculative behavior. He
writes: "Do you not see that mores are changing and that the moral conception of
rights is being obliterated with them? Do you not notice how on all sides beliefs are
giving way to arguments, and feelings to calculations?" See ALEXIS TOCQUEVILLE,
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considered judgments about how the various aspects of our lives are
best characterized.
The second answer is that whenever possible we do not force
these harmful decisions. If a decision requires the comparison of
incommensurate goods that does violence to our norms and values,
then to the best of our ability, we should not force these choices as a
society when they are not essential. This does not mean that the choice
will not come up. Choices are an unavoidable consequence of scarcity,
including the scarcity of time, and as such they may never be fully
removed from society. Yet we need not, as a society, constantly seek to
introduce new choices, whether through technology or otherwise, that
force these damaging comparisons and valuations. In other words, in
assessing the value of new choices, we must also assess the costs of
having the ability to make those choices.
The linkage to genetics is now clear, and so I will move on to
the affirmative case. However, the critical point to take out of this
section is that the law and economics school packs into its analysis
normative assumptions which, in the current moment, we tend to
accept without inspection. Usually, this is reasonable, as the
assumptions of the economic approach map reasonably well onto our
norms and intuitions in many areas of modern life. Yet in the question
of genetic enhancement, ignoring these normative assumptions and
accepting on its face the analytic framework of law and economics will
lead us to overlook some of the most compelling, yet hard to see,
consequences of the genetic era.
VI. NOT HUMAN BOUNDARIES, BUT HuMAN ESSENCE
I will now return to the fundamental paradox raised at the
beginning of this essay: many of us who reject genetic enhancement
intuitively have a difficult time expressing what drives this intuition.
Set against the more obvious benefits of genetic enhancement, this
makes for a difficult case.
My purpose in this section is to offer one explanation for this
intuited harm. I will then argue for a public policy that will capture
many of the benefits of genetic science while minimizing its harm.
On one level, Fukuyama got it exactly right. Genetic
enhancement has the ability to undermine something fundamentally
human. However, Fukuyama erred in three central ways that damaged
his case. To summarize:
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" First, Fukuyama treated the threat to "humanness" as
an instrumental harm and not an intrinsic harm. In
other words, his theory gives us no way to understand
the harms of genetic enhancement beyond the one
narrow, instrumental concern of human boundaries. Yet
even Fukuyama's own writings express a broader set of
anxieties, as seen in his discussion of what I termed
reductionism.
" Second, Fukuyama's case was normative rather than
descriptive. Fukuyama chose to pursue moral
philosophy, and this approach brought a series of
technical requirements that proved fatal to Fukuyama's
case. For one, Fukuyama had to identify a trait that was
shared by all humans and by no non-humans. As we
saw, his later shift to species-typical traits signaled the
collapse of this approach. For another, Fukuyama had
to defend a prescriptive position as normatively desirable
rather than descriptively true. This approach took an
essential point and dropped it into the morass of
competing philosophies.
" Third, Fukuyama provided an unsatisfactory account of
what the human essence at stake is. He focused on our
complex systems of politics, art, and religion. However,
he offered little explanation of (1) why these particular
ends are privileged over others, (2) what we should think
of humans who don't pursue or successfully produce
such ends, and (3) why enhancement jeopardizes these
ends as opposed to furthering them.
I will pick up precisely where Fukuyama left off, because I
share his driving intuition that genetic enhancement undermines
something that is fundamental to being human. However, I will try to
avoid the pitfalls which trapped Fukuyama. First, my theory of harm
will not be linked to one narrow (albeit important) instrumental
concern, such as human rights. As such, it will explain a wider range
of the anxieties we feel about genetic enhancement. Second, I will not
argue for a normative account of what the essence of human life ought
to be. Rather, I hope to build a descriptive account of what humans
have perceived to be the essence of our lives and what importance such
beliefs hold for us. Accordingly, I will not (and need not) show that all
humans possess this 'human essence'. Free from the technocratic
nature of moral philosophy, I need only to show that the values at
stake are perceived as important by our culture generally - not that all
humans and no non-human possess these qualities. Finally, my
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argument will attempt to avoid controversial claims over what is
important in human life. Where Fukuyama selected certain values to
privilege over others, I will attempt to remain agnostic on as many
such issues as possible. Instead, I will try to show that in various
divergent accounts of the human essence, genetic enhancement works
to undermine important components of humanity.
While this approach escapes many of the criticisms Fukuyama
faced, it is vulnerable to a different type of critique. If my account is
descriptive rather than normative, then I must answer the question: so
what if genetic enhancement undermines the human essence? If I am
not stating that any particular account is superior a priori, then why not
let genetic enhancement change the description of what it means to be
human? Certainly, our view of humanity often changes with scientific
understanding and possibility. As Freud noted (in a possible moment
of self-congratulation), Copernicus showed us that we are not the
center of the universe, Darwin showed us that we are not so different
from apes, and Freud showed us that we are not even the masters of
our own minds. So how can a descriptive account favor one era of
human self-perception over any other?
The answer is this. While I cannot say what view of the human
essence is normatively superior, I will argue that descriptively, some
views have served us better than others. The criterion I will use is
human happiness or well-being, a common definition of what
economists describe as individual utility.1"4 For some readers, the
importance of what it presently means to be human (as described
herein) will be self-evident and require no justification. More skeptical
readers will be concerned that the "human essence," much as I noted
for intuition earlier, has a fluid and contextual nature.10 5 I will try to
104 As defined in MARTIN FELDSTEIN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS: THE READINGS/WORKBOOK 10 (1996). Importantly, I am referring to
the economist's view of individual utility here and not to the philosophy
utilitarianism, which is concerned with summing individual utilities into a measure
of social utility. That theory suggests not just an end goal (social utility), but also a
means of resolving moral dilemmas via a social utility maximization calculus. This
theory produces results that I do not wish to suggest or defend. The extent of my
argument in this section is to hold up economic utility as a value that even skeptical
readers would agree is important, so that I can use this common ground to justify the
use of human essence as a central criterion in the enhancement debate. Nothing
more is meant to be implied here.
105 Here, it is worth noting that, at first blush, I appear to run into the
same problem Posner does with his intuition threshold. The crucial distinction,
however, is that I am not arguing for a threshold test as Posner did. In fact, I never
stated that intuition should be disregarded completely in evaluating a moral theory. I
only argued that intuition was slippery enough (and often wrong enough) that a
moral theory's conflict with immediate, unconsidered intuition was not sufficient to
disqualify it out of hand. However, in evaluating the direction our sense of meaning
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address this concern in three ways. First, whenever there is a major
normative controversy over the human essence, I will look to divergent
accounts to show that genetic enhancement will be detrimental in each
of the branches. Second, I will attempt to situate my account of the
human essence in broader historical contexts, which transcend at least
our immediate particulars, if not our general Western particulars.
There are traditions of discussing what it means to be human that have
remained relatively stable over lengths of historical and social contexts,
and certain themes recur. Even these accounts may not satisfy the
most dedicated postmodernists, though I hope to provide something
more durable than, say, our flip-flopping intuitions on in vitro
fertilization (IVF). Finally, I will show that the ways in which
enhancement undermines these traditional notions of humanity will
push us into familiar areas whose consequences on human happiness
are well known. Therefore, as a descriptive matter, my account of the
human essence and genetic enhancement will attempt to be both value
neutral and yet descriptively aware of the consequences for human
happiness or well-being.
I would also like to acknowledge and address at the outset a
number of easy attacks. First, this is not a religious argument. When I
talk about "human essence," I will look to the major traditions of
political thought to ask what it is about humanity that we've sought to
protect. From this I will derive and defend a descriptive understanding
of the human essence as the values we have traditionally defended in
society across religious and cultural distinctions. Second, this is not an
anti-technology argument. Nothing in this argument diminishes the
vast benefits of technology or of genetic science itself. Nor do I argue
in Luddite fashion that the only alternative to further innovation is a
return to campfires and pitch-tents. What I shall argue for ultimately is
a specific public policy norm that charts a guided course through new
technology. This norm will express an acute awareness of technology's
benefits - as well as one cost that is hard to measure but destructive to
ignore.
A. Two VIEWS OF HUMAN LIFE
There is a central dichotomy in the way we have thought about
what it means to live a human life. In broad strokes, I will attempt to
portray this division, knowing that I cannot do justice in this space to
the diversity of theories within each category.
has gone, it is crucial to consider and reconsider our intuitions on how well a current
theory of meaning is doing in providing the goods meaning would ideally confer.
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On one side is classical philosophy. The early philosophers,
including Aristotle, were concerned with the moral improvement or
perfection of humanity. The focal point of this philosophy was the
question of virtue or 'the good life.' Each classical philosopher
proposed his own catalogue of virtues; for the purposes of this essay, it
is not the contents of the catalogue that matter, but a recognition of the
virtue-based system. We might call this the perfectionist view of human
life.
On the other side of the partition is liberal philosophy. The
liberal philosophers, including Kant, sought to remain agnostic on the
question of virtue and the good life.1"6 Instead, their concern was with
individual dignity and freedom. In liberal philosophy, each individual
deserves the freedom to pursue a personal conception of the good"o 107
life. In the strong form expressed by Kant, a liberal society can
function without any concern for the virtue of its citizens."' 8 We might
call this the liberal view of human life.
106 Liberal theorists argue that philosophers should not impose a view
of virtue or the good life upon others. As Hobbes put it, in a direct swipe at
Aristotelian virtue:
Their Moral Philosophy is but a description of their own Passions...
what is Honest, and Dishonest; what is Just and Unjust; and
generally what is Good, and Evil: whereas they make the Rules of
Good, and Bad, by their own Liking, and Disliking: By which
means, in so great a diversity of tastes, there is nothing generally
agreed on ....
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 461 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford University Press
1996) (1651).
107 This principle was articulated by, among others, John Stuart Mill,
who writes: "The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our
own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs,
or impede their efforts to obtain it." See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in
UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, CONSIDERATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 81 (Geraint Williams ed., Everyman 1993) (1859).
108 Kant postulates a society in which a "nation of devils" might
peacefully coexist. Kant places only one behavioral condition on these devils,
namely that they must "possess understanding" or, in other words, be "rational
beings." By this he means that they must possess sufficient foresight to realize that in
the long run, their personal interests, no matter how antagonistic or self-seeking, are
best served not by opposing the liberal democratic system, but by submitting to
mutually coercive laws. If this condition is met, the state can function independently
of its citizens' virtues or vices:
the constitution must be so designed that, although the citizens are
opposed to one another in their private attitudes, these opposing
views may inhibit one another in such a way that the public conduct
of citizens will be the same as if they did not have such evil attitudes
... such a task does not involve the moral improvement of man; it
only means finding out how the mechanism of nature can be
applied to men in such a manner that the antagonism of their
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Charles Taylor has noted that an exploration of human identity
requires us to grapple with these notions of how to live. He writes that
in "tracing various strands of our modem notion of what it is to be a
human agent, a person, or a self... you can't get very clear about this
without some further understanding of how our pictures of the good
have evolved."10 9 The power of this statement is clear when we
consider how deeply these seemingly abstract philosophies have been
absorbed into our popular conceptions of daily human life and modern
society. The Kantian school of individual dignity is the foundation of
liberal society and the liberal conception of freedom. We understand in
general and imprecise terms that the nature of our freedom is that we
may act so long as we do not harm others. On a societal level, liberal
laws maximize individual freedom and honor individual choice
bounded by consent or non-harm. ° The Aristotelian school of moral
perfectionism is the foundation of much modern lawmaking that seeks
to incorporate community norms or values into regulations.
Aristotelian laws seek to shape character or to legislate morality,
hostile attitudes will make them compel one another to submit to
coercive laws, thereby producing a condition of peace.
See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 112-13 (Hans Reiss ed.,
H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge University Press 1991).
However, there are a number of intermediate positions that bridge the liberal
and virtue-based views. Mill, for one, was a liberal who was ultimately concerned
with human perfection. In his view, a liberal society as opposed to an Aristotelian
catalogue of virtues was the best instrument for achieving moral perfection of the
human race. Mill predicated his system of liberty on "the permanent interests of man
as a progressive being." See Mill, On Liberty, supra note 109, at 79. In his recent work,
Berkowitz has argued that a well-functioning liberal society requires that its citizens
internalize a particular catalogue of civil virtues. See PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (Robert P. George ed., 1999).
109 CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 3 (1989).
110 There is some ambiguity in liberalism over whether the limiting
principle is harm or non-consent. Mill's language usually supports a consent-based
view. Economists are likely to support a consent view as well, since this mirrors the
economic notion of mutual exchange for mutual benefit; the economic assumption of
rationality assumes that individuals will consent to actions that increase or maintain
their utility level (this is the notion of "revealed preference"). Neoclassical
economists generally oppose paternalistic legislation, which presumes that
individuals don't know what is good for them. Neoclassical economists would say
that someone who (with full information and normal rationality) consents to be
harmed is not truly being harmed. To say otherwise is to impose one's preferences
onto another a violation of the spirit of strong liberalism and free markets.
Much of the time, the two views, consent and non-harm, would produce the
same outcome. Assault, for example, is usually a violation of both. However, the two
theories depart on whether one can consent to be harmed; in different instances, the
law favors each theory. One can legally consent to assault and be assaulted, as in the
case of boxing. Yet the law does not allow individuals to consent to murder and be
murdered. However, this tension may simply reflect the observation, stated earlier,
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whether that morality is the political right's valuation of religion or the
political left's valuation of social welfare policies.
Both Kantian liberalism and Aristotelian virtue are alive and
well, both as theories of state action and as conceptions of who we are
as humans and how we ought to spend our lives. They coexist in
(sometimes unrecognized) tension, and the same persons will often
hold both views in different areas. As Posner has noted, a pure
liberalism would require economic and social freedom; yet in our
current political spectrum, the conservative right pursues economic
freedom and social regulation, while the left pursues social freedom
and economic regulation.111 In our private lives we balance the impulse
to spread our values with the impulse to recognize the plurality of
good lives.
Unlike Taylor, I do not wish to endorse one of these views or
the other. One may reasonably believe that these views are in conflict,
as many in the academic world do. Or one may believe, with equal
legitimacy, that each view is correct in its own domain: liberalism tells
us how our laws should be, and perfectionism tells us how we ought to
conduct our private lives. Likewise, one may believe none of the
above.
Instead of arbitrating between perfectionism and liberalism, I
wish to recognize the power both hold in contemporary society, in
shaping the ways in which we conceive the essence of living a human
life. Our perception of the human essence is wrapped up with the
existential question, framed by Tolstoy as, "What shall we do, and,
how shall we arrange our lives?" '112 Perfectionism and liberalism are
the two principal answers that our society has produced. That is, either
we conceive of ourselves as pursuing the good life as centrally defined
by an external source or we conceive of ourselves as pursuing our
individual conceptions of the good life, private conceptions that have
existential value because they are our own. I recognize, descriptively,
these two strains of thought in order to make the argument that genetic
enhancement fundamentally undermines both accounts.
111 Posner, An Army ofthe Willing, supra note 88, at 27-29.
112 Tolstoy quoted in Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 152-53 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. and
eds., Oxford University Press 1946). There is also the Socratic formulation, "How
should one live?" quoted in AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS & ECONOMICS 2 (1995).
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B. THE PERFECTIONIST VIEW
Aristotle is an exemplar of the perfectionist view - the view that
the essence of human life is to improve oneself in accordance with a
set of externally defined values.
We need not concern ourselves with Aristotle's particular
substantive view of the good life."' Aristotle presented one influential
list of virtues, which includes intelligence, understanding, wisdom,
generosity, wit, mildness, and truthfulness. 4 Various religions,
philosophies, and civic movements have supported alternate ideals for
human life. What matters in this essay is not the substance of the
catalogue of virtue but the procedure of the perfectionist view, namely,
how and why living the defined good life is important to our
conception of the human essence. We will use Aristotle as a starting
point, because his work underlies much of our modem understanding
of virtue, as well as a great deal of contemporary perfectionist thought
(including, for that matter, most communitarian theory). However, in
our inquiry, Aristotle is merely paradigmatic, not dispositive; what
matters ultimately is what we as a society have come to accept as the
relationship between virtue and the essence of being human.
At first blush, genetic enhancement would seem entirely
consistent with the perfectionist view of human life. In this view, the
essence of human life is to cultivate in ourselves certain skills, values,
and ways of living. Whatever the ideal, if the good life is to achieve
that end, then enhancement would seem to be a powerful tool in this
direction. Granted, enhancement could be misused, such as if one used
enhancement to increase her aggressive tendencies, and this would
conflict with the Aristotelian view of virtue. However, this would not
be a criticism of enhancement per se, but rather with a particular bad
application of enhancement. One could imagine a range of
enhancements that greatly further the human goal of perfectionism:
increased intelligence, athleticism, and musical prowess, moderated
aggression, and supplemented artistic, philosophic, and academic
creativity. Thus, on first inspection it is difficult to see why
enhancement and the virtue-based view of human life are intrinsically
in conflict.
113 For reference, Aristotle's view of virtue is when an object performs
its natural role excellently. According to Aristotle: "every virtue causes its possessors
to be in a good state and to perform their functions well." Thus, for an eye, virtue is
seeing well. For a horse, virtue is galloping well. What is virtue for a human?
Aristotle argues that it is finding the balanced, golden mean between our natural
human extremes in both feeling and action. The virtue "bravery," for example, is the
perfected mean between confidence and fear. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHIcs 42-44, 71 (Terence Irwin ed., Indianapolis, Hackett 1985).
114 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 113, at Books 4 and 6.
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Indeed, we must look deeper to see what gives virtue and
accomplishment their conceptual power in the perfectionist view of a
"good life." To this end, we will consider three questions concerning
accomplishment in the perfectionist view. In this section, I will refer
often to virtue and accomplishment. If we needed to distinguish
between these two terms, we might say virtue consists of achieving a
valued state, while accomplishment is achieving a valued goal.
However, we need not be terribly concerned with distinguishing
between the two. What we are basically concerned with is how we
evaluate human activity.
The first question is whether we are concerned with the
accomplishment of the goal only or with the mental state that
accompanies that accomplishment. In other words, is it enough that
someone does the right thing, or must she do the right thing for the
right reasons in order for us to value the action under the perfectionist
model? In a liberal model, the answer is easy - the intent of the liberal
actor is irrelevant. As we saw, the liberal system requires only that the
actor is rational enough to see that self-interested calculation supports
liberal behavior. Yet the question is harder in the Aristotelian view.
Simple accomplishment of an ideal may not be enough when the ideal
has value as a moral achievement; thus we will look deeper to see if
something more matters.
The second question is whether the good life is concerned with
only the end of achieving the ideal or also with the means by which we
reach it. Certainly, we can imagine scenarios in which we have placed
a high value on the means used to achieve a goal. For instance, we do
not respect (as a matter of law or common moral evaluation) one who
gains wealth through fraud. However, the answer becomes blurrier
when we consider more subtle interactions between means and ends,
such as when one achieves peace between two warring parties through
fraud. On the far other end, we have seen scenarios where we allow,
for example, anti-democratic means for the preservation of democracy
in extraordinary circumstances.115 Again, the means-ends question is
easier in liberalism. With the exception of the basic conditions of
consent (no fraud, no duress, etc.) neither the ends nor the means are
matters of public concern. But in the case of perfectionism, we must
again look more closely to see what animates the human appreciation
of virtue.
The final question is whether we care about objective or
subjective perfectionism. In an objective view, we are all measured by
a single standard - the highest test score, the most touchdowns, the
115 Lincoln's actions during the Civil War are often cited as an example
of democratic ends justifying anti-democratic means in exceptional circumstances.
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prettiest voice, and so on. In a subjective view, we are measured by the
degree to which we fulfill our own potential for accomplishing a given
end. The two views are each present in our conception of human
accomplishment. We are objective at times, comparing, say, the great
opera singers or the great basketball stars against a common metric for
their respective skill. Here, our concern is absolute achievement,
without concern for the starting conditions or various disparate
obstacles faced by the individuals. Yet in other domains we are
subjective, measuring a person's success not only by her end point, but
by her starting point, initial allotment of talents, and the difficulty of
the path chosen. We would not, for example, judge our child's voice
recital against Pavarotti to declare it a failure.
I am not suggesting that these three factors provide a complete,
mathematical account of human accomplishment. My purpose is only
to demonstrate the range of possible understandings of virtue within a
perfectionist model of human life. Furthermore, these three variables
function independently of one another, and they have different
significances in different contexts (we might imagine scenarios in
which the intent of an act matters to us, but the means do not, or vice
versa). Additionally, the distinction between subjective and objective
accomplishment underlies many tremendous philosophical debates,
and I do not wish to drag us into those here.116 Rather, our focus is a
description of common understandings of human accomplishment -
an attempt to understand what we value and why we do so.
These caveats aside, I will now present two distinct views of
human accomplishment, each of which is possible under the
framework presented above. Regarding those three questions, if we
answer that we are concerned with (1) the action and not the intent, (2)
the end product and not the means, and (3) objective accomplishment,
then we have a wholly product-oriented view of accomplishment. The
product-oriented view is concerned only with the outcomes of human
action. Each act is measured on a common scale against all other
individuals, without concern for the context of the accomplishment or
the factors behind it. If we answer instead that we are concerned with
(1) the intent as well as the action, (2) the means as well as the ends,
and (3) subjective accomplishment, then we have a wholly process-
oriented view of accomplishment. This view still requires that we assess
116 For example, debates on distributive justice ask whether we ought
to reward one's objective output (the view held by pure normative neoclassical
economics) or one's subjective output (the view held by egalitarian redistributionists
like Romer, who wish to normalize reimbursements to reward what one does relative
to one's natural abilities and advantages). All of this is irrelevant here, where we
consider only descriptively what animates our views on virtue in daily life. No
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the outcome (this is true by definition, since we are talking about
accomplishment), but the standard that measures accomplishment is
itself dependent on the nature of the actor and the action.
Of course, these three variables are independent, and we could
present more than two models of accomplishment even in this
simplified framework. Yet these are reasonably polar views, what we
might call ideal types, and so we can ask which of these two
understandings is more in line with the perfectionist view of human
life. That is, which is consistent with the view that links human
accomplishment to our understanding of virtue and living a good
human life?
1. THE ARISTOTELIAN VIEW OF
ACCOMPLISHMENT AND VIRTUE
Aristotle takes a particular view on this issue. For
accomplishment to constitute virtue in his account, the act must be
deeply process-oriented - even as we strive towards an objective ideal.
Aristotle writes, "By virtue I mean virtue of character ... [having these
feelings] at the right times, about the right things, towards the right
people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and
best condition, and this is proper to virtue." '117 Aristotle's phrase "for
the right end" is a requirement for proper intent. For example, in the
section on bravery, Aristotle writes, "The brave person's motive is
crucial."11 Aristotle imagines scenarios in which an action appears
brave, yet the virtue of bravery is absent because the actor's intentions
work against the value. He notes that one who treads 'bravely' into
death to avoid another harm, such as poverty or pain, is not brave,
because "such a person stands firm [in the face of death] to avoid an
evil, not because it is fine." '119
Similarly, Aristotle's phrase 'in the right way' introduces a
requirement for proper means. It not enough that one achieves the right
end-state; she must do so in the right manner for the accomplishment
to constitute virtue. Aristotle hints at what this virtuous methodology
might be:
[W]hat is true of crafts is not true of virtues. For the
products of a craft determine by their own character
whether they have been produced well; and so it suffices
117 ARISTOTLE, supra note 113, at 44.
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that they are in the right state when they have been
produced. But for actions expressing virtue to be done
temperately or justly [and hence well] it does not suffice
that they are themselves in the right state. Rather, the
agent must also be in the right state when he does them.
First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions];
second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for
themselves; and, third, he must also do them from a firm
and unchanging state.
120
As a side note, we can see from this passage that craft is Aristotle's
word for goods that are properly valued in a product-oriented fashion.
Yet the main point is that Aristotelian virtue requires the actor's
mental state to meet three requirements: understanding, choice, and
consistency. Understanding is the weakest requirement, as the actor
needs only to be conscious of what she is doing. Choice and
consistency are more important to Aristotle.
Aristotle describes choice, or voluntary action, as a
"precondition of virtue., 121 For Aristotle, voluntary action is necessary
for moral responsibility and moral credit, or as Aristotle puts it for
"praise or blame., 122 The 'firm and unchanging state' is a requirement
that the actor decide on a virtuous action and maintain the virtuous state
that inspired the good action.
Implicit in both the choice and consistency requirements is the
notion of struggle, and struggle is indeed an important element in
Aristotelian virtue. Aristotle has defined virtue in a reasonably
intuitive way. Namely, in the range of natural human tendencies,
virtue is the midpoint between two vices: excess and deficiency. For
example, temperance is the virtuous mean between enjoying too much
pleasure and too little. Friendliness is the virtuous mean between being
ingratiating and rude. Since we are often naturally pulled in one or
both directions away from the mean, virtue is difficult to achieve.
Aristotle writes, "Hence it is hard work to be excellent, since in each
case it is hard work to find what is intermediate ... 123
The critical point is that in the Aristotelian model, struggle is
not merely a description of virtue (i.e., 'virtue is hard to achieve').
Rather, it is one element of what makes virtuous action virtuous. On
this point, Aristotle writes,
120 Id. at 39-40.
121 Id. at 53.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 51.
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[N]ot everyone, but only one who knows, finds the
midpoint in a circle. So also getting angry, or giving and
spending money, is easy and anyone can do it; but doing
it to the right person, in the right amount, at the right
time, for the right end, and in the right way is no longer
easy, nor can everyone do it. Hence, [doing these things]
well is rare, praiseworthy, and fine.124
On the third question, Aristotle suggests an objective rather
than subjective approach. In other words, Aristotle proposes that
virtue arises from pursuing an objective ideal in a deeply process-
oriented way. As we have seen, Aristotle's particular view concerns
the mean between extreme positions ("Virtue, then, is a mean, in so far
as it aims at what is intermediate").125 The objectivity of his view is
subtle, because Aristotle also notes that in a certain respect, the mean
is relative to each individual and is not measured by a common scale.
He writes that "relative to us the intermediate is what is neither
superfluous nor deficient; this is not one, and is not the same for
everyone." '126 Thus, the amount of food that is temperate for one
person is not necessarily temperate for another, based on their build
and metabolism. Yet the ultimate goal is not simply a midpoint
between the individual's two natural extremes. Aristotle does not leave
it at this wholly subjective account, perhaps because it would allow for
the outcome that a devil was as 'virtuous' as a saint, provided the devil
reached the mean of his skewed, morally monstrous scale. Instead, the
ultimate goal is an objectively defined value, and it is the individual
expression of this value that is subjective. For example, if temperance
is the objective value, then drinking three glasses of wine instead of six
is the subjective expression of this value for a particular (highly
alcohol-tolerant) person. On the question of what defines the objective
catalogue of values, Aristotle tells us, "The excellent person is the
standard." '127 I won't pursue that further, since, as I stated before, it is
not any particular catalogue that concerns us here, but the
methodology.
Thus, we have a coalescing picture of Aristotelian virtue. It isn't
doing the right thing for the wrong reasons. Nor is it acting without
knowing, acting under duress, or acting in a brief flash of goodness.
Aristotelian virtue involves cultivating a good character, with reference
to an objectively defined set of virtues. We cultivate this good
character by fighting our extreme impulses and habituating ourselves
towards a mean state that consistently generates good actions. Proper
124 Id.
125 Id. at 44.
126 Id. at 43.
127 Id. at 65.
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intent and method, including choice and consistency, are necessary
components of this virtue. Aristotelian virtue, then, is about process
and product, and living the good life is a narrative process of
cultivating objective virtue in oneself.
2. AN ALTERNATE VIEW OF
ACCOMPLISHMENT AND VIRTUE
Given that my investigation is descriptive, not prescriptive, the
question now is how well does the Aristotelian account describe our
perfectionist views? The answer, I believe, is that the Aristotelian
model of virtue is deeply engrained in our culture, yet it is not a
complete account. Certainly, Western religious traditions contain a
large amount of Aristotelian-style thinking - from the Torah to the
New Testament to the Koran, we are used to objective ideals that must
be sought through highly scrutinized intent and method, often with a
narrative view of struggle, cultivation, and mastery.
However, in our secular culture, it is my hunch that the
Aristotelian account represents one major stripe of modem thought.
For while we care about process, we can also care about cold results,
and while we care about objective scales, we are also often subjective
in our valuations. These various combinations of product and process
seem to form a dynamic tension, a sort of contrapuntal relationship.
And, I will argue, it is through this dynamic tension that we find our
understanding of accomplishment and value in human life.
Furthermore, these two models of accomplishment hold
varying power in different areas of human life. Say that a formerly
illiterate adult teaches herself to read and write on a fifth grade level,
and then writes a short story. A parent, spouse, or friend is likely to
value this accomplishment very highly - it would be a cause for
celebration and joy. However, a literary agent might not share this
enthusiasm, at least in her professional capacity. And this is a critical
point: she might value the accomplishment deeply as a human being
who observes a fellow human being's struggle and personal triumph.
Yet as a professional literary critic, she would not value the story for
publication in comparison to stories by more talented writers.
Similarly, when we hire a painter to paint our house, if it comes out
peeling and splotchy, we do not care that the painter maximized her
individual potential, nor that her work ethic was superior to some
other masterful painter. The same is true for a person convicted of a
crime. When someone of reasonable mental capacity commits a crime,
we don't interpret the 'badness' of the act subjectively, in relation to
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the individual's capacity for restraint. No thief goes free just because,
relative to what he is capable of, the action is fairly tame.l z' Granted,
we still allow process-oriented concerns in certain instances (self-
defense, diminished capacity, duress, necessity, etc.), but these are
special cases that highlight the general spirit of product-orientation
over process-orientation in criminal law. The two views may
intertwine, as in the case of a student who studied an unprecedented
amount to raise a failing grade with a near perfect final exam. Some
teachers might only consider the final numerical average, while others
might feel a pull to take effort into account. Thus, the larger point is
clear: in certain relationships in human life, we employ different
combinations of subjective versus objective and process versus product
valuation.
Can we identify a common theme in the relationships that favor
objective product over subjective process? Our examples above had at
least one factor in common. In each, we expected someone else to do
something for us. These were the cases in which we relied on another
human being to meet some mark such as painting our house,
entertaining us with a good short story, or not harming us with violent
crime. Since expectations were set between and among individuals,
objective standards came into play. We might call these areas, which
stir product-oriented evaluations, instrumental relationships.
Similarly, there is at least one theme for the relationships that
favored a subjective view of accomplishment. In each example, the
nature of the accomplishment was not for the benefit of another
person, but for the betterment of the actor towards a valued goal. For
the newly literate writer, we value the writing of the story not for its
objective merit, but for what it communicates about the individual and
her personal trajectory. We might call these areas, which stir process-
oriented evaluations, personal relationships.129
This dichotomy also helps to explain, at least in part, why
certain activities generate a tension in us between product- and
128 Yet even in this area, where the product-oriented view dominates,
there is room for process-oriented concerns. Mental capacity and mens rea
requirements impose a process-oriented limitation on the product-oriented thrust.
Additionally, the self-defense, duress, and necessity defenses also provide process-
oriented exceptions to the dominantly product-oriented flavor of criminal law.
129 I considered using the term spheres rather than relationships, but
spheres tends to erroneously suggest that these modes of evaluation belong to
separate, mutually exclusive areas of human activity. Quite to the contrary (as we
shall see), one action can involve both types of relationships, and so an act may be
valued in both the instrumental and personal, product and process senses. Spheres
suggests mutual exclusivity, and it fails to capture how these different types of
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process-oriented evaluations. For the newly literate writer, in the
personal relationship, her accomplishment is great, yet in the
instrumental relationships of literature it is minor (though we could
state that her accomplishment has great objective value in the social
sense as an example to others).
There is a second thematic dichotomy that can help us explain
these two competing modes of evaluation. In each of the product-
oriented examples, our relationship with the actor was presumptively
anonymous, or at the most, professional. We started, in one example,
with the idea of a painter hired to paint a house and then claimed that
she would be held to a product-oriented view of the results. However,
this presupposed a business-like relationship. If we add to the story
that the painter is our best friend, or our mother, then the picture
becomes more complicated. We may still have product-oriented
leanings, to be sure, but these will be pulled in the process-oriented
direction as a result of the friendship or family relationship. We may
still be upset over bad outcomes, but we will be more likely to consider
subjective factors of effort, intent, means, maximization of potential,
and the like. In the case of the anonymous painter, such factors are less
likely to have pull.
These two dichotomies (instrumental versus personal, and
anonymous versus familial) work together to explain our distinctly
human view of virtue. In the anonymous, instrumental domain, the
product-oriented view tends to dominate. These are areas in which we
want results, and within a range of reasonable circumstances, results
and not subjective factors matter most in our evaluation. In the
familial, personal domain, the process-oriented view tends to
dominate. A principal example of anonymous, instrumental life is the
market of modem capitalism, and accordingly, the product view
dominates process within wide boundaries (while fraud, duress, and
the like serve as minimal process-oriented bars in a dominantly
product-oriented arena). A principal example of personal, familial life
is the family or close community. In general, the anonymous,
instrumental mode is most used in systems, while the personal,
familial mode is most used in the social domain of emotional, personal
relationships.
Importantly, the product and process views are not just a
description of what we value in different relationships. They are also
explanations of why we value what we do, when we do. Here, a return
to Aristotle is instructive. Aristotle argued that an essential part of
what makes virtue honorable and praiseworthy is that it is difficult to
achieve. Struggle is a core component of Aristotle's view. He
distinguishes objectively measured accomplishment (what he calls
craft) from his view of virtue, because virtue cares about who did the
2003-2004
65
TOBEY: WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
WHAT'S REALLY WRONG
act, how, and why. In my account, in the personal, familial parts of
human life we also care about who, how, and why, because we care
about the person doing the act. Whichever model is more descriptively
true, they share one thing in common, an essential element of the
human view of virtue is its role in the narrative of the actor's life. We
imagine people as given, and then we see what they do with themselves
and with their lives - and we evaluate accordingly.13 ° In the domain of
personal, familial relationships, what makes human accomplishment
special is not simply its end result, or its comparison to the
accomplishments of others. Rather, what truly makes it special (in
popular perception) is that the person we care about did it, given who
they are. This explains Aristotle's concern for choice, consistency,
struggle, and habituation - his account of virtue takes the lifespan as a
whole and imagines the purpose of being human is to perfect oneself
and accomplish over time, through hard work and discipline. This
narrative view also explains my account of competing relationships; it
is in the personal, familial arena, where people care about us as people,
that the process view matters most. In other words, the process-
oriented view is not merely a description of what we value in the
personal relationships; it is a description of why we value what we do.
This move is essential to the argument. If process and product
were just descriptions of how we value certain activities, then a critic
could say that we needn't care if we lose one or the other methods of
valuation. We could just use the other. This argument does not take
the day, however, because as a descriptive matter, product and process
also explain why we value what we do. Of course we value, say, our
children for their product-oriented accomplishment, but if we could
value them only for product, something distinctly human would be
missing from the relationship. Similarly, we can value an employee for
process, yet if we could value him only for process, something
distinctly human would be missing from this relationship as well. In
other words, product is a necessary element of value in anonymous,
instrumental relationships. Process is a necessary element of value in
personal, familial relationships. In human life, product and process are
the sources of our valuations as well as the measuring stick. If we
eliminated the product or process type of virtue, we would undermine
a necessary element of the human method of understanding our lives.
130 I don't wish to cause confusion here. My account of virtue does not
map precisely onto that of Aristotle. As we have seen, I believe that we are often
more process-oriented than Aristotle on the objective-subjective question, yet we are
often less process-oriented on the means and intent questions. The point here is that
both accounts share something in common: when process-orientation matters, it does
so because we conceive of virtue as being in part a narrative and a personal event.
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The critical point is that I have described two views of human
virtue, one Aristotelian and the other my own account of dynamic
tension between process and product. I believe that we can identify
strains of both views in our society. Yet importantly, what we have not
seen is a strong, generally-accepted human view that a wholly
objective, product-oriented accomplishment captures the complete
essence of human life. Only the strong normative economic view
(articulated by Posner) equates moral worth with outcomes alone (in
his case, market outcomes). Even still, it is not clear that Posner would
argue that this, as a descriptive matter, is all that we care about in our
lives. Yet we can remain agnostic on that issue for now. I will return to
the economic view later to consider its interactions with my own view.
3. GENETICS AND THE ARISTOTELIAN VIEW
Now, how does genetic enhancement interact with our human
understanding of virtue and accomplishment? From the outset, I will
stipulate that genetic enhancement is consistent with a wholly product-
oriented view of accomplishment. Enhancement has the potential, in
the best case scenario, to increase objective outcomes by increasing the
talents and abilities of individuals. Stipulating this is proper, because I
wish to grant enhancement its strongest case.
However, while enhancement facilitates product-oriented
accomplishment, it undermines essential elements of the process-
orientation, in both the Aristotelian account and in my account of
dynamic tension between product and process. It does so in four ways:
by undermining choice, struggle, consistency, and givenness.
In the Aristotelian account, we value an objective
accomplishment when the actor does it in the right way. The right way
involves understanding the action, choosing the action, cultivating the
stable state that gives rise to the action, and overcoming the human
inclinations and limitations that make the action difficult. Taken
together, these concepts generate an understanding of accomplishment
in which the good life is, in large part, the effort of making ourselves
good.
When we use genetic enhancement to achieve virtue or
accomplishment, we undermine the Aristotelian features that give the
accomplishments their meaning to us. For example, let's take bravery
as a typical virtue. What does it mean to have bravery when bravery is
implanted? Is it still admirable? There are, of course, only a very few
people who feel nothing but bravery in dangerous situations. The vast
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majority of humans feel the Aristotelian push and pull when they face
danger, between self-preservation and heroism, between cowardice
and glory. Bravery, for Aristotle, is struggling against those extremes
to achieve bravery in the right way. The person who is born feeling
nothing but bravery in all situations is of course not a bad person, and
objectively she may be the most brave. And yet she lacks a uniquely
human component of virtue, the conscious and difficult overcoming of
vice. What genetic enhancement does is raise all enhanced individuals
to the level of the blindly brave person. Objective bravery is thus
achieved, but at the expense of the narrative, life-span view of human
bravery, which relies on understanding, choice, cultivation, and the
all-to-human potential for failure. When we genetically enhance our
children prior to their birth, we rob them of the opportunity to choose to
do the right thing - or to struggle against their undesired impulses in a
way that makes the ultimate accomplishment meaningful to us.
The same is true when we genetically enhance ourselves. With
enhancement we achieve an end not through struggle but with the ease
of one selecting an item from a menu - it is the difference between
cooking a meal and ordering in. The purchased meal might taste better
objectively, but it is not ours, and in not working for it, we lose the
sense of ownership and accomplishment. Though trivial in the case of
ordering in one's dining, the same logic becomes powerful in the case
of ordering in one's identity.
However, seeing the Aristotelian harms of self-modification is a
bit trickier than in the case of future children, because self-modification
presents the appearance of choice and struggle. With self-modification,
we choose the modification - that is, we select to have the trait in
question, and in a way, this is like Aristotelian choice, because we are
choosing to possess an admired trait. Yet something is missing here.
Though we choose to genetically enhance the good trait, what we are
actually doing is robbing ourselves of the choice to do that action in
the difficult moment. It is comparable to tying one's hands before a
conflict, rather than doing the right thing at the right time. We would
not confuse a prenuptial agreement with marital trust. Trust requires
doing the right thing in the moment, when tensions pulls us towards
greed, whereas signing the prenuptial constitutes, on the other hand,
making the decision before the tensions and problems arise.
Functionally, they achieve the same result. But only one of these do
we generally consider virtue.
Similarly, the struggle involved with genetic enhancement is a
step removed from Aristotelian struggle in a way that eliminates the
necessary conditions for Aristotelian accomplishment. We may
struggle to make the money to purchase bravery or intelligence or
athletic skill, and this may make us appreciate it as something we
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earned. In the same way we might appreciate a car that we saved for
more than one that was given to us. Yet again, something is missing,
for struggling to earn the money to purchase an accomplishment is
distinct from struggling to cultivate oneself to achieve the
accomplishment. In the human view of accomplishment, we tend to
distinguish between the person who struggles to defend her family in a
dangerous moment and the person who struggled to earn the money
that allowed her to hire a bodyguard to defend her family.
Functionally, they both achieve the same result. But only one is
captured in the Aristotelian understanding of virtue as a struggle to
cultivate the good action in oneself.
For both future children and ourselves, enhancement also
presents the illusion of consistency. What unaltered human could ever
match the consistency of mood, impulse, and action offered by genetic
enhancement (or for that matter psychotropic medications or
biotechnological alternations)? The star athlete may wrestle with
laziness or love of junk food, but the genetically enhanced will benefit
from permanent fixes to our constitution - laziness reduced, love of
junk food diminished - so that the athlete can better focus on the
athletic task. And even if these changes were subject to fluctuation,
they could be tuned up externally as needed. We might imagine, for
example, monthly or yearly trips to genetic enhancement clinics,
where re-delivery of preferred genotypes is performed.
Yet again, if we look closely at why consistency matters in the
first place to Aristotle (and to the many worldviews that echo his view
of accomplishment), we see that something is missing from genetically
enhanced consistency. Consistency - what Aristotle called 'a firm and
unchanging state' - is perhaps his most surprising requirement,
because his account is so wrapped up with struggle and choice. Yet the
tension resolves when we realize that consistency is the goal of struggle
and choice. Aristotle does not imagine the good life as a series of
sporadic flashes of virtue, eked out of viceful, distemperate individuals
just when the moment requires. Rather, the goal is consistency -
cultivating a self that wants to make the right decisions all of the time.
This relationship between, on the one hand, struggle and choice, and
on the other, consistency, is the basis of Aristotle's narrative,
habituation view of the good life - living well means struggling to
make ourselves better, i.e., more consistently good. Put differently,
struggle and choice are necessary elements of virtue's worth, and yet
struggle and choice have a trajectory - they are goods not in the
abstract, but in the pursuit of consistent virtue. For that reason,
reaching consistency through enhancement once again grabs the goal
while sidestepping the path to the goal that gave it value in our eyes.
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Aristotle's particular view of virtue involves objective ends,
whose value is derived in part from process-oriented means. As we
have seen, genetic enhancement has the power to achieve our ends
while sacrificing the means that gave them value.
4. GENETICS AND THE DYNAMIC TENSION VIEW
Now we can turn to an alternative view of human
accomplishment, the account of dynamic tension between product and
process. What distinguished this view from Aristotle's is the belief that
in different types of relationships in human life, we favor different
modes of understanding virtue and accomplishment - and that in each
type of relationship, one of these views is a necessary element of our
valuation of an action. It is the push and pull between these competing
views that gives human evaluation its distinctive essence. We would
always evaluate a machine or a tool on purely objective, product-
oriented grounds, but only in the wholly anonymous, wholly
instrumental relationships of human life do we evaluate other people
as such.
Genetic enhancement plays a similar role in this view of
accomplishment. It sacrifices the subjective, process-oriented approach
for the objective, product-oriented approach to accomplishment. As
such, it benefits human action in our anonymous, instrumental
relationships, while robbing human action of its core source of value in
our personal, familial relationships.
When we value things in the wholly personal or familial sense,
we tend to care about the actor, her intent, her means, her struggle, her
context, her potential, and how much of it she met. As I stated before,
these are ideal types, and in reality product and process intertwine. A
wife may expect an alcoholic husband to meet very objective criteria,
and past a certain threshold of patience and compassion she may
resort to objective, product-oriented evaluation (the proverbial shape
up or ship out). But at the same time, process-orientation holds sway
within a fairly wide bandwidth of familial and personal life; most
parents would appreciate the fact that their C- daughter struggled to
earn a B+ just as much (or more) than the A+ from her sister who
never lifts a finger. The point here is not that any one of these modes is
the only way we value things in a given relationship. Rather, it is that
in our more emotional, caring, and person-focused relationships, the
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What happens when genetic enhancement enters the picture?
Let's return to the example of bravery. In a blindly objective view, all
we care about is the absolute level of bravery. Yet if we allow ourselves
the tiniest hint of process-orientation (that is, considering the
individual as well as the act), genetic enhancement affects that process-
oriented portion, however large or small. For example, when bravery
is natural, we can say in the more objective view: she was born brave,
and that is an admirable trait. Or, in the more subjective case, we can
say she was born cowardly, but she faced her fears and became braver,
and that is admirable. But when bravery is implanted, what is the most
we can say? She was designed by humans to be brave, and that is
admirable. But is it admirable for her? Do we value her for it? Can she
value herself for it? For any action that has even a tincture of process-
orientation, enhancement diminishes that process component.
Now, as a logical matter, there shouldn't be a difference
between someone being born brave and someone being designed to be
brave, since both actions are outside the individual's control. And yet
as a descriptive matter, the two scenarios do not seem to have the
same resonance in our valuations. This suggests that there is
something to the idea of givenness - whether by genetic accident or
metaphysical explanation, the unknowable sequence of events that
gives rise to each individual imbues the individual, in popular
perception, with an endogenous, natural identity. In a different
context, Owen Fiss has described the power of what I have called here
givenness; he writes of "the ideal of treating people as 'individuals' -
recognizing each person's unique position in time and space, his
unique combination of talent, ability, and character, and his particular
conduct. The pervasiveness of this ideal in society cannot be
denied." '131 As a result of the power of givenness in our sense of
identity and individuality, natural skills have, in our perception, a role
as a component of identity, while comparable but implanted skills do
not.
This ties directly into our notion of valuing human action. Thus
in sports, for example, we value the naturally gifted athlete, but not the
athlete who takes steroids. Somehow, the natural genetic lottery is fair,
because it makes us who we are; at the same time, steroids are unfair,
because they alter who we are. We can practice, lift weights, run laps,
and train in all sorts of ways, because this is maximizing our natural
self. But enhancement, whether through steroids today or genetics
tomorrow, is seen differently: as shifting our set potential rather than
maximizing it. And that, in the most common views, compromises our
given identity - it changes who we are. We could run the same
analysis for intelligence or attractiveness and achieve the same result.
131 Fiss, supra note 15, at 107.
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Part of the human notion of process-oriented evaluation is the idea of
taking one's self and maximizing one's potential, the colloquial doing
the best with the hand that's dealt. We might wish that we were born
with better looks, or more physical coordination, or more intelligence.
We might curse God or genetics for not granting this to us. Yet the
moment an improvement is made from the outside - implanted in us -
there is the sense that something in the whole of the self has been
invaded.
Thus, both the enhanced and unenhanced person can
accomplish or fail relative to their starting point, which is their initial
distribution of talents and predispositions. But in the enhanced case,
the starting point lacks something special that we feel in the
unenhanced starting point: givenness, or identity, or self. A tool is not
given; it is crafted. And when a tool performs well, we say it was well-
crafted, and when it performs poorly, we say it was poorly crafted -
but we praise or blame the toolmaker, not the tool itself. When a
person is crafted, they take on some of the features of a tool. Their
accomplishments are no longer their own, because inside them is a
tool that has been implanted. At most, they can be praised for using
the tool well, and if they fail, we can blame the tool or their use of it.
But in success or failure, they are, in a sense, beholden to the tool
inside them, and their actions are never fully theirs.
The essential point, however, is that process-orientation
requires that the actions be theirs. When the athlete on steroids does
poorly, we no longer say, "Well, he did the best he could with what he
had, and so we're proud of him." And when the athlete on steroids
succeeds, our pride is tainted as well; because the success is
attributable in part to the steroids, we can no longer say, "He did it."
Even if this element of success was complemented by hard work and
intense training, the victory remains easy to measure by objective
product, yet still harder to appreciate by subjective process, because the
win feels largely attributable to the tool-like element of the person.
Thus, as the balance shifts from subjective process to objective
product, our valuations of the act shift from issues of context and
narrative to issues of win/loss. In the presence of enhancement, it feels
more natural to appraise things in the mode consistent with
anonymous, instrumental relationships, rather than personal, familial
relationships.
The steroid story is analogous to self-enhancement of the
genetic sort. If we explore the concept of enhancement of future
children, there is an additional element of shifting from person to tool,
process to product. When our child maximizes his potential yet fails a
math test, we appreciate him because of who he is, knowing he did the
best he could. Yet when our other child, genetically enhanced to excel
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in math and science, fails the math and science test, there is something
new, a sense that she did not do what she was supposed to do - what
she was designed to do. This is complementary to the effect above, in
which the actor could no longer claim traditional ownership over his
act. Now, we can feel that the individual has a telos, or purpose, that is
not her own, yet is implanted inside her. 132 Together, these two effects
give a sense of the tool-like qualities of the genetically enhanced
individual.
What we are left with, then, is that enhancement shifts our
natural mode of valuing one another in the personal, familial sphere
away from process-orientation and towards product-orientation. In the
presence of enhancement, the only mode that makes sense is one that
takes into account the tool-like, machine-like elements of being
enhanced. And this means, within our personal, familial relationships,
a greater reliance on the objective and product-oriented measures that
have come to characterize our anonymous, instrumental relations.
What effects this might have on human happiness I will leave up to the
reader to decide. But of course it is my personal intuition that we feel
most human when we are valued in the personal, familial way, and not
in the anonymous, instrumental way. We might enjoy our moments of
objective, product-oriented success, to be sure, but to have that as our
dominant means of being perceived by others, in even our most
personal and familial relations, seems to me like a loss of something
uniquely human.
5. OBJECTIONS TO THE
ARGUMENT AND RESPONSES
What are the objections to this argument? One response is
"good riddance" to our popular view of the given self. A critic might
argue in this vein that the distinction between natural and unnatural -
between steroids and given ability - is arbitrary, or even unfair to the
less able. As such, we would be (according to this view) wrong, or at
best foolish, to believe in the given self. In my continuing attempt to
remain as neutral as possible on difficult normative issues, I will again
demur on that point. My response will be instead, to note as I have,
that our process-oriented view is a crucial component of our human
132 C.S. Lewis noted this effect of genetic engineering: "In reality, of
course, if any one age really attains, by eugenics and scientific education, the power
to make its descendants what it pleases, all men who live after it are the patients of
that power. They are weaker, not stronger: for though we may have put wonderful
machines in their hands we have preordained how they are to use them." C.S.
LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 70 (1947).
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perception of personal, familial relationships, and that our process-
oriented view depends on a notion of givenness. Therefore, the notion
may or may not be arbitrary, as the critic claims, but tearing it down
means tearing down a deep notion of how we value human life in the
perfectionist view. And what we are left with - a more tool-like,
machine-like way of valuing each other in even our personal,
emotional lives - has not seemed to be sufficient for human happiness.
A second objection is that choice and struggle are not always
good things. We could imagine scenarios where 'robbing' someone of
their choice or struggle is okay, or even wonderful. For example,
eliminating someone's desire for pedophilia or eliminating extreme
struggle (say, out of horrific poverty) would be excellent. Yet within
the reasonable bandwidth of normal human activity, eliminating
choice and struggle is to eliminate the felt source of value in our
actions - even as we are better able to achieve our ends. Therefore, we
need a mechanism to balance these competing goods. This is exactly
what I hope to provide in the final section of this essay, when I discuss
the distinction between therapy and enhancement.
A third objection is that struggle and choice will always be
present, even if we enhance ourselves to a higher level of objective
potential. This will not always be true, because, as we have seen, some
goods (like bravery) express themselves simply in having them.
However, to grant this point its due, one may still have to work
towards other goods; e.g., enhanced intelligence will simply allow the
individual to struggle towards higher intellectual accomplishments
than before, but she would still have struggle and choice. Yet this is
where the concept of givenness shows its full force. The human belief
in givenness means that our starting point is not arbitrary. As such, it is
not choice and struggle per se that we value, but the choice and struggle
of individuals as an expression of their natural, given selves working to
be the best they can. I won't repeat the analysis found above, in which
I considered the effects of a loss of givenness on human evaluation
(and ultimately human happiness), but rather I will point to it as a
response to this sort of critique.
In fact, the interaction between choice, struggle, and givenness
is a response to a fourth critique: that these two views of human
accomplishment above are themselves arbitrary, incomplete, or
otherwise unsatisfactory. These two views are presented only as
descriptive accounts of how we value human activity. We examine
them as components of the perfectionist view, should the reader
choose to take this branch at the normative split between perfectionism
and liberalism (or, as I noted before, if the reader believes both are
essential parts of human life). However, these accounts of
accomplishment and virtue are not presented as mathematical
D. TOBEY
74
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol6/iss1/2
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
theories; they are merely helpful descriptions of something very
complex, and there may be other (more?) satisfactory accounts. Yet
the notions of choice, struggle, consistency, and givenness, in the way
they were used above, appear to flow through most understandings of
human life, not only as descriptions of human activity but as
explanations of its meaning. And they interact in ways that extend
beyond these particularized accounts. There is a notion of givenness
implicit in Aristotle, though he does not dwell on it. There is a notion
of choice and struggle in my account, though I focus more on product
and process. These concepts are bound up in much literature and art
exploring being human, and I would describe them as organic
concepts. That is, difficult to describe and pin down for neat analyses
such as these - and yet we try to do so, to put forth a written response
to the economic account of things. It would be interesting to see how
one might argue that the loss of choice, givenness, and struggle would
be anything other than a loss of something distinctly human.
6. SUMMARY OF THE PERFECTIONIST ACCOUNT
Under the perfectionist view of human life, we have studied
two methods of valuing human activity. We have seen that in each,
genetic enhancement furthers one aspect of accomplishment while
undermining the other; while a goal is apparently achieved, a
necessary element of its meaning is stripped away. In the Aristotelian
view, genetic enhancement undermines choice, consistency, and
struggle. In the dynamic tension view, genetic enhancement
undermines givenness and the valuation of personal, familial activity.
In both, the conclusion is that apparent goals are furthered, yet in
subtle ways, the elements that made those goals meaningful to us as
humans are diminished.
C. THE LIBERAL VIEW
The other side of the normative division is liberalism. In this
view, we make no external claims about virtue, accomplishment, or
the good life. Instead, the essence of human life is to pursue one's
personal vision of the good life, based on one's own goals, preferences,
and desires. Within a reasonable bandwidth, we do not compare or
rank these individual views against each other. Rather, we design a
system in which each person has the maximum freedom to pursue her
own life goals, consistent with that same freedom for others.
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Of course, while I am treating perfectionism and liberalism as
separate for analytical purposes, it is worth noting the overlaps. For
example, within liberalism, individuals still may seek to accomplish
their own personally-defined goals and virtues. And so all the
problems of genetic enhancement undermining human achievement
and virtue can plague the liberal actor as well. Yet the liberal view of
the human essence has its own unique features, and here I wish to
show that they too are undermined by genetic enhancement.
Once again, at first blush, genetic enhancement would seem
entirely consistent with this view of human life. If the essence of
human life is to pursue one's individual desires, then genetic
enhancement could be seen as a powerful tool in this direction. If
freedom is about pursuit of ends, pursuit of happiness, or even self-
expression and self-actualization, then why shouldn't people use
genetic enhancement to feel what they want to feel and do the things
they want to do? Wouldn't this be liberty realized, as we are finally
freed from the constraints of our natural constitutions? Genetic
enhancement does nothing if not expand our set of choices.
However, once again we must look deeper to see what gives
liberalism its conceptual power in our view of the human essence. Like
the perfectionist view, the liberal view is deeply engrained in our
society and our conception of human life. Liberalism reveals a great
deal about our beliefs of what is valuable in human life, and so we can
ask, what do we really care about here? What leads us to a liberal
system? What are we trying to protect?
1. TWO VIEWS OF LIBERALISM
The obvious answer is liberty, but that begs the question of why
we care about liberty. What is liberty intended to protect?
There are at least two answers to this question, and they give
rise to two different views of liberalism - what I will call here dignitary
and contractual liberalism.
The first answer is that we protect individuals because we
believe there is something special about each person. This is the
dignity-based view, and it is the one Fukuyama relies on in his work
regarding Factor X. Kant's moral theory is a primary example of the
dignitary view. In Kant's work, every rational being has dignity and,
as such, should not be used (solely) as a tool for someone else's
benefit. This notion of dignity is written into Kant's famous moralism:
"Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of
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every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means"
(original emphasis).133  The view runs deep in our current
understanding of liberalism, providing a conceptual, secular basis for
such familiar concepts as equality, liberty, and rights. I will call this the
dignitary view of liberalism, because what is at stake (and what is
protected by the liberal system) is equal human dignity.
The second answer is that we value our own individual ability
to live well, and so we make a deal with society, along the lines of 'I
will accept limitations on my own actions towards others, so that
others will similarly leave me alone.' Hobbes describes the motivations
that lead rational, self-interested beings into restrictive social contracts.
"The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death, Desire of
such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by
their Industry to obtain them., 13 4 Locke explains how this leads to
government, "the great and chief end therefore of men uniting into
commonwealths and putting themselves under government.. .is the
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates." '35 Of course,
this view and the dignitary view are not necessarily at odds. Locke
believed in both natural rights and the strategic value of forming a
state. Yet in the extreme form of this view, one need not believe in the
equality, dignity, or rights of all people; one need only see that it is in
her self-interest to join the commonwealth. This is what Tocqueville
called having "the sense to sacrifice some.. .private interests to save the
rest."' 36 Thus, I will call this the contractual view of liberalism, because
what is at stake (and what is protected by the liberal system) is securing
our individual ability to live our lives as we please.
In their extreme versions, these two views of liberalism serve as
ideal types. In the former, we value the pursuit of all life-plans; in the
latter, we value the pursuit of our personal life-plan. We will consider
the effects of genetic enhancement on both.
2. DIGNITARY LIBERALISM
What animates the dignitary view? To answer this, we will
consider two questions: (1) what do we mean by dignity, and (2) what
133 KANT, supra note 7, at 47.
134 HOBBES, supra note 106, at 90.
135 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 66 (C. B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Company 1980) (1690). Note that while Locke
includes a right to material property in the state of nature, other liberals do not.
Hobbes argues that the motivation for the movement from nature into civil society is
a universal desire for peace. See HOBBES, supra note 108, at 90.
136 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 103, at 527.
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exactly about human life are we trying to protect with dignitary
liberalism?
(a) DIGNITY DEFINED
Dignity is a deeply-engrained idea with two main
understandings, one religious and one secular. In religious views, the
source of dignity is the divine entity of the particular religion (e.g.,
humans have dignity because God invested them with dignity).
In secular form, the theory of dignity flows in large part from
the influential moral writings of Kant, and so we can look there for
hints on what we mean, in a secular sense, by dignity.
In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant suggests at
least three related ideas explaining dignity: pricelessness,
incommensurability, and intrinsic worth. Kant writes, "In the realm of
ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price is
such that something else can also be put in its place as its equivalent; by
contrast, that which is elevated above all price, and admits of no
equivalent, has a dignity" (original emphasis).137 Thus, Kant sees a
relationship between pricelessness and incommensurability.
Something has dignity because it has no equivalent; i.e., is not readily
interchangeable or replaceable in our eyes. Similarly, it is the kind of
good we would not price, because having a price means having an
exchange value among other goods, and this belies the incomparability
of the good. As I stated in the section on economics, we need not
believe that a good cannot be priced for it to have dignity; rather, we
can follow Sunstein and say that something is incommensurable when
we cannot price it without "doing violence to our considered
judgments about how these goods are best characterized.""13 Thus, we
resist pricing, for example, babies, because (1) this causes immediate
violence to our moral beliefs, and (2) in the long run it may actually
diminish the value we assign to babies by eroding their perceived
incommensurability. Kant notes this distinction between cannot and
should not (though many who follow his writings don't); Kant does not
speak of what cannot be priced, but rather "what is elevated above all
price."
Kant's third related concept explaining dignity is intrinsic
worth. He writes, "that which constitutes the condition under which
alone something can be an end in itself does not have merely a relative
137 KANT, supra note 7, at 52.
138 SUNSTEIN, supra note 94, at 80.
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worth, i.e., a price, but rather an inner worth, i.e., dignity." '139 Thus,
inner worth (or dignity) results, according to Kant, from something
being an end in itself. If something meets this criterion, then it is
worthy of moral protection. Here, dignity is something that is not
merely instrumental, but is also inherently valuable. Kant is not so
naive as to argue that some values are wholly intrinsic. Even humans,
he notes, must often act as means for one another. Thus, Kant writes
that humans cannot be used merely as means. Since people have
dignity, we value them not only for what they do for us, but also
because they are people.
Taken together, these factors present a picture of dignity that
maps well onto our popular understanding. Something has dignity
when it is priceless, unique (and not interchangeable), and has inner
value (and not just relative or instrumental worth). Thus, a human
being would qualify, but a precious diamond would not. A diamond is
expensive, but we can price it without doing violence to our common
morals. A diamond may be unique in the sense of its cut or
sentimental value, but we would not say that it is irreplaceable in the
way a person is. Finally, we love a diamond because of what it does for
us (echoes love, signals wealth, delivers beauty) - but ultimately an
unloved, unwealthy, unbeautiful person still merits dignity.
This is a negative definition of dignity, yet it comports with
popular understanding that we conceive dignity not by what it is, but
why what it is not - something with dignity is not priced, is not
interchangeable, is not just a tool, etc. Fukuyama set out on a quest for
a positive definition, but this is not the goal here. As a descriptive
matter, we understand dignity to be a special negative category of
valuation meriting special protective treatment. Through this analysis
of Kant, we have a better sense of what the features of that negative
category are.
(b) WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO PROTECT?
Now that we have a working sense of what dignity is we can
determine what the dignitary liberal system values. The easy answer is
dignity, but this begs the question: dignity of what? The next easy
answer is dignity of people. This is true, but what is it about people
that we are honoring when we support the liberal system? If we press a
little harder on the issue, we will see that there are actually two distinct
possibilities.
139 KANT, supra note 7, at 53.
2003-2004
79
TOBEY: WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
WHAT'S REALLY WRONG
In liberalism we respect each person's plan for their own life.
The entire structure of the system is designed to give individuals the
liberty to pursue the life of their choosing. We are each allowed to
answer the question: how do I want to spend my time?
This freedom of ends-pursuit is a distinctly liberal feature. In
the perfectionist view, we are perfectly happy to tell people sorry, your
view of the good life is not as good as my view, and accordingly, I am
going to impose a set of values (whether from the political left or right)
that you must follow. In the liberal view, such ranking and imposition
is forbidden. We internalize the notion that there is something special
- something worth protecting - about people pursuing their ends,
whatever those ends may be. So what is it about ends-pursuit that we
value?
There are two potential answers to this question.
The first answer I refer to as the preference-based view of
dignitary liberalism. In the preference-based view, we decide,
normatively, that people deserve dignity because they are people.
Then, after this determination, we note that individuals have traits,
inclinations, and personalities, which lead to preferences about what
they want to do with their time. We don't concern ourselves with the
nature or source of those preferences. We only note that most
everyone has them, and they serve as a means of increasing each
individual's happiness. Because we value humans, we protect the
individual's ability to pursue their preferences. Thus, the preference-
based view involves an instrumental respect for preferences.
The second answer I refer to as the identity-based view. In the
identity-based view we note similarly that people have preferences, but
here the nature and origin of those preferences are of interest to us -
not because we care about what the preferences are, but because in this
view of human life, having preferences is more than just an
instrumental good. It is an explanation of what is special about being
human.14 ° Here, a review of Fiss's quote on identity may be helpful;
Fiss writes about "the ideal of treating people as 'individuals' -
recognizing each person's unique position in time and space, his
140 This is not to say that having preferences is a necessary condition
for liberal protection. The preference-view is concerned with protecting people, not
preferences, and preferences receive only instrumental protection. In the identity
view, people and preferences have intrinsic value. This is not a functional difference,
since both views lead to the dignity liberal system. Yet it is a difference in what
motivates us to this end. Since the distinction is 'people not preferences' versus
'people and preferences' there is thus a core valuation of humanity present in both
views and therefore a core level of protection that would be afforded to all persons
regardless of whether they have preferences.
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unique combination of talent, ability, and character, and his particular
conduct., 141 Previously, we focused on 'talent' and 'ability', but now
we are interested in the power of the unique combination of 'character'
and 'conduct,' as well as something Fiss didn't mention, but probably
would agree to include - the person's natural wants, aims, preferences,
or desires. In this identity-based view, we respect individual preferences
because they bundle together to create the particular individual, a
unique identity in time and space who wants to be something or feels
that they are something - whatever that something is. Thus, in this
view, we respect preferences (1) because they can lead to happiness,
but also (2) because, in and of themselves, there is something we value
about people having preferences. The identity-based view perceives
both an instrumental and intrinsic component of value for preferences.
The principal difference between the two views is where the
boundary of dignity stops. This is not a functional difference, since we
know both views lead to dignitary liberalism; rather, it is a difference
in what we feel we are protecting about human life. In the preference-
based view, it is people, not their preferences, that have dignity and
thus merit respect and protection. We also protect their preferences,
but only because they lead to the dignitary human's happiness, and as
such they have instrumental, as opposed to inner, value. In the
identity-based view, it is people and their preferences that have dignity
and inner value, because the two are bound up together into a
dignitary whole. Thus, when we protect preferences in this view, it is
for both instrumental and intrinsic reasons.
This is a fine distinction, and if it seems like a bizarre one, it is
because, at this point in time, no technology has ever forced us to
choose between the two views. 142 I now hope to show that genetic
enhancement will do exactly that, at a cost to our perception of the
human essence.
141 Fiss, supra note 15, at 107.
142 As bizarre as this distinction (between a person and her preferences)
may seem, it is worth pointing out that large swaths of liberal metaphysics, from
Kant to Rawls, seek to imagine the person as distinct from her particular identity,
character, aims, talents, etc., for the purposes of understanding justice. What is left,
in theory, is the rational core, and this rationality is (in this view) objective and
universally constant it will come to the same answers as all other objectively
rational beings. See, e.g., JOHNRAWLS, ATHEORY OF JUSTICE 136-37 (1995).
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Genetic enhancement will allow us to control and alter key
elements of how we feel, what we want, and what we are inclined and
able to do. In order to deliver these desired traits, inclinations, and
personalities, we will have to distinguish them and separate them into
distinct items. We will have to produce them, label them, and - if we
treat them as we do nearly all goods in our society - price them so that
markets can distribute them efficiently.
Thus, along at least three axes, enhancement will alter the way
we perceive our traits, inclinations, and personalities. They will go
from priceless to priced, from incommensurable to commensurable,
and from intrinsic to instrumental value. The first two changes are
easier to see. The pricing mechanism will be applied because
individuals will be able to select their traits or the traits of their
children, and we will have to pay someone to manufacture and deliver
those traits. Some traits will be more difficult to produce and deliver or
will be perceived as more desirable; as such, they will cost more in a
market environment. Commensurability is a result of price specifically
but also choice generally. Having the ability to choose our traits and
identities (rather than having them be a given part of us in the way Fiss
describes) allows us to make comparisons between competing traits,
and they thus become exchangeable, tradable, and rankable in a way
given identities are generally not within the liberal framework. Finally,
the instrumentality of enhanced traits is the most difficult to see,
because we may seem to value the purchased traits, inclinations, or
personalities for themselves. Sometimes, a purchased element will
clearly be a tool towards an end and thus instrumental (we might
purchase physical strength or aggression in order to become a pro-
wrestler, for example). Yet sometimes we might purchase a trait,
inclination, or personality that we believe is valuable in and of itself.
This has the initial appearance of intrinsic value, yet it seems, by
analogy, more akin to purchasing a beautiful piece of art or the
aforementioned precious diamond than to a given element of
personality. In a sense, we value the art intrinsically and do not wish
to 'use' it for anything else. Yet its 'intrinsic' value comes from what it
does for us, and not from the fact it is a part of a dignified whole (as
given traits were). We would not say it had dignity in the sense
humans have dignity, nor would we say it is a component of our
dignity, in the way we might of formative traits.
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Accordingly, genetic enhancement triggers a shift on precisely
the three traits associated with secular dignity. 143 One consequence is
that genetic enhancement requires us to adopt the preference-based -
rather than the identity-based - view of dignitary liberalism. We still
believe that the individual has dignity, and we still support the same
system to protect that dignity. The difference is that the umbrella of
dignity has drawn inward, leaving preferences outside its scope. We
still may value them instrumentally, as acts of individual freedom to
pursue happiness, but we can no longer feel that they are direct
elements of our individual dignity. In other words, the identity-view of
dignitary liberalism would no longer be possible.
4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHIFT
TO THE PREFERENCE-BASED VIEW
We have seen that in a world with common genetic
enhancement, the only view of ourselves that would make sense is the
preference-based view. By undermining the features that gave identity
its conceptual power with respect to dignity, we automatically went
from two possible views of the human essence under dignity to one.
Is this an even trade or are there consequences to this change?
Let's start with an assumption and then test it. At least some
human preferences are more commonly valued, as a descriptive
matter, by the identity-based view than the preference-based view. For
instance, a person might feel that her desire to buy a new shirt is not
part of her identity. She might then believe that the preference-view is
fully explanatory of her actions in this instance. She has dignity, and
while her desire to buy a shirt is not in itself a part of her dignity, it is
an act of freedom which is merited by her dignitary status. Yet the
same person might feel that her choice of a spouse, or the time she
spends with her children, or her lifelong passion for the practice of law,
might in fact be more than preferences comparable to desiring a new
shirt; rather, these actions are characterized as part of her identity and
thus a component of her dignitary whole. They are an explanation of
who she is. These preferences have the qualities we associate with
dignity: pricelessness, incommensurability, and inner value. Rather
than "preferences," she might feel more comfortable using words like
143 And while this is not a religious paper (and a religious scholar could
do a much better job than I describing the theological implications of enhancement),
it is worth noting, at the very least: if the source of religious dignity is the divine
entity, then making traits manmade instead of divine-in-source would seem to work
against that view of dignity as well.
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identity, passions, hobbies, loves, goals, dreams, and aspirations for
these parts of her life.
We might be able to describe her actions and choices using the
language of preferences, labeling each action she takes (towards a shirt,
a child, a career) as such and then plotting trade-offs, quantities, etc.
Yet she would not use these terms herself, because they do not capture
the fullness or importance of those sorts of elements of her life. Thus,
the preference-based view is not so much functionally different as
emotionally different. A preference is a colder, more compartmentalized
description of the same phenomenon. Disentangling the whole of
identity into the units of preferences makes great sense for modeling
behavior and charting diminishing marginal utility and indifference
curves. Yet this preference-based view belies the full flavor of the
identity-based understanding of ourselves and our human essence.
If this rings true, then we might conclude that yes, the identity-
based view of dignitary liberalism is a better descriptor of at least some
aspects of our life - and these, as components of identity, would be the
aspects we considered most important or meaningful.
If this is so, then the transition forced by genetic enhancement
from identity to preference would not be a neutral process. It would
come with a cost to our view of the human essence. If the preference-
view fails to capture the fullness of our traits, inclinations, and
personalities, then an action which undermines the identity-view and
leaves only the preference-view must, logically, represent a thinning of
our conception of the human essence.
What happens when something that is traditionally valued in
terms of dignity is changed to something priceable, commensurable,
and instrumental? As we have seen, there may be an affront to our
immediate moral intuitions, but more importantly, there is a collapse
in the way we are able to value privileged human goods that may
reflect a diminution in our sources of value or meaning over time. We
have already seen the incommensurability theorists and their view of
pricing in other respects; these included Kant, Calabresi and Bobbitt,
Sunstein, and Simmel. We can briefly recall Simmel's words, "Money,
with all its colorlessness and indifference, becomes the common
denominator of all values; irreparably it hollows out the core of things,
their individuality, their specific value, and their incomparability." 14 4
We can even situate this transition into a larger process to
better understand the historical scope of what genetic enhancement
means for the human essence. Max Weber was perhaps the most
144 Simmel, supra note 95, at 414.
D. TOBEY
84
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol6/iss1/2
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
famous observer of a process he called rationalization or
disenchantment. In his view, the Enlightenment and modernity
brought with it a downside; our progress, in science and economics
especially, was inconsistent with the feelings of transcendental
meaning people had previously found in life. The more we knew, the
more the world lost its magic and significance. In Weber's words:
The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization
and intellectualization and, above all, by the
'disenchantment of the world.' Precisely the ultimate
and most sublime values have retreated from public life
either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into
the brotherliness of direct and personal human
relations. 145
By rationalization, Weber meant, among other things, the
intellectualization, analytic dissection, routinization,
compartmentalization, and bureaucratization of formerly mysterious,
transcendental wholes. Such a view is present in the transition from
the Native American view of land - as something whole, with which
people had a spiritual relationship - to the contemporary
understanding of something that is divided, owned, bought, and sold.
In Weber's view, our enchanted, transcendental sorts of feelings took
refuge in the few places that seemed resistant to rationalization, such
as intimate human relationships and art.
It is not accidental that our greatest art is intimate and
not monumental, nor is it accidental that today only
within the smallest and intimate circles, in personal
human situations, in pianissimo, that something is
pulsating that corresponds to the prophetic pnuema,
which in former times swept through the great
communities like a firebrand, welding them together.
146
Yet Weber noted that even these areas were slowly giving way.
The only thing that is strange is the method that is now
followed: the spheres of the irrational, the only spheres
that intellectualism has not yet touched, are now raised
into consciousness and put under its lens. For in practice
this is where the modern intellectualist form of romantic
irrationalism leads. The method of emancipation from
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intellectualism may well bring about the very opposite of
what those who take to it conceive as its goal.147
Weber imagines, as a final consequence, a world in which we have
mastered everything, and in the process stripped all areas of human
endeavor of their vital sources of meaning, of emotional and cultural
values. This final human he describes as a nullity, writing, "for of the
last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said:
'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity
imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before
achieved.""'14
The analogies to our present inquiry are fairly clear. Genetic
enhancement can be seen as, among other things, the Weberian
disenchantment of our given identities. In the same way that land was
transformed from something whole and given, with its own sanctity,
emotional significance, and even dignity, into something priceable,
divisible, wholly usable, and tradable, enhancement disenchants our
identities, carving our traits, personalities, and inclinations into
components available for purchase and sale. The question is not
whether one view is right or wrong, or whether the idea of given land
or given identities is arbitrary or not. The question for Weber was,
what effect does this process have on people's feelings about their
lives? He traced the felt loss of meaning in his era to these grand
transitions. And he noted the continuing direction of rationalization
into the last refuges of enchantment: the intimate and personal
relationships of love and friendship. Yet genetic enhancement takes
the Weberian process farther then even Weber suggested - into the
rationalization and disenchantment of our selves.
The early philosophical writings of Marx suggest another
consequence of the shift from identity to preference, particularly for
the case of genetically enhanced children.149 Marx, of course, was
concerned about the labor market. He argues that a central cause of
human unhappiness is the laborer's alienation from his work, as the
result of becoming a "cog" in a larger production process rather than a
self-sufficient, co-owner of the labor process. This results in the
147 Id. at 143.
148 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM 182 (Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge 1996).
149 To be clear, a reference to the philosophical observations of Marx
does not suggest an approval of his economic prescriptions, such as they were, nor
the brutalities that were done in later communist regimes. I wish to be very explicit
about this, since this essay seeks to balance praising market economics in its proper
domains with criticizing its particular effects in particular uses. Mine is a highly
specific argument, and I do not wish for it to get carelessly bound up with Marx's
ideas simply because he is referenced on an unrelated, philosophical point.
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"concept of alienated labor - i.e., of alienated man, of estranged labor, of
estranged life, of estranged man."'15 The source of this unhappiness is
due to the loss of autonomy: the worker "degrades himself to the role
of a mere means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers." 
151
We don't need to support Marx's economic views to appreciate
the insights of this idea. In fact, we can acknowledge the complete
awfulness of communist regimes in practice and still note that the idea
of workers feeling deeply alienated and soulless in their work is a
familiar modern image, particularly for the most powerless workers in
the most routinized jobs.
Marx's analysis raises, by analogy, a dramatic question for the
genetic enhancement of children. Marx was worried about alienation
in the labor market, a fear premised on his view of the importance of
work in human life. Yet in the case of genetic enhancement of
children, what would be at stake is the child's alienation from his own
self Knowing that he has been designed by his parents to have certain
talents, traits, personalities, moods, and inclinations, the question is,
what will his relationship be to himself? Will he be able to feel that
these traits are part of his identity, now that they have lost the
givenness, naturalness, incommensurability, and pricelessness of the
identity-based view? Or will he feel that he has become, in Marx's
words, "the plaything of alien powers" - and not in the labor market,
but in his own being? C. S. Lewis echoed this exact theme on the
subject of genetic engineering. He argued that genetically engineering
one's children was a form of slavery.
1 52
In the topic of this essay, Kant's loss of dignity, Sunstein's and
Calabresi's loss of incommensurability, Weber's disenchantment,
Marx's alienation, and C. S. Lewis's slavery are each consequences of
the transition from a dual view of dignity (identity and preference) to a
singular view of dignity as preference satisfaction. Genetic
enhancement is the cause of this transition. In the dignitary view of
liberalism, the system is designed to protect something we find
valuable about our human essence: the traits, inclinations,
personalities, desires, and aspirations that sum to constitute our given
selves. And once again, genetic enhancement seems to bring us more
of what we respect - liberty and choice - at the expense of the
fundamental human values that animated our love of liberty and
choice in the first place. What is gone is a strong notion of identity and
150 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 79 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2nd ed. 1978).
151 Karl Marx On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER
34 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2nd ed. 1978).
152 See LEWIS, supra note 132.
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The contractual liberal does not enter the liberal state out of a
sense of universal human dignity. Rather, she enters to protect herself
by joining a covenant for mutual protection.
Nevertheless, most contractual liberals will still be harmed in
the ways I have described above, because the ideas of dignity and
accomplishment commonly function within the contractual liberal's
life. For instance, the contractual liberal may not recognize dignity in
all human beings, but she will often find dignity in elements of her own
life - in herself, her family, her community, etc. In fact, it might be
respect for this dignity, and a desire to protect it, that compels her into
the liberal contract. Thus, the elimination of dignity as a source of
meaning and value will harm this contractual liberal, even though she
does not believe in global human dignity.
Similarly, many contractual liberals will find value and
meaning in their accomplishments and virtues. Again, a diminution of
these values will affect the contractual liberal. Even if she follows the
liberal model and rejects a universal notion of excellence or virtue, the
contractual liberal may want to accomplish things in her own life,
measured against her own standards. Thus, the harms we have seen
for the classical perfectionist and dignitary liberal will apply to the
contractual liberal who believes in personal dignity or accomplishment.
However, we must also consider the contractual liberal who
does not believe in dignity or humanistic accomplishment as sources of
value or meaning. I will refer to this actor as the minimal contractual
liberal. The first thing to note is that the minimal contractual liberal is
already living in the harmed state I have described in this essay,
stripped of the fundamental sources of value that have informed
human life. However, I will consider here whether the minimal
contractual liberal still has something left to lose in the face of genetic
enhancement. Doing so requires a consideration of what motivates the
minimal contractual liberal in the first place.
Hobbes gives us a hint of what drives the minimal contractual
liberal to enter the liberal state. He writes, "The passions that encline
men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are
necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to
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obtain them." '153 Thus, we see two motivations; the first is fear of death
and pain. This is the most basic form of raw liberalism, where the
individual enters the liberal state simply to avoid the anarchic, brutal
state of nature. The second motivation is the drive to experience a
commodious life. In other words, Hobbes' two motivations for the
minimal contractual liberal are (1) preserving one's life, and (2) filling
one's life with the desired experiences.
The pursuit of commodious experience plays a central role in
most human life, but it takes on heightened importance to the minimal
contractual liberal, who lives in the absence of the other sources of
meaning we have considered. Once again, at first blush, enhancement
would seem to further the goal of experience. Enhancement could
increase our ability to perceive external experiences, boosting our
senses of taste, feel, sight, etc. Additionally, enhancement could
introduce us to desired states when they do not occur spontaneously
from external stimuli (inducing, for example, our perceptions of love,
happiness, and passion, for a lifetime or for a particular target).
However, once again the apparent benefits of enhancement are
called into question by a closer inspection of the desired good - in this
case, experience. The notion of a human life motivated by the drive for
desired experiences is actually quite broad; it can map onto at least two
very different philosophies. For instance, experience is the core of
existentialism, a philosophy that holds, loosely, that our personal
experiences are the only things we can draw significance from in an
otherwise random and meaningless universe. Experience is also the
core of hedonism, a philosophy that places the experience of pleasure
as the highest goal of life.
From the examples of hedonism and existentialism, we can
distinguish two different types of experience. The first, consistent with
hedonism, is experience as sensory perception. When we eat a pie in
pursuit of pleasure, it is the sensory perception of the taste, sight, and
smell of the pie that yields the experiential value. We might ask if this
view of experience sufficient for the existentialist. If it is, then the two
views collapse into hedonism. Yet it seems that there is something
additional that many existentialists find in experience, beyond the
sensory perception of the event. The existentialist does not believe in
higher meaning of a religious or secular nature. She often feels alone in
the universe and believes the universe to be random, purposeless, and
ethically irrational. Yet there is often a romance to the existentialist
that distinguishes her from the total nihilist; she derives what meaning
she can from a view of life as a narrative experience. As such, for her
the sole source of human meaning is the sum of the experiences she
153 See HOBBES supra note 106, at 86.
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collects over a lifetime, her relationships, travels, observations,
interactions, etc.
This view adds a new element to experience. It is not just
perceiving the experience as a sensory event that matters; rather, there is
value derived from the fact that the existentialist has done the thing
that yields the experience. This is the core of Nozick's insight that "we
want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing
them." '154 For an experience to transcend pure hedonism and yield this
additional, existential value, it must connect the experiencer to her
world, letting her find something she perceives as real and authentic to
hold onto. Thus, the existentialist can find some meaning in the
universe from a natural and spontaneous rush of love for another
person, or from an unplanned moment of joy. Yet when these
experiences are reduced to their chemical nature and highlighted as
artificial, induced or purchased sensations, the experience loses its
realness - thus, the existential dimension is gone, and the experience
collapses into a purely sensory one.
Unlike Nozick, I will not take a position on which sort of
experience is superior or morally worthy. For the purposes of this
essay, it is enough to note that many, or most, of the minimal
contractual liberals may find some meaning in the existentialist view of
the world. Enhancement, when used to enhance or create experiences,
is inconsistent with this view of experience. Thus, the minimal
contractual liberal who engages in genetic enhancement is left with
only one form of experience available, that of sensory perception.
Enhancement has reduced what little source of meaning the minimal
contractual liberal had available to begin with.
D. SUMMARY OF THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE
One way to summarize what we have done here is to note that
virtue is the study of our human ends, while liberalism is the study of
our human means. As we have seen, this is generally true but not
complete. Virtue requires a certain set of means to give its ends value,
and liberalism requires a certain set of ends to preserve the value of its
means. These two views inform the basic shape, content, and
boundaries of human life in contemporary society; they are the
fundamental reflections of what we value in human life, and they exist
in tension, with different combinations influencing each of us
differently.
154 Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 43 (1974).
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Yet the crucial conclusion is this: genetic enhancement
undermines both liberalism and perfectionism in specific but subtle
ways - and it does so under the appearance of furthering each system's
values. Perfectionism is concerned with human accomplishment, and
on first blush, genetic enhancement seems to increase the possibility of
human accomplishment. Liberalism is concerned with human freedom
and self-definition, and on first blush, genetic enhancement seems to
increase both. Yet we have seen that there is - functioning under the
radar of these surface benefits - a systemic dismantling of what gives
liberalism and virtue their conceptual power in human life.
Enhancement hollows out human accomplishment and virtue,
increasing the accomplishment but stripping it of what animates our
valuation of the accomplishment in the first place. And enhancement
hollows out the human dignity through which we find worth in our
lives as we pursue our personal views of the good life. Thus, virtue is
reduced to instrumentalism or machine-ism, while self-actualization is
reduced to hedonism.
This, I believe, takes us a long way towards solving the puzzle
posed at the outset of the essay, and it is the explanation of our
difficulty in seeing the solution: genetic enhancement tempts us by
appearing to benefit the things it destroys.
E. THE POSTMODERN RESPONSE
Fukuyama opened himself to a central vulnerability when he
premised his case on one particular, and particularly controversial,
normative view of humanity.
I have tried to avoid this same vulnerability by taking us
through various descriptive conceptions of the human essence,
showing that in each, genetic enhancement conflicts with the values of
that account (and its sources of meaning and satisfaction for our lives).
This may satisfy a wide range of people who were skeptical of
Fukuyama's particular stance but who are willing to agree that one or
more of these views captures reasonably well the bulk of what we
value about being human. They may find their own sense of being
human in one or more of these accounts, and they might also find the
effects of genetic enhancement on those conceptions sufficiently
destructive to seek a policy remedy against enhancement.
However, there is one class of critics who may not be satisfied
even by this approach, because to them, any view of the human
essence is false and deserves to be discarded. Thus, in this
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postmodernist view, if genetic enhancement destroys all views of the
human essence, the response might be, good riddance. In the words of
Jane Flax, "Postmodernists wish to destroy all essentialist conceptions
of human being or nature.... In fact, Man is a social, historical, or
linguistic artifact, not a noumenal or transcendental Being .... Man is
forever caught in the web of fictive meaning, in chains of signification,
in which the subject is merely another position in language.
155
If one truly accepts these postmodernism ideas, then, if they are
consistent in their beliefs, they will not find fault with genetic
enhancement. Quite the contrary, genetic enhancement could be seen
as the ultimate realization of postmodern ends (or anti-ends, as the
case may be) - individuals are now freed not only from the
'domination' of tradition, history, reason, and language, but also from
that of biology and nature.
There are a number of responses to the postmodern critique of
my approach. The first is to note that as a descriptive matter,
postmodernism is followed in full by a very few people. This says
nothing about its substantive merits, but it serves as a reminder that we
are concerned with what is descriptively, not prescriptively, true of the
human sense of meaning. Even in academia, postmodernism's
influence is waning, largely due to the fact that its fundamental tenets
quickly limit what one can say about anything. As Benhabib puts it,
"Once we have detranscendentalized, contextualized, historicized,
genderized the subject of knowledge, the context inquiry, and even the
methods of justification, what remains of a philosophy?" 156 Yet even if
we grant postmodernism its strongest case - that philosophy is in fact
dead - this would not contest the fact that the diversity of perceptions
of human life explored in this paper continue on, yielding the same
benefits as before. Just because we could (in arguendo) undermine
these sources of meaning using postmodern analysis or genetic
enhancement doesn't mean we should. If the case here concerning the
harms of losing our sources of meaning is satisfactory, then it is also
sufficient to reject the general dispersion of the postmodern
conclusion.
In the initial statement of my affirmative case, I noted that I
would have two types of readers: those who found in my argument a
view of the human essence they found normatively valuable and those
who were skeptical of essential accounts. My solution, then, for this
second set was to provide as best as possible a predictive account of the
effects of each view on human happiness, once genetic enhancement
155 Jane Flax quoted in Seyla Benhabib, Feminism and Postmodernism: An
Uneasy Alliance, in FEMINIST CONTENTIONS 18 (1995).
156 Id. at 25.
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has had its way. I proposed this approach as the solution to the
problem of bridging irreconcilable normative stances, as human
happiness might provide a reasonably agreeable uniting point for
skeptics.
Following this idea, we can note briefly, as Lauren Slater has
noted, that postmodernism, and particularly postmodernism in the
context of genetic enhancement, has deleterious effects on human
happiness. Slater describes a radical plastic surgeon who wishes to
grant his patient's their wildest wishes: wings, reptilian scales, and
other modifications. Slater follows this doctor to conferences where
physicians and bioethicists register their disgust, and yet no one can
provide Slater with a compelling account of what is wrong with the
doctor's proposed, consensual modifications."l 7 Slater finally settles on
her own solution, what she calls the Protean self. Slater writes:
Proteus, a minor mythological figure, could shape-shift
at will, being alternately a tiger, a lizard, a fire, a flood.
Robert Lifton, one of, I think, the truly deep thinkers of
the last century, has explored in his volumes how
Proteus has become a symbol for human beings in our
time. Lacking traditions, supportive institutions, a set of
historically rooted symbols, we have lost any sense of
coherence and connection."' 8
The cause of this rootlessness is the lack of a human essence: "Our
protean abilities clearly have their upsides. We are flexible and
creative. But the downside is, there is no psychic stability, no
substantive self, nothing really meaty and authentic. We sense this
about ourselves."l5 9 Slater believes that what the plastic surgeon wishes
to do physically is simply what the postmodern culture has already
done to us environmentally. In other words, the postmodern condition
is simply the end state of all the harms I have described in this essay as
a result of the destruction of essence. In this sense, the economic actor
and the postmodern actor arrive at the same point, filled with
possibilities and yet stripped of meaning. These observations may not
be enough to convince the postmodernists, but they may be enough to
convince the rest of us that postmodernism's liberation is not a
desirable alternative to our essentialist views.
157 See Slater, supra note 1, at 57.
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F. SUMMARY: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
TAKES Us FROM THICK TO THIN HUMANITY
All of these different categories (perfectionism and liberalism,
Aristotelianism and dynamic tension, dignitary liberalism and
contractual liberalism, preference-satisfaction and identity-formation)
are ways we have traditionally understood what it means to be human
and live a human life. These are ideal types, and in our own views we
tend to mix and match them as we form an answer to the question of
what shall we do with our lives. These are thick conceptions of human
life.
The harm of genetic enhancement is that it transforms our thick
conception of human life into something thinner, diluting our historic
sources of meaning and value in human life. These sources go beyond
superstructural elements of faith or culture - they are the underlying
structures of life in, at the least, Western societies.
In the perfectionist view, we conceive virtue in human life
thickly, as a mix of product and process, action and intent, ends and
means, subjective and objective accomplishments. We value raw
output, and we value the struggle and choice that give narrative shape
to our final products. It is this dynamic tension between product and
process that animates our uniquely human view of virtue and
accomplishment. Genetic enhancement pushes us from this thick
conception to a thin one, in which objective product is enhanced at the
expense of process. Genetic enhancement shifts us towards a mode of
valuing human action that is most associated with the instrumental,
impersonal, mechanical, and bureaucratized elements of human life.
In so doing, we are better able to achieve our objective goals, and yet
the subtle factors that made those goals valuable in our personal lives
have vanished.
In the liberal view, we base liberty on a thick conception of
human dignity or personal experience. In the former, we imagine that
every human merits equal liberty as a result of equal human dignity. In
the latter, we imagine that our personal conception of the good life is
valuable because it is ours, because it represents our given, internal,
natural desires and our beliefs about who we are and what we want to
be. In either view, we see the value of the self as its wholeness and its
desire to be expressed as what it is. Phrases like 'self-actualization' are
used. Genetic enhancement pushes us from this view of the human
essence to a thinner view of ourselves: as bundled preferences that are
identifiable, separable units, to be appraised, priced, purchased, traded
in and upgraded. Genetic enhancement shifts us towards a mode of
valuing our internal selves that is most associated with the appraisal of
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commodities in the marketplace. In so doing, we have more freedom
to define ourselves, and yet the givenness, internality, and wholeness
that sanctified this pursuit have vanished.
This, I think, explains the paradox set out at the beginning of
this essay. Genetic enhancement has an extraordinary and peculiar
combination. It brings us closer to our goals than we have ever come,
and yet it does so while subtly undermining the reasons those goals
matter to us. We have internalized the liberal and perfectionist views
for so long that we have stopped considering what exactly it is about
liberalism and perfectionism that we value. We focus on the ends and
not what those ends represent. And so many of us sense that
something profound is at stake with genetic enhancement, but we
cannot say what. I hope that this essay puts a finger on it. The last
sections have been a reexamination of how we structure our modem
lives, and why we did so in the first place. I hope this analysis sheds
some light on just how deeply genetic enhancement will cut.
G. LAW AND ECONOMICS REVISITED
Now we can see more fully why the law and economics school
might not be able to identify and appreciate these consequences.
Referring to the thick and thin accounts of human life, the economic
model of human behavior best describes only the thin conception.
Neoclassical economics, the school that animates much law and
economics, is concerned with what I have called the thin versions of
virtue and liberty - that is, the objective instrumentalism of
accomplishment and the mathematized model of liberty as choice and
preference satisfaction. The market system, in its currently dispersed
and impersonal form, rewards the product-orientated view of virtue.
The microeconomic account of liberty says nothing about the self
beyond a mathematical theory of preference sets, utility functions,
maximization calculi, rationality, and deviations from rationality. This
is not to say that these values are not appropriate to the market, nor
that these assumptions aren't useful in an economic model. Socialism
is certainly more subjective and process-oriented than market
capitalism, but that does not mean it is a better (or even good) means
of production and distribution. The point here is not that neoclassical
economics is "bad," but rather that its language is impoverished when
extended beyond the sphere of economics into virtue, liberty, and the
like. Using the economic methodology to assess the political and social
choices of genetic enhancement means missing the most important
aspects - it is using a ruler to describe a painting.
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The source of the problem is that economics began as a model
of human behavior, and no one expects a model to capture the full
depth of what it describes. A model is an approximation of a complex
system, and its worth is measured by its predictive value. But
somewhere along the line, the tool was turned into the project;
economic behavior was no longer proposed as a simplified description
of human behavior but as a normative ideal. Some, like Posner, are
explicit in this. Others have done it implicitly, by simply allowing
efficiency and other economic values to guide their normative analyses
of social policy, while systematically under-analyzing values that are
harder to quantify and describe.
Yet as we have seen, economic behavior as an ideal shares the
same weaknesses of economic behavior as a model. It does not capture
the full range of what is going on - and in this case, it is unable to
recognize and protect the values at stake.
This analysis of genetic enhancement calls to the forefront all
the critiques of economic analysis we have discussed. There are issues
of incommensurability, the cost of costing, the cost of choosing, and
the poverty of economic norms in capturing what gives depth and
importance to our perception of human life.
Law and economics will be a poor guide on genetic
enhancement. The descriptive school will have a difficult time
describing its harms. And whether explicit or implicit, the normative
school cannot guide us, because its framework has already prejudged
the answer - while lacking the apparatus to weigh fully the costs.
H. FUKUYAMA REVISITED
As a final note, I would like to return to Fukuyama's account.
Recall that Fukuyama described one problem with genetic
enhancement that did not fit into his analytic framework - the
argument I labeled 'reductionism'. There were two elements to this
claim: Fukuyama argued that without our full range of human
emotions, including suffering, we would have (1) no elements of
character, and (2) no depth. While this idea only claimed a brief
paragraph in Fukuyama's book, I believe that in those sentences
Fukuyama hit on exactly what is at stake: something will be lost in the
depth and breadth of human life.
Yet, as I argued earlier, Fukuyama's theory of human
boundaries and human rights did not give us a language or framework
for analyzing these harms. Nor did it give us a reason to adopt the
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distinction between therapy and enhancement as a policy solution.
One very terrible consequence of genetic enhancement could be the
undermining of human rights, yet even if we never reach that point,
there is still serious harm done. The theory in this essay, I hope, gives
an account of that harm while still allowing the possibility that such
Fukuyaman harms may occur.
In the pages above, I have tried to reconstruct Fukuyama's case
for the harm of reductionism, what I have referred to as the loss of the
human essence. Now, in the section that follows, I will make the
argument that legislating the distinction between therapy and
enhancement is the best policy solution to the harms I have described.
VII. POLICY: ENHANCEMENT VERSUS HEALING
How can the law respond to this harm? Now that I have
reconstructed the case against genetic enhancement, I must explain
why I end up, as Fukuyama did, supporting the legal distinction
between therapy and enhancement. Importantly, I support this
distinction for instrumental and not intrinsic reasons. My concern is
that we capture as many of the benefits of genetics as possible while
protecting our sense of the human essence.
A. FIRST PRINCIPLES:
THE BASIS FOR REGULATING ENHANCEMENT
The case for banning enhancement of one's future children is
easier than the case for banning self-enhancement.160 This is because
160 It is worth noting that in the case of banning enhancement of future
children, one's opinion on this issue should function independently of one's opinion
on abortion. It is tempting to conflate the two, since they both involve unborn
potential persons. Yet there is a critical distinction between regulating abortion and
regulating enhancement, and it would be misguided to line up on this issue based on
political concerns about the other. The essential difference is that abortion can be
conceived as a harm to either (1) a fetus or (2) a potential future person who will not
be born. In contrast, enhancement is a harm that is actually realized by a person not
in the fetal stage, nor in the abstract person-who-would-have-been stage. Rather, the
harm is realized once the child is in fact born and is old enough to conceive the
consequences. Thus, in order to accept the harm of enhancing future children, one
need not have any opinion on the status of the fetus. Nor does one need to wrestle
with the philosophical question of what it means to harm a potential future person
who will never be born. Those are problems in abortion. But in enhancement, the
problems actually vest - the child is born and the harm manifests itself. Therefore, we
can agree on the nature of this enhancement harm regardless of whether we disagree
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enhancing one's future child, with all of the harms I have described, is
a harm done to another, while self-enhancement is (so the theory goes)
a harm to oneself.
In other words, if genetic enhancement destroys the human
essence, then why shouldn't we allow consenting adults to destroy
their own essences, if they believe the benefits outweigh the costs?
One popular response (though not mine) is that there really is
rarely such thing as a purely self-regarding action. This view animates
a great deal of communitarian legislation on both sides of the political
spectrum. As John Gray puts it:
The idea that one person may harm himself or herself
without affecting others, that there is a sphere of self-
regarding conduct which deserves absolute immunity
from legal and social intervention, neglects the
interdependency of human beings... We are not, in
truth, Mill's sovereign selves, parading our individuality
before an indifferent world: we are born in families,
encumbered without our consent by obligations we
cannot by voluntary choice renounce.161
For many, this type of thinking provides a basis for regulation, and the
case for banning enhancement need not go further. However, in the
spirit of remaining agnostic on as many normative disputes as possible
- in order to provide the firmest case against genetic enhancement - I
wish only to note this view, but not to rely on it.
There is another answer, I believe, that falls squarely within the
liberal view of individual freedom, and even neoclassicists may
acknowledge its appeal. The answer is that genetic enhancement is an
ideal example of the Prisoner's Dilemma - and as such, it is a scenario
where individuals will not be able to reach their optimal, preferred
choice in the absence of regulation. This is where my analysis of
Posner's third criterion for normative theories (from way back at the
start of the essay) is relevant. Posner hinted that we should reject
ethical theories whose required actions would fail in a competitive
environment. One of my responses was that Posner was ignoring an
asymmetry. Perhaps instead of rejecting the ethical theory, we should
consider rejecting the less ethical theories that out-compete it. My
example came from game theory economics - the Prisoner's Dilemma
describes a situation in which all participants would be better off with
on the harms of abortion. An opinion on one has no necessary relationship to an
opinion on the other.
161 JOHN GRAY, BEYOND THE NEW RIGHT: MARKETS, GOVERNMENT,
AND THE COMMON ENVIRONMENT 51-52 (1993).
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outcome C, but because they cannot be sure everyone else will do the
same, they choose the less desired path. This is the tragic irony of the
Prisoner's Dilemma; every individual wants the same thing, but left to
our own devices, everybody loses.
When we consider the competitive advantages that genetic
enhancement offers us, it is reasonable to assume that if it is used by
some, it will one day be used by many, if not most. No one could
afford, in a competitively structured market society, to choose
otherwise. Yet crucially, this does not mean that everyone would want
genetic enhancement. This, as we saw, was the lesson of the Prisoner's
Dilemma. There may be an optimal outcome that everyone agrees on,
such as no genetic enhancement, but without a third party guarantee
that no one else will enhance, non-enhancement is a dominated
strategy. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a situation in which regulation
benefits, rather than constrains, individual choice by making the
desired choice possible. If we accept the theory of harm laid out in this
essay, then third party regulation is necessary. And since competition
also occurs internationally, this need would transcend national
regulation and require international agreements as well.
B. NEED FOR A PRACTICAL STANDARD
My goal is a standard that allows as many of the benefits of
genetic science as possible while protecting against the destruction of
the human essence.
The problem is that "protection of human essence" is not a
practical standard for public policy. In fact, it is problematic for three
reasons.
First, as important as it is, when placed in the banal context of
public policy, phases like "human essence" and "meaning" are not
likely to be taken seriously.
Second, the boundaries of what undermines the human essence
are unclear. When we consider the big picture, as we did in this essay,
the cumulative effects of genetic enhancement cause profound harms;
but in the case-by-case nature of legislation, 'destruction of human
essence' does not provide enough resolution for line-drawing.
Third, the big picture of dehumanization will resonate with
many people and would thus, in theory, be expressed in democratic
decision-making. However, in reality, the enhancements offered by
genetics will likely be incremental, with the more complex and higher
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order possibilities coming way down the line. Thus, eased into society
a little at a time, genetic enhancement may shift norms incrementally,
and in this model, the essence principle would not be protected by
democratic decision-making, because each allowed enhancement
might serve to push back the barrier of when we think essence is
affected. In the end, we might find ourselves in a place we never would
have wanted to go had we seen the end game from the starting point,
and yet the shift in norms might leave us less well off without the
ability to understand why (nor, possibly, the ability to go back).
Therefore, I need a standard that acts as a reasonable proxy for
what I am actually concerned about, yet has a more practical policy
bent. For that I turn to therapy and enhancement.
C. ENHANCEMENT VERSUS THERAPY
The distinction between therapy and enhancement is widely
used in bioethics, and thus benefits from familiarity. The two terms are
meant to be mutually exclusive: therapy is used to signify the
correction of a problem (such as cancer treatment), while enhancement
is something elective (such as cosmetic surgery).162
The distinction is controversial, however, because it quickly
runs into trouble at the margins. In fact, I believe Fukuyama
understates the difficulty of drawing this distinction when he writes
that "even in the cases where the borderline between sickness and
health, therapy and enhancement, is murkier, regulatory agencies are
routinely able to make these distinctions in practice."163
Fukuyama's approach is essentially one of normalcy versus
abnormalcy. He uses height as the easiest example. Assume, for
example, that the mean height for men is 5'10". We then imagine a
standard bell curve graph that represents the normal distribution of
men's heights around the average. At some point, the tails of this bell
curve represent what is beyond normal height. A man who is 4' would
162 The phrasing is misleading, because the word "enhancement" has a
positive connotation; i.e., to make something better. Yet consider the issue of sexual
orientation. A person might argue that modifying sexual orientation is decidedly not
therapy. However, the word opposite therapy is enhancement, which places a positive
connotation on an action they might view as wholly negative. Thus, the
therapy/enhancement phraseology is semantically distasteful for them: the word
mistakenly connotes a negative value judgment on homosexuality, which was, of
course, what they were trying to avoid in the first place. To avoid this confusion, I
would suggest using the phrases "therapeutic" and "non-therapeutic."
163 FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 209-10.
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be considered beyond the range of normal height, and using medical
procedures such as limb-lengthening would be therapeutic. However, a
man who is 5'4" is within what most people would consider the
normal range. If he decided to undergo limb-lengthening, we would
label it enhancement and not therapy.
Each of Fukuyama's examples functions on the same principle
in that they assume a bell curve represents the distribution of features
around a social mean, and then they ask how far away from the mean
we will draw the boundaries of what is normal. Beyond this boundary,
modification is therapy. Within this boundary, modification is what
we would call enhancement.
However, this model captures only one of the difficult issues
raised by trying to distinguish therapy from enhancement, in what is
essentially a two-by-two grid: normal versus abnormal and disease
versus non-disease.
1. NORMAL VERSUS ABNORMAL
As above, normal implies that the trait falls within a certain
range of the mean. Therefore, we could say normal height is between
the 5'h and 9 5'h percentiles.
Determination of where to draw the line (e.g., 10' percentile is
normal, while 9 th is suddenly abnormal) is by nature arbitrary. This is a
fundamental consequence of using binary terms like normal/abnormal
when what is actually occurring are graduated judgments. We could
imagine using a fuzzy logic system to better approximate our gradient
assessments of normalcy:
Abnormal -- Intermediate -- Wholly --> Intermediate --> Abnormal
Normalcy Normal Normalcy
Yet a fair question would be, why bother? At the end of the day, the
physician or policy maker will have to make a binary assessment:
therapy or enhancement, modify or do not modify. Thus, an arbitrary
determination will be required at some point, even if it requires
treating a continuous curve as something binary and discontinuous.
16 4
164 The fuzzy logician might respond that the benefit of a continuous
curve rather than a binary division in this case is that we could allow physicians to
raise each individual from their natural state to the average and no more (rather than
allowing treatment for some but not others). I believe this approach would be sorely
inadequate for both theoretical and practical reasons. The theoretical reason is that
2003-2004
101
TOBEY: WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
WHAT'S REALLY WRONG
There is a second approach to measuring normalcy, what we
might call a subjective approach to distinguish it from the objective,
percentile approach used above. We can propose this view by analogy
to economist Amartya Sen's subjective definition of poverty. Sen was
reacting to objective definitions of poverty that suffered from two
flaws. First, arbitrariness (as we discussed above), and second,
mismatch: a set poverty line may capture the inability to purchase
basic goods, but it does not necessarily capture what really bothers us
about poverty. Therefore, Sen, quoting Adam Smith, described the
following definition: poverty is the inability to participate in one's
community without shame.
We can imagine a similar definition to define normalcy for
therapy versus enhancement determinations. An abnormal trait is one
that would cause a reasonable person difficulty or shame in
participating in daily life, beyond the normal insecurities we all might
feel. Thus, a person with a large but fairly typical nose would be
normal (and their nose job would be cosmetic enhancement), while a
person with a bulbous growth on the nose that draws stares in daily
interactions would be abnormal (and removal would be therapy).
A definition of this sort is not without its own set of problems.
The subjective nature makes measurements difficult, allows room for
experts to disagree, and is far more open to corruption given the lack
of objective standards. What, for example, constitutes shame? We can
imagine a child with large but not unusual ears feeling shame, but we
such a policy of using genetics to take all people to the mean would encounter all of
the harms I have attributed to genetic enhancement in the preceding sections,
without the firewalls created by the therapy/enhancement categories. Without going
through the entire analysis again, it shall suffice to say that the elements of concern
(givenness, incommensurability, individuality, struggle, choice, and the rest) would
equally be compromised by the concept that every individual has the right to be
modified or reconstructed to fit the mean at their whim. Again people would be able
to alter themselves at will for conditions which, while they are not at the mean, also
do not qualify as extreme cases within the conceptual domain of therapy. As I will
show later in this section, the benefit of the therapy/enhancement distinction is that
the concept of therapy, whether or not its borders are arbitrary, blesses the use of
genetic modification in a way that reduces the harms of the modification to the
human essence. I will discuss this point in more detail soon, but here it is sufficient to
say that for these reasons, the gradient approach fails my initial test of allowing the
benefits of genetics while minimizing the harms. The practical reason this approach
fails is that it would almost certainly generate an untenable barrier to full-on
enhancement. Allowing the physician to perform the modification on all people, in
an amount relative to their distance from the mean, is quite distinct in practice from
saying only people beyond this threshold disease/abnormalcy point can go to the
doctor and seek to be modified. With patients of all stripes in the office, receiving
these sorts of treatments to varying degrees, it seems likely that the demand for
enhancement will quickly erode the weak barriers of "You're here, but I can only
take you X far."
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would still most likely consider plastic surgery in this case cosmetic.
Shame must mean something much more extreme here to track the
distinction between therapy and enhancement: it must mean
something akin to the inability to walk down the street without
strangers staring.
However, for all the shortcomings of a subjective approach,
there are benefits as well. Rather than being bound by rigid rules, a
subjective approach would allow physicians to make determinations
on a case by case basis. That is, when a child with feature X comes
into the doctor's office, rather than worrying whether the radius is 0.5
or 0.6, the doctor can determine whether the individual needs the
modification to participate normally in her community.
The bell curve is not the only description of traits and
normalcy. There is also the question of binary, either-or conditions.
However, the same methodology and the same choice between
societal determinations (in this case, yes/no rather than line-drawing)
and subjective standards giving physicians discretion would apply.
2. DISEASE VERSUS NON-DISEASE
A second set of bioethicists argue that the normal/abnormal
distinction is insufficient for unraveling therapy from enhancement.
They often point out that susceptibility to certain diseases is, by the
objective measures above, perfectly normal, yet we would classify
treatment of those diseases as therapeutic. Furthermore, we could
imagine treatments that raise our internal ability to avoid disease
above what is normal, an activity that is therapeutic in nature though it
summons the feel of enhancement. For example, one proposed genetic
modification is encoding a resistance to certain diseases, sort of a
genetically transmitted vaccine. In another example, the NIH has
approved gene transfer technology to increase LDL receptor activity
above normal levels for persons with hypercholesterolemia.
165
Following the normal/abnormal analysis, this would qualify as
enhancement, because it boosts this body function above normal
human levels. However, its aim is the prevention or amelioration of
disease and therefore suggests a therapeutic character. Those who
favor these treatments argue that yes, boosting LDL receptor activity
gives the patient super-normal activity, but it does so in order to
prevent or reduce disease. Thus, it is treatment of disease, and not
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normality/abnormality, that defines the split between therapy and
enhancement.
D. FUNCTIONALIZING ENHANCEMENT VERSUS THERAPY
Suppose we assume that both theories are correct: neither
normality nor disease-status is sufficient to completely explain the
distinction between therapy and enhancement. Rather, the two
dichotomies represent two axes of analysis for the same question.





(Intervention: genetic cancer treatment
vaccines = Therapy) Therapy)
Non-Disease 3. 4.
Eye Color Genetic Deformity
that Garners Stares on
Street
(Intervention: (Intervention: genetic
changing eye color modification for next
genetically = generation = Therapy)
Enhancement)
The above framework suggests that disease and abnormalcy are
both sufficient conditions for therapy, but neither is necessary in the
presence of the other.
Box (1) raises the issue of genetic therapy to create inherent
vaccinations. Some bioethicists have questioned whether such
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techniques constitute enhancement, since natural vulnerability to
common diseases is normal in the population. But in the above
framework the aim of preventing disease brings this box into the realm
of therapy.
Box (2) is the easiest case of clear therapy. Abnormal disease
traits would include cancers, cystic fibrosis, Huntington's, and other
conditions that are universally considered diseases and abnormal
states.
Box (3) suggests that enhancement interventions are those that
seek to change a normal, non-disease trait.
Box (4) allows a person to modify traits via therapy that are
abnormal but may not be labeled as diseases using the objective or
subjective method described above.
Thus, law and medical ethics would prevent Box (3):
modifications for normal, non-disease traits. This is the domain of
enhancement.
E. THE CATEGORIES SHAPE THE PERCEPTIONS
However, I do not know if we can ever distinguish purely in
principle between therapy and non-therapy. Some theorists, Foucault
in particular, have mounted forceful campaigns to argue that our
categories of normalcy and disease are deeply problematic.
Therefore, I will suggest that even if the distinction between
therapy and enhancement is entirely arbitrary, we need it as a crucial
social construction. As Mary Douglas has written, it is often not the
substance or rationality of our categories that matters - it is our
apparent human need to create and maintain categories.166
In this case, I believe that the categories of therapy and
enhancement can function in a way that blesses the use of genetic
manipulation for a wide range of interventions, while minimizing the
damage done to the human essence.
Therapy versus enhancement is not a perfect proxy for
protecting the human essence. We can imagine enhancement
interventions that, taken alone, have very little effect on our sense of
166 See MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO 171 (2002).
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the human essence.167 For example, neither flu shots (therapy) nor
cosmetic braces (enhancement) challenge human meaning in any
significant way. We might call braces de minimus enhancement. We
can also imagine therapeutic interventions that could have an effect on
meaning: the removal of anti-social psychotic desires, for example,
calls into question the modification of a core, if negative, trait of one's
identity.
Yet that example is telling, because something in the
therapeutic nature of the intervention dissolves or at least reduces the
perceived cost to the human essence. The example of a person seeking
modifications to reduce anti-social criminal behavior does not resonate
the same way as a person getting treatments to be more charming. In
the latter, we might perceive the new personality as somehow fake or
contrived. But in the previous case, we might perceive the new
personality as a return to normal - the long-awaited departure of nasty
disease. Any medical intervention may have qualities of
rationalization, pricing, and instrumentalism, but by creating and
maintaining the categories of therapy and non-therapy, we have
cleared out a space in our moral intuitions for emotionally permissible
interventions - the value of healing dissolves the potential attendant
cost to meaning. Thus, these categories, whether arbitrary in their
substance or not, provide us with a safe space in which to capture
many of the benefits of genetics while disallowing a whole range of
affronts to our human essence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This essay raises three flags.
The first is that science moves incrementally, and acceptance of
one small change facilitates acceptance of the next. As such, we may
one day find ourselves in a place that is deleterious, wondering how
we got there. The utility of an essay like this is to look far down the
line - farther than skeptics might think necessary - to ask, is this
someplace we wish to end up?
The second flag is that genetic enhancement pushes us from a
thick to a thin understanding of what it means to be human. It does so
in ways that span the big normative divisions and undermine the key
sources of value and satisfaction in our lives, including identity,
167 Though I wouldn't want to neglect the possibility that a sufficient
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dignity, virtue, accomplishment, and experience. The irony, however,
is that genetic enhancement does this while appearing to further the
same goals it ultimately undermines. This helps to explain the puzzle
of genetic enhancement set out at the beginning of the essay - why it is
so difficult to articulate a theory of harm. We have valued these
elements of human life for so long that we rarely consider the
motivating reasons we value them in the first place. Thus, the apparent
benefits of enhancement to these goals are so overt, while the
consequences for them are indirect and subtle, though fatal. This essay
attempts to recall those first principles, in order to build the case
against genetic enhancement.
The third flag is that the consequences of genetic enhancement
will not be detected by economic analysis, in either its descriptive or
normative form. This is important to know, because the law and
economics school represents a prominent and influential school of
legal theory - one which has already been vocal in other areas of
genetics. The point of this essay is not to disparage market economics
or the power of the economic model as a descriptive tool in many
areas. Rather, the point is that, on the questions of genetic
enhancement, economic analysis will not guide us well. As a
descriptive system, its greatest weakness is understanding and
analyzing exactly the features of humanity that genetic enhancement
will harm. And as a normative system, its framework contains
threshold assumptions that will prejudge the crucial issues of
enhancement without ever holding them under the spotlight for proper
inspection. Thus, we will lose something, without ever knowing what
was at stake. As a model - or as a model turned into an ideal -
economics describes us in exactly the form to which genetic
enhancement will reduce us.
This essay proposes a policy solution that will preserve a vast
swath of the benefits of genetics, while at the same time preserving the
core human values at stake. The distinction between therapy and
enhancement, codified as a principle in law and medical ethics, will
capture the healing potential of genetic science, while protecting our
deepest senses of what it means to be human.
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USING WYSH COMPUTER PROGRAMS TO MODEL
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
ERIc ALLEN ENGLE
This paper argues that an artificial intelligence algorithm can model
some of the principles of civil procedure. The binary conditionals used in civil
procedure - e.g., personal jurisdiction exists/does not exist - correspond closely
to the Boolean logic used by computers. Modeling procedural rules on a
computer is thus possible and possibly useful. To illustrate this thesis, this
paper applies the WYSH computer programming language to the Alien Tort
Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act.
I. WYSH: A DEDICATED COMPUTER PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN LAW1
Since WYSH is an internet based application it is globally
available. WYSH enables a lawyer anywhere to model any law quickly
and accurately using a computer. WYSH is an inference engine. Many
inference engines exist on the market today. However, WYSH and
PANNDA (one of WYSH's predecessors) are the only inference
engines of which I am aware that specifically address the question of legal
reasoning.
The WYSH engine is simple, globally accessible, and useful,
though it does have some limitations. Any lawyer could easily learn to
program in WYSH. Rulebases created in WYSH can be called from
other rulebases anywhere in the world via the World Wide Web.
WYSH also has an automatic English language parser, formats output
and input dialogs automatically, and its output closely resembles
standard English. Finally, WYSH is cost-free to users, thanks to the
Australian National Research Council.
The WYSH engine automatically develops inferences from the
rule base or case base which is supplied to it using forward chaining
1 For a brief introduction to WYSH, see
http: //www.austili.edu.au/ austlii/wysh (last visited Mar. 7, 2004).
2 For a list of open source Al interpreters, see htn://wwv-
2.cs.cmu.edu/ati/cs/project/ai-rcTositoy//ai/areas/expert/systems/O.htmI (last
visited Mar. 7, 2004).
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and backward chaining. Because WYSH automatically chains the
inferences for the programmer, it simplifies greatly the task of
programming. Furthermore, the syntax of WYSH resembles BASIC
and Pascal, whose syntax closely resembles standard English. Because
of these facts, WYSH is highly accessible even to inexperienced
programmers. A simple learning curve, tangible results, and global
accessibility are why WYSH is worth investigating.
WYSH is a Perl program run through a common gateway
interface (CGI). Therefore, a rule base can be made and hosted
anywhere on the internet and call the WYSH CGI to process it.
Further, different rule bases can call each other. Thus, in theory,
several different jurists could develop different but interrelated
rulebases in WYSH to represent whole areas of law. CGI's do
however run less rapidly than a locally hosted program. Compiling
also may be a cause of slow execution. Slow execution leads to
frustration when testing and debugging rule bases because the CGI
must compile the program for each and every execution of the rule
base. Since WYSH is simply a web front end for the YSH inference
engine it may be possible to obtain the YSH backend and use that for
testing and debugging. I have not yet however found a source for the
YSH program. YSH is currently being upgraded to a new program
AIDE,3 so some of the critiques and suggestions raised here may be
being taken care of.
WYSH supports most simple control structures (IF... THEN...
ELSE... ELSE IF; FOR.. .NEXT). End of line (return) rather than a
semi-colon (;) indicates the conclusion of a statement. Function calls
also are supported in WYSH. WYSH is not object oriented so FOR
EACH is not supported. WYSH also does not have a Graphical User
Interface. (GUI). I do not see either of these as serious limitations for
the modelling of small rulebases.
WYSH uses a quasi English syntax which seems similar to
BASIC. WYSH also automatically generates dialogues. WYSH
rulebases should be "isomorphic", i.e. the text of a WYSH knowledge
base should be as close as possible to the original legal text it models.
In theory this isomorphism reduces the likelihood of typographical
error or logical confusion and simplifies programmatic representation
of law. Personally I find isomorphism neither a blessing nor a curse.
However for new programmers isomorphism and automatic dialogue
generation are strong points for WYSH because it can be an
3 Caroline White, Artificial Intelligence to Give Lawyers a Run for Their
Money, dotJournalism, May 3, 2001, at
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introductory language for lawyers (i.e. non-programmers). This
simplicity speaks for using WYSH as an introduction to computer
intelligence in law.
II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS IN WYSH
I have written one case base and several small rulebases using
WYSH to simulate a court facing a claim under the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA) and/or the Torture Victim's Prevention Act (TVPA). I
then ported the rulebases both as separate entities and as one entire
overview to metaCard's Transcript scripting language, which was
derived from Pascal / HyperTalk and also uses quasi-English for its
instruction.
A. RULE BASED INFERENCE ENGINE (DEDUCTION)
The WYSH artificial intelligence engine allows the programmer
to build either a rule base or a case base. A rule base is simply a series
of rules that represent some area of knowledge - e.g., statutes. Rule
based inferencing works via deduction - reasoning from general rules
to specific cases. Deductive reasoning is the principle form of
inference in the civil law. However, it is only a secondary form of
reasoning in common law. Deduction does apply even within the
common law to inferences from statutes. Thus, the rule based
inference engine is better adapted to represent statutes. Case based
reasoning in contrast reasons inductively from a series of known cases
to the instant cases. Case based reasoning is appropriate for
representing case-law.
The following rule bases simulate the findings that a court
would meet under the Alien Tort Claims Act or Torture Victim's
Protection Act. Note that each of these modules can be separately run
under WYSH simply by copying the text, exactly as it appears, and
pasting it into the WYSH manual start page. The beauty of the
WYSH engine is that it automatically chains each of the rules in one
rule base so that each of these modules is automatically interrelated
without having to be explicitly called by the user. A rule set is
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The following rules represent the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA),4 the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)5 and various
defenses developed in about a dozen cases. Each RULE indicator can
run separately on the WYSH manual start page.6 The entire rule base
can be run as one whole.
RULE 'ATCA' PROVIDES
IF the defendant is an alien
THEN
IF the tort is a violation of the law of nations
OR the tort is a violation of a treaty of
the United States
THEN




the defendant is an individual
AND the plaintiff has exhausted their remedies
in the foreign nation
AND the U.S. ten year statute of limitations has
not tolled
AND the plaintiff was subjected to torture or
extrajudicial killing
AND the defendant had actual authority
OR the defendant had
apparent authority
OR the defendant acted under
color of law
THEN
the defendant is liable in tort for the
the plaintiff
ELSE
the defendant is liable in tort for the
the plaintiff
RULE 'tort defenses' PROVIDES
IF federal jurisdiction does not apply
OR government immunity applies









28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
See http:i/aideaustili.,edu.au/wysh/wyshstart.htmin (last visited
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OR the claim is time barred
OR forum non-conveniens applies
OR political question doctrine applies
THEN
defendant is not liable in tort
ELSE
defendant may be liable in tort
RULE 'federal jurisdiction' PROVIDES
IF subject matter jurisdiction applies




federal jurisdiction does not apply
RULE 'in personam jurisdiction' PROVIDES
IF specific jurisdiction applies
OR general jurisdiction applies
THEN
in personam jurisdiction applies
ELSE
in personam jurisdiction does not apply
RULE 'general jurisdiction' PROVIDES
IF defendant has systematic and continuous




general jurisdiction does not apply
RULE 'specific jurisdiction' PROVIDES
IF original jurisdiction applies
OR federal question applies
THEN
subject matter jurisdiction applies
RULE 'original jurisdiction' PROVIDES
IF general jurisdiction applies
OR personal jurisdiction applies
THEN
IF defendant is an alien
THEN
IF law of nations applies
E.A. ENGLE
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OR the tort is a violation of a




original jurisdiction does not apply
RULE 'in personam' PROVIDES
IF defendant has systematic and continuous




defendant has minimum contacts to the U.S.
THEN
IF the tort occurred in the U.S.
OR the tort has effects in the U.S.
THEN
personal jurisdiction applies
IF general jurisdiction applies
THEN
personal jurisdiction applies
IF personal jurisdiction applies
THEN
'in personam' jurisdiction applies
RULE 'law of nations' PROVIDES
IF the underlying tort arises out of piracy
OR the underlying tort arises out of genocide
OR the underlying tort arises out of an illegal
war of aggression
OR the underlying tort arises out of a crime
against humanity
OR the underlying tort arises out of a
conspiracy to commit war of aggression
OR the underlying tort arises out of a
conspiracy to commit a crime against
humanity
OR the underlying tort arises out of a
conspiracy to commit genocide
THEN
the tort is a violation of the law of nations
ELSE
the tort is not a violation of the law of nations
2003-2004
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IF the defendant is not a government
THEN
government immunity does not apply
IF the defendant is a government
THEN
IF there is an express waiver of governmental
immunity
OR the act is purely commercial (acto
iure gestionis)
THEN
government immunity does not apply
ELSE
government immunity applies
RULE 'head of state immunity' PROVIDES
IF the defendant is a head of state
OR the defendant is a governmental minister
THEN
the defendant is not liable
ELSE
IF the defendant is still serving in their
ministerial capacity
THEN
head of state immunity applies
ELSE
head of state immunity does not apply
RULE 'official immunity' PROVIDES
IF the defendant is a civil servant
AND the defendant is in the term of his office
AND the act is a ministerial act
AND there is no waiver of immunity
THEN
official immunity does not apply
ELSE
official immunity applies
RULE 'statute of limitations' PROVIDES
IF the tort happens within the last ten years
OR equity tolls the statute of limitations
THEN
the statute of limitations applies
ELSE
the statute of limitations does not apply
E.A. ENGLE
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RULE 'forum non conveniens' PROVIDES
IF this forum is oppressive to the defendant
OR this forum is an uneconomical choice
when compared to competing fora
THEN
forum non conveniens applies
ELSE
the claim is barred by the statute of limitations
RULE 'act of state doctrine' PROVIDES
IF the relief sought requires a U.S. court to declare
invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign
performed in its own territory
THEN
act of state doctrine applies
ELSE
act of state doctrine does not apply
RULE 'political question' PROVIDES
IF the issue has been committed to the executive or
legislature
OR there are no judicially manageable
standards
OR it is impossible to decide the case without
also making a policy determination
OR the case requires unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made
OR the court risks causing potential
embarrassment by creating multiple
conflicting pronouncements from
different branches of government
THEN
political question doctrine applies
ELSE
political question doctrine does not apply
RULE 'comity' PROVIDES
IF principles of fairness indicate that a foreign court
would be more appropriate
OR judicial economy indicates that a foreign




comity does not apply
2003-2004
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RULE 'color of law' PROVIDES
IF the non state actor fulfils a public function
OR the nexus of state and non-state actor
connections are close
OR the private sector was compelled by the
state to act as it did
OR the action was undertaken jointly
THEN
The non state actor is considered to be a state
actor for it operated under color of public law
ELSE
the non state actor is not considered to be a state
actor for it did not operate under color of public
law.
As we can see, this rule base is relatively complex. Logically,
the first inquiry should be whether jurisdiction exists. We must then
inquire whether a prima facie violation of the ATCA or TVPA exists. If
so, we then consider the half dozen procedural defenses which
defendants can raise to thwart such claims. If jurisdiction exists, and a
primafacie tort exists under either the ATCA or TVPA, we then look at
the defenses. If none of the defenses applies then a tort may exist.
B. CASE BASED INFERENCE ENGINE (INDUCTION)
A case base is a representation of a series of cases. Case bases
permit the computer to reason inductively, from the case rules
provided to determine the outcome in the case being determined.
Basically a case base should summarize a series of relevant cases. The
engine then reasons from the known cases to determine what the
outcome would be in the case provided by the user. Inductive
reasoning, inferring from known cases to determine the outcome in a
new similar case, is the principal form of reasoning in the common
law. This is a form of analogical reasoning: aspects of known cases are
compared to those of a new case. If those aspects are similar then the
same rule used in the old cases will apply to the new cases.
The WYSH engine includes case based reasoning. The singular
brilliance of this engine is that it allows a weighted comparison of
factually similar cases to be used to determine whether a rule does or
does not apply to a given case.
The following is the listing of the case base used to determine
whether a case constitutes a violation of either the Alien Tort Claims
E.A. ENGLE
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Act or Torture Victim Protection Act. The code is fairly self
explanatory. Each EXAMPLE is a new case in the case base. The
names of the EXAMPLEs correspond to the name of cases litigating
the ATCA or TVPA in U.S. courts. The conditionals (IF.. .THEN) are
so the same as in standard English.
GOAL RULE defendant may be liable PROVIDES
DETERMINE defendant may be liable
EXAMPLE An v. Chun7 PROVIDES
defendant may not be liable
IF defendant was present in the United States
AND defendant was not a U.S. resident
AND defendant was not kidnapped
AND defendant state asserted its right to
immunity
AND defendant was a minister
AND defendant was representing a state friendly
to the United States
AND defendant did not transact business in the
United States
AND defendant did not maintain an office in
the United States
AND defendant did not act as a commercial
agent (acto jure gestionis)
AND defendant did not act as a sovereign (acto
jure imperii)
EXAMPLE Kadic v. Karadzic8 PROVIDES
defendant may be liable
IF defendant was present in the United States
AND defendant was not a resident in the United States
AND defendant was not kidnapped
AND defendant state asserted its right to immunity
AND defendant was a minister
AND defendant was not representing a state friendly to
the United States
AND defendant did not transact business in the United
States
AND defendant did not maintain an office in the
United States
7 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 1303 (9th Cir. 1998).
8 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996).
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AND defendant did not act as a commercial agent (acto
jure gestionis)
AND defendant did act as a sovereign (acto jure
imperii)
EXAMPLE Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 9 PROVIDES
defendant may be liable
IF defendant was present in the United States
AND defendant was a resident in the United States
AND defendant was not kidnapped
AND defendant state did not assert its right to
immunity
AND defendant was a minister
AND defendant was representing a state friendly to the
United States
AND defendant did transact business in the United
States
AND defendant did maintain an office in the United
States
AND
defendant did not act as a commercial agent (acto
jure gestionis)
AND
defendant did act as a sovereign (acto jure
imperii)
EXAMPLE Amerada Hess1" PROVIDES
defendant may not be liable
IF defendant was not present in the United States
AND defendant was not a resident in the United States
AND defendant was not kidnapped
AND defendant state asserted its right to immunity
AND defendant was a minister
AND defendant was representing a state friendly to the
United States
AND defendant did not transact business in the United
States
AND defendant did not maintain an office in the
United States
AND defendant did not act as a commercial agent (acto
jure gestionis)
AND defendant did act as a sovereign (acto jure
imperii)
9 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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EXAMPLE Sampson v. Germany11 PROVIDES
defendant may not be liable
IF defendant was present in the United States
AND defendant was not a resident in the United States
AND defendant was not kidnapped
AND defendant state asserted its right to immunity
AND defendant was not a minister
AND defendant was representing a state friendly to the
United States
AND defendant did transact business in the United
States
AND defendant did maintain an office in the United
States
AND defendant did not act as a commercial agent (acto
jure gestionis)
AND defendant did act as a sovereign (acto jure
imperii)
EXAMPLE U.S. v. Noriega12 PROVIDES
defendant may be liable
IF defendant was present in the United States
AND defendant was not a resident in the United States
AND defendant was kidnapped
AND defendant state did not asserted its right to
immunity
AND defendant was a minister
AND defendant was not representing a state friendly to
the United States
AND defendant did transact business in the United
States
AND defendant did not maintain an office in the
United States
AND defendant did act as a commercial agent (acto
jure gestionis)
AND defendant did not act as a sovereign (acto jure
imperii)
EXAMPLE Doe v. Unocal Corp.13 PROVIDES
defendant may be liable
IF defendant was present in the United States
AND defendant was a resident in the United States
AND defendant was not kidnapped
11 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001).
12 117 F.3d 1206 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
13 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).
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AND defendant state asserted its right to immunity
AND defendant was not a minister
AND defendant was representing a state friendly to the
United States
AND defendant did transact business in the United
States
AND defendant did maintain an office in the United
States
AND defendant did act as a commercial agent (acto
jure gestionis)
AND defendant did not act as a sovereign (acto jure
imperii)
EXAMPLE Doe v. Unocal Corp.14 PROVIDES
defendant may not be liable
IF defendant was not present in the United States
AND defendant was not a resident in the United States
AND defendant was not kidnapped
AND defendant state asserted its right to immunity
AND defendant was not a minister
AND defendant was not representing a state friendly to
the United States
AND defendant did transact business in the United
States
AND defendant did not maintain an office in the
United States
AND defendant did act as a commercial agent (acto
jure gestionis)
AND defendant did act as a sovereign (acto jure
imperii)
EXAMPLE Saudi Arabia v. Nelson15 PROVIDES
defendant may not be liable
IF defendant was present in the United States
AND defendant was not a resident in the United States
AND defendant was not kidnapped
AND defendant state asserted its right to immunity
AND defendant was a minister
AND defendant was representing a state friendly to the
United States
AND defendant did transact business in the United
States
AND defendant did maintain an office in the United
States
14 248 F.3d 915.
15 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
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AND defendant did not act as a commercial agent (acto
jure gestionis)
AND defendant did act as a sovereign (acto jure
imperii)
EXAMPLE Amerada Hess16 PROVIDES
defendant may not be liable
IF defendant was present in the United States
AND defendant was not a resident in the United States
AND defendant was not kidnapped
AND defendant state asserted its right to immunity
AND defendant was not a minister
AND defendant was representing a state friendly to the
United States
AND defendant did not transact business in the United
States
AND defendant did not maintain an office in the
United States
AND defendant did not act as a commercial agent (acto
jure gestionis)
AND defendant did act as a sovereign (acto jure
imperii)
Again, as can be seen, the PANNDA engine forces us to
consider each element of the case as having a value even where the
facts were such that in the actual case no such value existed or was
relevant. Similarly the UNOCAL case had to be split into two parts
since it held that UNOCAL could be liable but SLORC could not.
Further one could easily disagree with the characterizations I assigned
to Doe v. Unocal (SLORC): was SLORC only engaging in a sovereign
act? Or was it only a commercial actor? Or was it both a commercial
and sovereign actor? Is Myanmar a regime friendly to the United
States? Is it a regime unfriendly to the United States? Should that
status even be considered? That factor - whether a foreign state is
legally "friendly" to the United States - seems to be an example of
creeping legal realism. A realist would note that in the cases where a
close U.S. ally is involved liability is not found, but in cases where the
locus delicti happens to be a state either not friendly to or even
unfriendly toward the United States that liability is more likely to be
found. In other words, simply because we can make a model of the
law does not mean our model is necessarily right. That problem is
compounded where debugging is hindered by the CGI's slow response
16 Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428.
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time. Slow CGI response time does force the programmer to be
disciplined however and so is not entirely a bad thing.
Ill. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF WYSH PROGRAMS: THE USE OF
Al AS A TOOL TO REDUCE LEGAL COMPLEXITY
Lawyers would principally find WYSH and similar artificial
intelligence useful for diagnostic work and more particularly as a way
to avoid missing easy but obscure arguments. A well written WYSH
program will force the lawyer to ask questions which s/he might
otherwise overlook and thus raise potential defenses or lines of attack
which they might not remember to raise at trial. For example, the civil
procedure WYSH program will force the lawyer to remember each
step in the determination of federal jurisdiction. These kinds of
checklists already exist on paper of course but they may be more
interesting if the lawyer is forced to go through them systematically
and prompted to consciously formulate explicit answers to what might
seem quite inconsequential factual questions. WYSH can also generate
documents automatically (such as wills or contracts) based on user
input.17
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Computer applications in law have expanded from simple word
processing to electronic research and trial aids (primarily animation).
There have been relatively few applications of artificial intelligence to
law. This is partly because Al is still a developing technology. Expert
systems generally answer limited tasks reasonably well, but Al general
systems have not yielded much success. Al, unlike other areas of
programming, has not yet yielded profits. Al algorithms do
increasingly figure in commercial programs. Al can be useful not only
as a tool to teach legal reasoning to law students, but also as a source
for automated document generation (principally contracts and wills)
and "checklists" for legal practitioners.
17 See, e.g.,
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